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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on the behavior of political elites and their effect on
economic development. The first two chapters focus on political dynasties in the Philippines
while the third chapter analyzes the long-run economic effects of the concentration of political
power in the state of Cundinamarca, Colombia.
In Chapter 1, I use a regression discontinuity design based on close elections to estimate
the causal effect of entering the political system on dynastic persistence. I find that candidates
who barely win their first election are four times (22 percentage points) more likely to have a
future relative in office than those who barely lose and never serve. The magnitude of the effect
is remarkable and substantially larger than the effect on the intensive margin reported by Dal
Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009) for the United States. These results suggest that the prevalence
of dynastic politicians does not simply reflect the existence of a fixed set of historically powerful
families, but rather that the political system itself creates persistence.
In Chapter 2, I study whether the introduction of term limits in 1987 by the Philippine
Constitution was effective at breaking the dynastic pattern in Philippine politics documented
in chapter 1. In particular, I explore the potential countervailing effects created by dynasties
in response to the introduction of term limits: (1) replacement of term-limited incumbents
by relatives and (2) running for a different office. I find that term limits are not effective in
reducing the probability that the same family remains in power both in the short and long-run.
Moreover, term limits made incumbents safer in their early terms before term limits bind, by
deterring high-quality challengers who prefer to wait for the incumbent to be termed-out and
run in an open-seat race. These results suggest that political reforms that do not modify the
underlying sources of power of dynasties will be ineffective in changing the political equilibirum.
In Chapter 3, which was co-authored with Daron Acemoglu, Maria Angelica Bautista and
James Robinson, we explore the relative importance of political and economic inequality in
explaining long-run development outcomes in the state of Cundinamarca, Colombia. Using
micro data on land ownership we find that municipalities that were more unequal in the 19th
century (as measured by the land gini) are more developed today. However, we argue that
political rather than economic inequality might be more important in understanding long-run
development paths and we document that municipalities with greater political inequality, as
measured by political concentration, are less developed today. We also show that during this
critical period the politically powerful were able to amass greater wealth, which is consistent
with one of the channels through which political inequality might affect economic allocations.
Overall our findings shed doubt on the conventional wisdom and suggest that research on long-
run comparative development should investigate the implications of political inequality as well
as those of economic inequality.
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Chapter 1
Family and Politics: Dynastic
Persistence in the Philippines
1.1 Introduction
The distribution and evolution across time of political power plays a central role in political
economy. Most of the economic and political institutions emphasized in the literature as cru-
cial determinants of economic development are the outcome of collective action amongst various
groups with conflicting preferences and interests. Hence, equilibrium policies and institutions
in a society reflect the preferences of groups with greater political power (Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson, 2005). However, the allocation and sources of political power differ greatly
across societies. In most modern states, political power is allocated by political institutions.
In dictatorial or autocratic regimes, political power is concentrated in a small group of indi-
viduals whose preferences have a disproportionate weight in the decision-making process. In
contrast, power within democratic regimes is distributed more fairly. In principle, decisions
in democracies should represent the preferences of the majority. However, even in democratic
societies, politicians do not exercise exclusive influence over policies and institutions. Other
actors such as lobbies, unions, and irregular armies have disproportionate power over the rest
of the population due to wealth, cohesion or military strength.
An important source of power in many societies is the family. Families, when compared
to other groups, are better able to cooperate and solve the collective action problem. Their
hierarchical structure and high levels of trust allow for coordinated decisions concerning issues
of succession and the intergenerational transmission of economic resources across time. Most
importantly, not only can families exercise their power outside formal institutions of government,
but they can also take over these institutions and capture the political system. This is illustrated
by the existence of political dynasties in many contemporary democracies such as Argentina,
India, Japan, Mexico, the Philippines and the United States1 . The term "political dynasty"
refers to families whose members have exercised formal political power for more than one
generation. Notable examples include the Kennedy and Bush families in the United States, the
Gandhi family in India, the Aquino and Ortega families in the Philippines and the Lopez and
Lleras families in Colombia.
The study of political dynasties is important for various reasons. The dynastic nature of
politics broadly relates to the classical literature by elite theorists which emphasizes the dispro-
portionate power of elite groups in society (Mosca, 1939 and Pareto, 1968 [1901]) undermining
the extent to which democracies achieve a fair distribution of political power. Similarly, Michels
(1911) notes the tendency of elites to perpetuate themselves in power (a phenomenon he called
the "iron law of oligarchy") an idea closely related to the persistent power held by members of
the same family. More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) argue that the persistence of
elite political power may result in captured democracies wherein economic institutions reflect
the interests of the elite, irrespective of changes in political institutions. All of these arguments
suggest that persistent control of political power by a small number of families may lead de jure
democracies to not be very democratic de facto.
However, the observation of dynastic families is not necessarily evidence of self-perpetuation
or persistence stemming from power per se. Members of political dynasties may have greater
political power due to various observed and unobserved characteristics of the family such as
wealth, talent, popularity or looks and not due to the political power of its past members.
Evidence on the existence of self-perpetuation is relevant for understanding the potential effect
of political dynasties on economic development and the openness of the political system.
In this paper, I study political dynasties in the Philippines and provide evidence for a
'For the Argentinean case see Rossi (2010), for the Japanese case see Asako et.al. (2010), see Camp (1982)
for the Mexican case and Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009) for the U.S.
substantial causal effect of serving in office on the probability of having future relatives in
office. The Philippines constitutes an interesting setting in which to address these questions
as political dynasties are prevalent in many elected offices. For example, in the 2007 election,
roughly 50% of elected Congressmen 2 and Governors were dynastic (had a previous relative in
office). Moreover, in 40% of the 79 provinces, the Governor and Congressman are related. In
the province of Leyte, a member of the Veloso family has been in power in every year since
1916. However, while political dynasties receive a great deal of attention from the media and
academic literature in the Philippines 3, previous work has not provided any evidence for the
existence of self-perpetuation. I begin by classifying every congressional and gubernatorial
candidate between 1946 and 2007 as dynastic or non-dynastic. A candidate is classified as
'dynastic' if it had a previous relative serving in Congress or as Governor prior to the election.
A simple comparison shows that dynastic candidates get a vote share which is 14 percentage
points larger than that of non-dynastic candidates and are 22 percentage points more likely to
win the election. Similarly, candidates who win an election are 4 times more likely to have a
future relative in office than losing candidates.
These simple comparisons however, confound the effect of serving in office with other char-
acteristics of the family. To estimate the causal effect of holding office on the probability of
having a relative in power in the future (causal effect of power on dynastic persistence) I use a
regression-discontinuity design based on close elections. The identification assumption is that
the outcome of a close election is nearly random and does not depend on any characteristics
of the candidates or their families. The main result of the paper is illustrated in Figure 1
which plots the fraction of non-dynastic candidates with posterior relatives in office and the
vote share in their first election together with local polynomial regression estimates and their
confidence intervals. There is a "political power treatment" that changes discontinuously at
vote share=0.5. Those above this threshold win their first election and serve in office while
those below the threshold do not serve (unless they run again in the future and win). The
figure shows a discontinuous change in the probability of having posterior relatives in office
2In comparison, only 7% of current U.S. Congressmen had a previous relative in Congress. See Dal Bo, Dal
Bo and Snyder (2009).
:See Coronel et.al. (2007), McCoy (1994), Hutchcroft (1998), De Dios (2007), Sidel (1999) and Simbulan
(2005), amongst others.
around the 0.5 threshold. This discontinuous change constitutes the causal effect of winning
and holding power on the probability of having posterior relatives in office and provides evi-
dence of self-perpetuation. The regression analysis shows that candidates who barely won their
first election are 17 percentage points more likely to have a relative in office after them than
individuals who barely lost. These results are robust to the inclusion of province and year
fixed-effects and to various definitions of what constitutes a close election.
The magnitude of this effect is remarkable and constitutes the main contribution of this
paper. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that non-dynastic candidates who win their first
election by a small margin are 4 times more likely (22 percentage points) to have a posterior
relative in office than those who lost their first election by a small margin. Moreover, this
suggests that the prevalence of dynastic politicians in the Philippines does not simply reflect
the existence of a fixed group of powerful families. In fact, those without any family ties to
politics who enter the political system become disproportionately more likely to create their
own dynasty than those who fail in their first attempt to become politicians.
This paper is closely related to Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009) who use close elections in
order to test for self-perpetuation in the U.S. Congress. They find that U.S. congressmen who
barely won their first reelection attempt and served for more than one term are 5 percentage
points more likely to have relatives serving in Congress after them, than those who barely
lost their first reelection attempt. In another related paper, Rossi (2010) exploits an interesting
natural experiment in Argentina where the term length of legislators elected to Congress in 1983
was randomly assigned. He finds that Congressmen who served a longer term are more likely
to have a relative in office in the future. These two papers focus on incumbents and provide
convincing evidence of self-perpetuation on the intensive margin: incumbents who serve for
more than one term are more likely to have post-relatives in office than incumbents who only
serve for one term. In this paper I consider not only incumbents but also losing candidates.
Hence my main results focus on the extensive margin and the extent to which those who exercise
power are more likely to have future relatives in office than those who lose and never serve. To
my knowledge this is the first paper to present this type of evidence.
This paper is also related to a growing literature on the effect of the concentration of
political power on economic development. Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubin and Robinson (2008)
find that municipalities in the state of Cundinamarca, Colombia, where political power was
concentrated in relatively few families in the late 19th century, are currently poorer and have
a lower provision of public goods. Similarly, Ferraz and Finan (2010) find that municipalities
in Brazil, where power was concentrated in a small number of families between 1947 and 2000,
have worse development outcomes today.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides some brief background
on the political system in the Philippines and the origin of political dynasties, section 3 describes
data sources and provides some descriptive statistics, section 4 presents the main results on the
electoral advantage of dynastic candidates and on self-perpetuation and section 5 concludes.
1.2 Historical and Political Background
The Philippines, a Spanish colony for almost 400 years, shares a colonial history similar to that
of most Latin-American countries. During the period of Spanish control, economic and political
power was restricted to a small 'mestizo' elite known as the principalia4 . The Spaniards relied
on the clergy for the administration of the islands and never established a strong centralized
State. Instead, power was dispersed amongst various elite families in the provinces. These
families had the right to hold land, vote, and serve in positions of local political power. The
most important position at the local level was the gobernadorcilloo (petty governor), elected by
the principalia class from its own ranks and put in charge of collecting taxes and administering
justice (See Simbulan, 2005 and Cullinane, 2003).
In 1899 with the arrival of the United States, the power of these families was further con-
solidated. Because these families controlled the land and the armies that fought the Spaniards
between 1896 and 1898 and the United States from 1899 until 1902, the American author-
ities needed their support and loyalty in order to pacify the islands. Americans introduced
4 Some scholars such as Simbulan (2005) and Cullinane (2003) claim that the origins of the principalia can be
traced back to the maharlika class in pre-colonial Philippines. The maharlika were at the top of the social pyramid
and upon their arrival Spaniards gave them nobility status and used them to control the population and collect
tribute for the encomenderos. With the elimination of the encomienda system came the towns and provinces and
new positions of local power emerged. Former maharlikas and elected officials formed the principalia class, a
status that became hereditary.
" The title of gobernadorcillo was changed to "municipal captain" after 1895 following the passage of the Maura
Law in 1893 (Carlos, 1998).
local elections for mayors in 1901, elections for a national legislature from single-member dis-
tricts in 1907, and finally elections for the senate in 1916. Furthermore, those eligible to vote
and run in these early elections had to belong to the principalia class or satisfy literacy and
property requirements (Lande, 1965). This clearly contributed to the continuation of family
power. These elite families enjoyed preferential access to agricultural products and credit from
the Philippine National Bank further increasing their local power (De Dios and Hutchcroft,
2003). By 1908, Governor Taft was already warning that the purpose of the United States was
not "merely to await the organization of a Philippine oligarchy or aristocracy competent to
administer government and then turn the islands over to it.,"
It was precisely the introduction of positions of power initially at the local level that gave
principalia families substantial economic and political power. The subsequent introduction of
elections at higher levels of government (provincial and Congressional district level), increased
the families' sphere of influence. National politics and the central State became subordinated to
the local dynamics of power. This power structure prevented the emergence of strong political
parties with national platforms. The weakness of parties is often mentioned as an explanation
for the importance of the family as a unit of political organization: parties did not emerge due
to the local concentration of power and their weakness further consolidated the power of elite
families (Sidel, 1999 and Hedman and Sidel, 2000).
In 1946, following a brief period of Japanese invasion during WWII, the Philippines became
independent from the United States. Its government structure and electoral system resembled
that of the U.S. 24 Senators were elected every 6 years from the country at large, with elections
held every 4 years for provincial governors and congressmen. The House of Representatives
was composed of members from single-member congressional districts. However, independence
did little to curb the power of local families. Of 98 Congressmen elected in the first post-
independence congress, 61 had either served under the Americans or came from a family that
held power between 1901 and 1941.
In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law and closed Congress. Marcos' political
discourse revolved around the idea of breaking the power of the country's established oligarchy.
However, by 1975 Marcos was acknowledging that martial law "may have liquidated an oli-
'See Owen (1971, p.14).
garchy, only to set up a new oligarchy (...) [establishing] the opportunities for graft, corruption
and misuse of influence... . While Marcos succeeded in expropriating and weakening some of
his political enemies, a new generation of "Marcos cronies" emerged during this period.
In 1986, following civilian unrest, Marcos was ousted from power and Corazon Aquino
became president of the Philippines. The return to democracy, however, did not cause any
major change in the power of political dynasties. Many political families that held power in
the pre-martial law period were elected to Congress in 1987. Even Marcos' cronies and allies
remained in power and ran successfully for many offices'. Of the 200 Congressmen elected in
the 1987 elections, 113 were either members of established political dynasties or had served
at some point between 1946 and 1986. A new constitution, drafted in 1987, introduced some
changes to the political system. Congressional districts were reapportioned and term length
was reduced from 4 to 3 years for Congress, Governors and other provincial and local offices.
Most importantly, the constitution included a clause stating that:
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
However, after 23 years, a dynasty-controlled congress has failed to pass legislation providing
a definition of "political dynasty" making this constitutional provision vacuous. Similarly, the
1987 constitution introduced term-limits for all elective offices. Senators can only be elected to
two consecutive 6-year terms while Congressmen and all other local officials can only be elected
to three consecutive 3-year terms. This reform however, has not been successful in limiting the
political power of dynasties. Elected officials are often replaced by their relatives after reaching
the term-limit or switch to other elected offices. This is the topic of Querubin (2010).
Beyond the political institutions that lead to the emergence of powerful local elites and
prevented the emergence of strong parties and a strong central state, some scholars argue
that the prevalence of political dynasties is also associated with the importance of kinship in
'See Steinberg (2000, p.38).
'In fact most of Ferdinand Marcos' closest family members continue to occupy important elective positions.
Imelda Marcos, his wife, was a congresswoman from 1995 to 1998 and got elected to Congress once more in the
May, 2010 elections where she got 80% of the vote share. She replaced her son Ferdinand Jr. who was Governor
of Ilocos Norte between 1998 and 2007, got elected to Congress in 2007 and was elected Senator in the past 2010
elections. Finally, Imee, Ferdinand's oldest daughter was also a Congresswoman between 1998 and 2007.
Philippine culture. Since pre-colonial times, the prevalent form of social organization was the
barangay composed of members of extended families (also called clans). In the absence of a
centralized authority, individuals relied on their relatives for the provision of credit, insurance,
etc. Moreover, bilateral descent together with fictional kinship, introduced subsequently by the
Spaniards, created very large extended families which became important economic and political
organizations. In fact, the importance of kinship in the Philippines extends beyond politics
into other occupations. For example, at the local level the "closed family corporation" is the
predominant business structure9 (Simbulan, 2005). While Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009)
provide evidence showing that family persistence is more prevalent in politics than in other
occupations in the U.S., similar evidence is not available, to my knowledge, for the Philippines.
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
1.3.1 Data Sources
This paper focuses on the persistence of political families in two elective offices: House of
Representatives and Provincial Governors. These are the only offices for which data on the
identity of all incumbents dating back to 1901, when Americans appointed the first provincial
governors, are available from official sources'(). Most importantly, these are the most influential
offices at the provincial level of government"1 . The Philippines is currently divided into 79
provinces that are headed by a provincial governor (top executive position). Provinces and
cities are divided into multiple congressional districts, each of which elect a Congressman to the
'There is a literature that studies the consequences of family control of business organizations on firm per-
formance in other countries. See Bennedsen et.al (2007) and Perez-Gonzales (2006) amongst others.
"The names of provincial governors for the period 1901-1935 come from the Roster of Public Officials available
in the National Archives in Manila. Names of Congressmen for the period 1907-1972 come from the Congressional
Directories available in the House of Representatives in Quezon City. Data for the period 1987-2010 comes from
the Commission of Elections and Coronel etal (2007).
" Elective offices in the Philippines vary according to the different subnational levels of government. The
President, Vice-President and 24 senators are elected in. the country at large. The main sub-national level of
government is the province which is the equivalent of a U.S. State. In some cases, provinces are split into multiple
congressional districts that elect a Congressman. The top executive position in the Province is the Governor
followed by a Vice-Governor and a Provincial Board (equivalent of a U.S. State Legislature), all elected in the
province at-large. The next sub-national level is the city/municipality (equivalent to a U.S. city/town) headed
by an elected mayor, vice-mayor and body of councilors. Cities are also entitled to elect at least one congressman
to the House of Representatives. Finally, municipalities and cities are subdivided into barangays (equivalent to
a U.S. ward) who also elect a barangay captain.
House of Representatives (lower chamber of Congress) 12. There are currently 219 Congressional
districts in the Philippines, each composed of approximately 250,000 inhabitants1 3 . I also
constructed from various sources, a dataset with the name and number of votes obtained by all
congressional and gubernatorial candidates for the period 1946-200714. To my knowledge, this
is the first paper to bring together these electoral data and to analyze them in a systematic
way.
The dataset on incumbents includes 2,521 individuals who served as governors during the
period 1901-2010 or as Congressmen during the period 1907-2010. The dataset on candidates
covers 14 congressional and gubernatorial elections during the period 1946-2007 (7 before Mar-
cos declared Martial Law and 7 after the restoration of democracy) corresponding to 3,104
different races and 6,920 candidates.
Dynastic Measures
The first step is establishing the number of prior and posterior relatives in office for all incum-
bents and candidates in the dataset. This was done by matching the candidates family names,
with the family names of prior and posterior incumbent governors and congressmen within the
same province. However, bilateral descent in the Philippines implies a particular structure of
family names that must be taken into account. The name of a Filipino male or single female
takes the form:
firstname midname lastname
where midname corresponds to the mother's family name and lastname corresponds to the
father's family name. In the case of married women, names take the following form:
2 Nonetheless, 28 provinces have lone congressional districts and elect only one Congressman from the province
at large.
" The number of provinces and congressional districts has been increasing since 1907 due to reapportionment
and the creation of new cities and provinces. There were originally 33 provinces and 80 Congressional districts in
the first legislative elections in 1907. At the time of independence in 1946 the number of provinces had increased
to 50 and the number of Congressional districts to 133.
"'Electoral data for the period 1946-1972 was collected by hand from the original Canvass of Votes of the Com-
mission of Elections available in microfilm at the Center for Research Libraries. Data for the 1987 Congressional
and 1988 Gubernatorial elections were available in Gutierrez, Torrente and Narca (1992). Electoral data for the
period 1992-2007 were provided by the Commission on Elections and the Institute for Popular Democracy.
firstname midname lastname-lastnamehusb
where again midname corresponds to the mother's family name, lastname corresponds to the
father's family name and lastnamehusb corresponds to the husband's lastname.
Relatives are identified by finding a match of the midname, lastname or lastnamehusb within
the same province, whenever these are available'. Relatives traced only by lastname would
fail to identify wives (that play a crucial role in the post-1987 period), and some grandchil-
dren. However, the results presented in this paper are similar if relatives are traced using only
lastname.
A natural concern with the above matching procedure is that individuals from the same
province who share a midname, lastname, or lastnamehusb may not necessarily be related
biologically to each other' 6 . While this is certainly a possibility, this is less of a concern in
the Philippines than in other countries due to the peculiar way in which family names are
distributed across the different provinces. In 1849, concerned with the arbitrary way in which
Filipinos chose their surnames17 , Governor Narciso Claveria y Zaldua created a catalog with
a list of 61,000 different surnames. A different set of surnames (often starting with the same
letter) was assigned to each town and local officials had to assign a different surname to the
different family heads". As a consequence, common lastnames (such as Smith in the U.K. and
U.S. or Gonzalez in Latin America) are not as prevalent in the Philippines. I also used various
biographical sources to verify the accuracy of the relatives identified by the matching procedure
for a sample of individuals19 . Nonetheless the possibility of some measurement error remains.
'"Several biographical sources were used to find the midnames of as many incumbents as possible. For most
of the post-1946 Congressmen, midnames were found in the Congressional Directories available at the House of
Representatives in Quezon City.
"This matching procedure will identify almost all existing relatives in the dataset. The main concern is the
existence of false positives, or matches that do not correspond to actual relatives.
"Claveria complained that the natives "arbitrarily adopt the names of saints and this practice has resulted
in the existence of thousands of individuals having the same surname. Likewise, I saw the resultant confusion
with regard to the administration of justice, government, finance, and public order, and the far-reaching moral,
civil and religious consequences to which this might lead, because the family names are not transmitted from the
parents to their children, so that it is sometimes impossible to prove the degrees of consanguinity for purpose of
marriage, rendering useless the parochial books which in Catholic countries are used for all kinds of transactions".
See National Archives of the Philippines (1973).
"See National Archives of the Philippines (1973).
"In particular, Coronel et.al. (2007) provide a list of current and previous relatives in office for Congressmen
elected in 1992, 1998, 2001 and 2004 and Governors elected in 2001 and 2004. This information is self-reported
Based on the above procedure, I construct several measures for each congressional and gu-
bernatorial candidate in the dataset. The first measure is a Dynastic Ever dummy which
takes a value of one if the individual had a relative who served as governor or as congress-
man at any time prior to the year of election. In order to minimize the likelihood of matches
not corresponding to relatives I also create the dummy Dynastic_ Recent that takes a value
of one if the individual had a relative who served as governor or as congressman in the 20
years prior to the year of election. Finally, I construct the dummy Incumbent- Relative that
takes a value of one if the candidate is related to the current incumbent. Naturally, Incurn-
bent_ Relative C Dynastic_ Recent c Dynastic_ Ever.
In addition to the dynastic dummies, I also construct post-relative dummies that take a
value of one if the candidate has any relatives who first enter the house of representatives
or serve as governors at any time after the election (Post_ Relative_ Ever) or in the 20 years
following the election (Post_ Relative_ Recent).
Other Data
The electoral variables are standard and correspond to the number of votes and the vote share
of each candidate in each election. I also create a dummy variable for whether the candidate is
the current incumbent seeking reelection in the same office (Incumbent).
Finally, for Congressmen elected in 1992, 1998 and 2001 I have information on various
personal characteristics such as the gender, age, previous political experience and net worth
that will allow me to describe the differences between dynastic and non-dynastic incumbents 20).
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The main descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 1A-1C. Table 1A reveals that on average
25% of the candidates were dynastic if one considers the broader definition while the figure
decreases to 18% once I focus on previous relatives in the 20 years prior to the election. This
by the politicians in their Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and was verified by the Philippine Center
for Investigative Journalism.
2 
"These data were compiled by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism based on the self-reported,
Sworn Statements of Assets and Liabilities that all elected officials must file. See Coronel at.al, (2007).
suggests that approximately 75% of the candidates who had a previous relative in office, had
at least one relative in the two decades prior to running for office. The last two rows of
Table 1A also demonstrate that only 12% of candidates have posterior relatives in office (9%70
under the narrower definition). These averages however, mask substantial variation across time
and between those who get elected and those who lose the election. As Table 1A illustrates
the fraction of dynastic individuals amongst elected incumbents ascends to 0.48 (0.4 using
Dynastic_ Recent) while amongst losing candidates the fraction is only 0.19 (or 0.12 under
the narrower definition). Differences between winners and losers are particularly striking when
comparing the post-relative measures; incumbents are approximately 5 times more likely to have
a relative in office in the future than losers. These comparisons suggest that dynastic candidates
have an electoral advantage over the non-dynastic. Indeed, Table 1B shows that dynastic
candidates obtain almost twice the vote share of non-dynastic candidates and accordingly are
twice more likely to win the election. Such electoral advantage is even more pronounced for
candidates related to the current incumbent. I will explore all of these results in more detail in
the next section.
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the different dynasty measures across time and for each
office (House and Governor) separately. The figures in Panel A reveal an increasing trend
in the fraction of dynastic candidates (and incumbents) and a remarkable similarity in the
evolution of these measures in both offices. Such an increasing trend is not surprising for the
Dynastic_ Ever measure given that the pool of potential previous relatives becomes larger with
time. However, the figures in Panel B reveal a similar increasing trend for the Dynastic Recent
variable, especially after the 1998 elections when the first cohort of congressmen and governors
elected in 1988 reached the term limit. This is confirmed by the figures in Panel C that illustrate
a substantial increase in the fraction of candidates related to the current incumbent starting in
1998 when wives, daughters and sons of term-limited incumbents ran to preserve their relatives'
seat. In sum, these figures suggest an increasing trend in the fraction of dynastic candidates
in both offices, which becomes more pronounced after term limits become binding from 1998
onwards for different cohorts of incumbents.
Finally, while I do not have any detailed information on candidate characteristics beyond
their vote share and prior and posterior relatives, I do have data on some personal characteristics
of congressmen elected in the 1992, 1998 and 2001 elections. This allows me to characterize
some simple differences between dynastic and non-dynastic incumbents that are reported in
Table 1C. This table reveals that the fraction of women is substantially larger amongst dynastic
incumbents suggesting that entry into politics may be especially hard for women not related to a
previous politician. It also shows that dynastic incumbents are 5 years younger and accordingly
have less political experience prior to entering Congress. While 15% of non-dynastic politicians
held a local position of power such as municipality mayor, vice-mayor or councilor, this figure
is only 10% for dynastic incumbents. Finally, the data suggests that dynastic incumbents
are almost 50% (US$105,000) richer than the non-dynastic. All of the above differences are
statistically significant.
1.4 Results
Given the similarity in the patterns of the dynastic and electoral variables in both offices, in the
remaining analysis I pool congressional and gubernatorial elections. Similarly, for conciseness
I only report results using the narrower (and more conservative) definitions of the dynastic
and post-relatives measures that I will refer to as Dynastic and Post_ Relatives respectively.
However, the results are similar if I use the measures based on the broader definition.
1.4.1 Electoral Advantage of Dynastic Candidates
The first set of results focuses on the electoral advantage of dynastic candidates, already pre-
viewed in Table 1B. Evidence that dynastic candidates are more successful in elections and are
more likely to win would provide preliminary evidence of dynastic persistence. To address this
question I run an OLS regression of the form:
VoteSharejt a + IIncumbentijt + yDynasticjj (1.1)
+A(Incumbentit * Dynasticijt) + 6j + $t + eigt
where VoteShareit is the vote share of candidate i from province j in election year t,
Incumbentjt is a dummy for whether candidate i is an incumbent at the time of the elec-
tion and Dynasticijt is a dummy for whether the candidate is dynastic. In some specifications
I also include a full set of provincial and time fixed effects (6j and dt respectively) to control for
potential differences in political competition across provinces and across time. Finally, Eijt is
an error term that captures all omitted influences. I include an Incumbent dummy in order to
disentangle dynastic from incumbency advantage. The previous section showed that dynastic
individuals are more numerous, in relative terms, amongst incumbents than amongst losing can-
didates. Hence, the dynastic dummy would confound dynastic and incumbency advantage. The
results are presented in Table 2, where all standard errors are clustered at the candidate level
(given that some candidates run multiple times). Column 1 suggests that dynastic candidates
obtain a vote share that is 15 percentage points higher than that of non-dynastic candidates and
the difference is statistically significant. This effect remains relatively unchanged once province
and year fixed effects are included in column 2. The results also demonstrate a very large
incumbency advantage: incumbents' vote share is 36 percentage points larger than that of non-
incumbent opponents. Surprisingly however, the interaction term at the bottom of the table
suggests that incumbency advantage is smaller for dynastic incumbents than for non-dynastic.
In column 3, I add a dummy for whether the candidate is a relative of the current incumbent
in order to disentangle the effect of candidates with a previous relative no longer in power from
that of candidates whose relative currently controls office. The results reveal that candidates
with a relative in power at the time of the election have a vote share which is 24 percentage
points larger than that of non-dynastic candidates and 13 percentage points larger than that of
other dynastic candidates. This suggests that a political dynasty is particularly likely to remain
in power and persist if it can attempt to do so while one of its members currently holds power.
In columns 4-6 of Table 2, I estimate the same regressions as in columns 1-3 but instead of
using the vote share as the dependent variable I use a dummy variable for whether the candidate
wins the election. This is useful as it allows me to estimate the effect of being dynastic on the
actual probability of winning the election. Consistent with the results of columns 1-3, columns
4-6 reveal that dynastic candidates are 23 percentage points more likely to win the election
than non-dynastic candidates. Similarly incumbents are 56 percentage points more likely to
win the election than non-incumbent opponents. Finally, the results reported in column 6 show
that candidates with a relative currently in power are 41 percentage points more likely to win
than non-dynastic candidates and 24 percentage points more likely to win than other dynastic
candidates.
The results in Table 2 suggest a substantial electoral advantage of dynastic candidates.
However, as discussed in the introduction one cannot conclude from this evidence that dynastic
candidates have an advantage simply because they have had a previous relative in office. In par-
ticular, other family characteristics correlated with electoral success such as wealth, charisma,
talent or looks may be transmitted across family members and may simultaneously explain why
a candidate had a previous relative in office and obtained a high vote share. In this case, one
cannot interpret -y as the causal effect of having a previous relative in office on electoral success.
I propose a strategy to address this issue in section 4.3.
1.4.2 Posterior Relatives and Electoral Success
An alternative way of looking at dynastic persistence is to test whether candidates who win
and get elected to office are more likely to have posterior relatives in office than candidates who
lose. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1A suggested that this was the case but in
this section I explore this relation more systematically.
To do so I estimate via OLS a regression of the form:
Post_ Relativeigt =a -+ pWinnerijt + AVote _Shareijt + 6j + t + vit (1.2)
where Post Relativejjt is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if candidate i in province j has
any relatives in office in the 20 years following the election at time t, Winnerijt is a dummy
that takes a value of 1 if candidate i wins the election and VoteShareit is the fraction of
votes obtained. Some specifications also include a set of province fixed effects (6j) and year
fixed effects (#,) and vijt is the error term. Equation (1.2) is estimated on the sample of non-
dynastic candidates in order to avoid confounding the effect of the candidate with that of its
previous relatives in office. Results are presented in Table 3 where again standard errors are
clustered at the candidate level.
The regressions in columns 1 and 3 report the estimates for coefficient p on the Winner
dummy without controlling for the vote share. These results reveal that candidates who win and
serve in office are 19 percentage points more likely to have posterior relatives in office. The point
estimate remains basically unchanged once I include province and year fixed effects (column 3).
While this provides suggestive evidence of a treatment effect from serving in office on dynastic
persistence the same caveat discussed in the previous section remains: p may confound the
causal effect of serving in office with other characteristics that make members of a family more
powerful and successful in elections. An alternative is to control for the vote share obtained
by the candidate in the election. The vote share measures the electoral success and popularity
of candidates and may control for some of the unobserved characteristics of candidates and its
descendants (such as wealth, charisma and looks). The regression results, after controlling for
the vote share, are reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 3. Controlling for the vote share makes
the coefficient on Winner fall by about 40%. Nonetheless, the estimate remains statistically
significant at the 1% level and suggests that election winners are 12 percentage points more
likely to have posterior relatives in office. Moreover, the vote share is also statistically significant
at the 1% level and suggests that an increase of 10 points in the vote share is associated with an
increase of 2 percentage points in the probability of having posterior relatives in office. These
results are again robust to the inclusion of province and year fixed effects (column 4). While
the vote share may capture some of the unobserved heterogeneity across candidates and their
families, in the next section I propose a regression discontinuity design to control for the vote
share in a more systematic way and capture the component of elections which is due to chance
and not to characteristics of the candidates or their families. This allows me to explore whether
access to the political system creates persistence.
1.4.3 Close Elections: Estimating the Causal Effect of Political Power on
Dynastic Persistence
While the evidence in the previous section provides preliminary evidence of self-perpetuation
such results cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of power on future relatives' probability of
reaching elective office. To estimate a causal effect I perform a regression discontinuity analysis
21based on close elections
Close elections provide a natural experiment to test for the existence of self-perpetuation.
2 1 See Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2007) for a general discussion of
regression discontinuity designs and Lee (2007) for an application to close elections.
The underlying assumption is that the outcome of close races is nearly random and does not
depend on any personal or family characteristics that were potentially confounding the estimates
in Table 3.22 More concretely, I will focus on the set of non-dynastic candidates (winners and
runner-ups) who won or lost their first election by a small margin23 . The focus on non-dynastic
candidates is important in order to avoid confounding the effect of the candidate's previously
elected relatives with its own effect. The margin of victory is defined simply as the difference
between the vote share of the race winner and the runner up.
I define two baseline samples for the analysis. The first sample, Baseline_ 1, is composed
of non-dynastic candidates who won or lost their first election by a margin of less than 5
percentage points. The second sample, Baseline_ 2 is composed of non-dynastic candidates
who won or lost their first election by a margin of less than 2.5 percentage points. It is also
important to characterize the type of opponents that candidates in the baseline samples faced
in their first election as this may influence the outcome of such races. If the outcome of close
races is nearly random and resembles a coin toss, one should observe that 50% of the races are
won by the candidates in the baseline samples and the remaining 50% by their opponents. A
natural concern however, is that candidates in the baseline samples facing incumbents, dynastic
or seasoned candidates (where seasoned refers to candidates who previously ran for office) are
less than 50% likely to win as this type of opponents could manipulate the outcome of the close
race in their favor.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the number of candidates in each sample while Panel B reports
the fraction of races won by candidates in the different baselines according to the type of
opponent they faced. The first row of Panel A shows that the first baseline (Baseline_ 1)
is composed of 383 candidates out of which 116 were facing a dynastic candidate, 100 were
facing an incumbent and 184 were facing a seasoned candidate. Moreover, in 67 races both the
winner and runner-up were in this baseline (i.e. it was their first election, they were both non-
dynastic and the margin of victory was less than 5%). The second row of Panel A reports the
corresponding numbers for the second baseline (Baseline_ 2) where the fraction of opponents of
2 2For instance, in close races with a large electorate, the outcome may be determined by random factors such
as election-day weather in certain precincts and will resemble a coin toss.
23I drop candidates whose first election was in 2007 (last election in my sample) as these could not have any
relatives entering politics after them in my dataset.
each type is similar to the one found for Baseline_ 1. The candidates in both baseline samples
are also distributed relatively evenly across the different election years (not reported). Most
importantly, Panel B reports the fraction of races won by the candidates in the baseline samples.
The first column shows that overall, candidates in Baseline_ 1 won 48% of the races while those
in Baseline_ 2 won 49%. These fractions are not statistically different from 50% in either case
(figures in brackets report the p-value of a T test for fraction=0.5). This validates the use of
close elections as a natural experiment and suggests that their outcome is, indeed, as good as
random. Columns 2-5 report the fraction of races won by candidates in the baseline samples
by type of opponent. Column 2 shows that candidates in the baseline samples are less likely
to win when facing a dynastic candidate; in Baseline_ 1 they only won 42% of the races and
this fraction is statistically different from 0.5 at the 10% level. This provides weak evidence
that dynastic candidates may be able to manipulate the output of close elections in their favor.
Similarly, incumbent opponents seem to win more than 50% of the races though in this case I
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the fraction of races won is equal to 0.5. To address any
concerns driven by these differences I perform robustness checks by excluding candidates in the
baseline samples who faced a dynastic candidate or an incumbent. I also perform additional
robustness checks by doing the analysis on races in which both the winner and runner-up were
in the same baseline sample and where, by construction, 50% of the candidates won and 50%
lost.
OLS Results
The main analysis is based on OLS estimates of the following equation:
PostRelativeijIt c +/Winnerijt +wijt (1.3)
Vi E Baseline_1, Baseline 2
where Post_ Relativeijt and Winnerijt are as defined previously and Wijt is the error term. The
basic identifying assumption is that for the candidates in the baseline samples E (oijt, Winnerijt] =
0 as Winnerijt is randomly assigned and hence / corresponds to the causal effect of serving in
office on dynastic persistence.
Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of equation (1.3). Column 1 shows the results for esti-
mates based on Baseline_ 1 and suggests that those who win and serve in office are 12 percentage
points more likely to have posterior relatives in office. This coefficient is statistically significant
at the 1% level. The results are relatively similar in column 2 once I add province and year
fixed effects, further confirming the random assignment of Winnerjjt. Results for Baseline_ 2
are reported in columns 3 and 4. The smaller margin of victory in this sample provides further
confidence on the random assignment of Winnerijt but this comes at the expense of efficiency
losses as the sample size falls by about 50%. Nonetheless, the results in column 3 are remarkably
similar to those in column 1 based on the larger sample and suggest once more that officehold-
ers are 12% more likely to have posterior relatives in office. This effect remains significant in
column 4 where I include province and year fixed effects and in fact the point estimate of #
increases by 0.051 points.
While results in columns 1-4 of Table 4 provide convincing evidence of self-perpetuation,
they tend to be inefficient due to small sample issues. Hence, in columns 5 and 6 I apply the
global polynomial estimation technique proposed by Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001).
I include all non-dynastic candidates and estimate equation (1.3) after including a fifth order
polynomial in the vote share of their first election. The results remain very similar to those
based on the smaller baseline samples and suggest a treatment effect of 0.11.
2SLS Results
The results reported in Table 5 correspond to the reduced form effect of winning or losing
by a small margin in the first election. In other words they correspond to ITT (intention to
treat) estimates. Nonetheless, some candidates who lose their first election may run again and
eventually win. In this case, the results reported in Table 5 underestimate the causal effect of
ever holding political power. To deal with this possibility, one can use the outcome of the first
close election as an instrument for whether the candidate serves or not by running a first stage
of the form:
Servedijt = p + rWinnerijt + ujjt (1.4)
where Servedijt is a dummy that takes a value of one if candidate i eventually serves in office
and Winnerijt, as before, is a dummy for whether candidate i wins his first election. One can
then estimate a second stage regression of the form:
Post Relativeijt = <p + yServedit + vijt (1.5)
where Servedijt is the predicted value from the first stage (1.4). Table 6 reports the corre-
sponding 2SLS estimates of -y for the equivalent columns of Table 5. As expected the point
estimates are now larger and suggest a treatment effect of up to 0.23 points (in column 4) when
I focus on Baseline 2 and include province and year fixed effects.
Robustness Checks
The numbers in Panel B of Table 4 reveal that dynastic opponents and incumbents are slightly
more likely to win close elections than the candidates in the baseline samples. This could
potentially lead to a violation of the random assignment of Winnerijt in equation (1.3) and
affect the results. As a robustness check, Table 7 estimates again the OLS and 2SLS regressions
reported in the even columns of tables 5 and 6, but excludes races in which the opponent was
either dynastic or an incumbent (columns 1, 3 and 5 in Table 7 correspond to the even columns
of Table 5 while columns 2, 4 and 6 correspond to the even columns in Table 6). Even though
sample sizes fall by almost 50% relative to those in Tables 5 and 6, the point estimates in Table
7 are very similar and the treatment effect ranges from 0.16 (OLS estimates in columns 1 and
5) to 0.25 (2SLS estimate in column 4).
The final robustness check is reported in Table 8, which re-estimates columns 1-6 of Table
7 on the sample of candidates facing an opponent also included in the baseline . That is, it
eliminates candidates whose opponents were either dynastic, incumbents or had previously run
for office. This implies dropping almost 65% percent of the observations used in Tables 5 and
6. Nonetheless, the results do not change substantially and suggest a treatment effect ranging
from 0.15 (in column 1) to 0.23 (in column 6).
Overall, the results reported in Tables 3-8 provide robust evidence that winning elections
and serving as representative in Congress or as provincial governor increases the probability
of having a posterior relative in these offices by 15 to 22 percentage points. Compared to
the average probability of having posterior relatives in office for losing candidates (0.05), these
estimates suggest that winning an election more than quadruples the probability of dynastic
persistence. Moreover, the results based on close elections suggest that this result is causal
and is not driven by unobserved characteristics of the candidates or their families. These point
estimates are substantially larger than those found by Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009)
who find that serving more than one term in the U.S. Congress increases the probability of
having post-relatives in office by as much as 7 percentage points , and to those of Rossi (2010)
who finds that serving an extra term in the Argentine legislature increases the probability of
having relatives in future congresses by 8 percentage points. However, as mentioned in the
introduction, their results capture the effect of serving many, as opposed to only one term in
office (intensive margin) while my results focus on the effects of winning and serving in office
vs. losing and not serving at all (extensive margin). To estimate results more comparable to
those found in previous literature, the next section replicates the exercise of Dal Bo, Dal Bo
and Snyder (2010).
1.4.4 Dynastic Persistence on the Intensive Margin
In this section, I focus on elected candidates in order to test whether those who serve for
more than one term are more likely to have posterior relatives in office. To do so I estimate a
regression of the form:
Post Relative jt = a + ALongtermijt + 6j + $t + 7ijt (1.6)
where Post _Relativejjt is as defined before and Longtermijt is a dummy that takes a values
of 1 if incumbent i from province j who got first elected in year t served for more than one
term and 0 if he only served for one term. As before, 6j and $t are a set of province and
year fixed effects and 7ijt is the error term. Results from OLS estimates of equation (1.6) are
reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9. The estimates of A suggest that incumbents who serve
for more than one term are 15 percentage points more likely to have post-relatives in office
than incumbents who only serve for one term. The estimated coefficient increases to 0.2 once
province and year fixed effects are included in column 2. These estimates are almost six times
larger than the equivalent OLS estimates reported by Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2010) for
the U.S. Congress.
Alternatively, one can regress PostRelativeijt directly on the number of years served in
office and estimate an equation of the form:
Post_ Relativeip = a + 0 Years_ Officei3 t + 6 + pt + vijt (1.7)
where YearsOf ficeijt corresponds to the number of years in office served by candidate i.
Results of the OLS estimates of (1.7) are reported in columns 3-5 of Table 9. Results suggest that
an additional year in power is associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the probability
of having a posterior relative in office. Moreover, once I include a quadratic term in the number
of years served (column 5), the results show that while an additional year in power increases the
probability of dynastic persistence, this happens at a decreasing rate as the coefficient on the
quadratic term is negative and statistically significant. Once more, the estimates in columns
3-5 are also almost 3 times larger than those reported by Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2010)
for the U.S. House of Representatives.
While the evidence reported in Table 9 provides suggestive evidence of a positive effect of
tenure length on the probability of dynastic persistence one cannot interpret these estimates
as causal. Once again, it is possible that unobserved family characteristics explain both why
an incumbent serves for more than one term and has relatives in future offices. In order to
find whether the effect reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 is causal one can also use close
elections as a natural experiment.
Regression Discontinuity Results on Close Elections in First Reelection Attempt
The natural approach to estimate the causal effect of a longer tenure in office on the probability
of having posterior relatives in power is to focus on incumbents who barely won or barely lost
in their first reelection attempt. This is precisely what Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009)
do for U.S. Congressmen. I define two baseline samples similar to the ones introduced in
section 4.3. The first sample, Baseline_ Incumbents_ 1 is composed of non-dynastic incumbents
who won or lost their first reelection bid by a margin of less than 5 percentage points while
Baseline- Incumbents_ 2 is composed of non-dynastic incumbents who won or lost their first
reelection bid by a margin of less than 2.5 percentage points. Sample sizes in this setting are
almost 75% smaller than those reported for the close election samples in Table 4: there are only
119 incumbents in Baseline_ Incumbents_ 1 and 51 in Baseline_ Incumbents_ 2. Hence, these
results must be interpreted with caution.
Table 10 reports the results of estimating by OLS equation (1.3) on the different baseline
samples of incumbents. Contrary to the evidence provided by Table 9, results in columns 1-4
provide evidence of a slightly negative, but statistically insignificant effect of winning the first
reelection attempt on the probability of having relatives in office in the future. A similar esti-
mate is obtained when controlling for a 5th order polynomial in the vote share of all incumbents
in their first reelection bid (columns 5 and 6). These results remain unchanged if the regressions
in columns 1-6 are estimated by 2SLS using Winnerijt as an instrument for the Longtermijt
dummy previously defined (results not shown).
Given the large effects of winning the first election reported in section 4.3, it is perhaps not
surprising that there is no marginal effect of winning additional elections. However, these results
must be interpreted with caution. In particular, the estimates reported in Table 10 provide the
local treatment effect of serving an additional term for the set of incumbents who won their first
reelection by a small margin. Given the large incumbency advantage reported in Table 2, it
may be that incumbents in these close-election samples are very different from other successful
incumbents and hence the external validity of the results is questionable. For example, some of
these incumbents may have performed very poorly or may have faced a corruption scandal and
as a consequence they win (or lose) by a small margin and are less likely to have future relatives
in office. These threats to external validity are a general concern with regression discontinuity
designs and apply as well to the results presented in Tables 5-8. This concern however, also
applies to Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009) who find a statistically significant effect at the
intensive margin.
Moreover, the magnitude of the effects reported for the Philippines on the extensive margin
suggest that a similar exercise for the United States may reveal a much larger effect than those
reported by Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009). While theoretically possible, it would be
surprising to find a statistically significant effect of winning reelection races on future relatives
in office but to find no (or a smaller) effect of winning the first election.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence of self-perpetuation in power by political dynasties in the Philip-
pines. In particular, the results demonstrate that those who serve as Congressmen or Provincial
Governors are four times more likely to have a future relative in office than candidates who run
and lose. Moreover, these estimates suggest that this effect is not driven by unobserved char-
acteristics of candidates and their families; there is a causal effect from holding political power
on the electoral success of future relatives. This causal effect is estimated using a regression
discontinuity design based on close elections where candidates who win their first election by
a small margin are compared to those who barely lose in their first attempt to reach Congress
or the provincial governorship. Results are robust to different definitions of what constitutes
a close race (different margins of victory and types of opponent) as well as to the inclusion of
province and year fixed effects.
This evidence complements previous research by Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009) and
Rossi (2010) for the U.S. and Argentina respectively, who find that incumbents who serve for
a longer period of time are more likely to have relatives in future elective offices. However, the
magnitude of the effect reported in this paper is substantially larger than the effects reported
by these studies. Moreover, this paper finds no causal effect of winning an additional election
and serving for more than one term, on dynastic persistence. Future research should estimate
comparable effects on the extensive margin for United States congressmen and governors in
order to establish whether the patterns found in the Philippines (and their magnitude) are
atypical and reveal a different type of incumbency advantage and dynastic persistence.
The findings presented in this paper are an important step towards the understanding of
how democratic political systems function in practice. The existence of dynastic persistence
reveals that electoral democracies may be captured by individuals from a given set of families
who have a disproportionate chance of accessing power. Indeed, evidence from the Philippines
suggests that dynastic candidates are 22 percentage points more likely to win an election than
individuals without any previous relatives in office. However, these results also reveal that
the political system may create new powerful families because non-dynastic individuals who
access office are more likely to create a political dynasty of their own. In other words, the
prevalence of dynastic politicians in the Philippines does not simply reflect the existence of a
set of historically powerful families. Instead, the political system itself creates persistence.
Most importantly, the evidence reported in this paper motivates a series of research ques-
tions related to the causes behind the persistence of these families as well as the consequences
on policy and economic development in the Philippines. Dynastic persistence in a weakly insti-
tutionalized democracy such as the Philippines may have very different causes and consequences
than in a consolidated democracy such as the United States, where political institutions are
more effective at constraining the behavior of politicians. Future research should seek to un-
derstand whether the persistence in power of these families is driven by wealth accumulated
while in office, the political experience and electoral networks inherited by incumbents to their
relatives, or simply the name recall advantage that candidates from political families enjoy in
the presence of uniformed voters. The fact that dynastic candidates whose relative is currently
in office exhibit the largest electoral advantage suggests that incumbents may actively use their
office to continue their relatives' power. This constitutes an incumbency advantage that spills
over to relatives.
Similarly, understanding the consequences of this dynastic persistence on policy outcomes
and public goods provision is important in order to determine whether reforms aimed at pre-
venting the entrenchment of political dynasties are desirable. Mean reversion in talent suggests
that a society that draws it leaders from a small set of families could end up with politicians of
lower quality. Another natural concern is that families use political power in order to further
their own interests and appropriate rents at the expense of the majority of the population.
However, it is also possible that elections are successful in keeping politicians in check and that
political competition provides incentives for good performance while in office.
Finally, additional research is necessary to understand whether reforms of political insti-
tutions, such as the introduction of campaign finance reform or term limits, for example, are
effective methods to change the dynastic equilibrium in these democracies. If the power of
these families is based on sources outside public office (such as the ownership of land or the
creation of private armies) as many scholars argue, it is unlikely that changes in formal political
institutions will curb the persistence in power of these families. This is the topic of Querubin
(2010) where I explore whether the introduction of term limits in 1987 changed the dynastic
nature of politics in the Philippines.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1A: Characteristics of Winning and Losing Candidates (1946-2007)
Number of Individuals
Fraction DynasticEver=1
Fraction DynasticRecent=1
Fraction Post-Relatives Ever= 1
Fraction Post-Relatives Recent=1
Candidates
6920
0.25
0.18
0.12
0.09
Elected
1409
0.48
0.40
0.31
0.26
Losers
5511
0.19
0.12
0.07
0.05
Table 1B: Electoral Performance of Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Candidates
Probability of Winning
Vote Share
Dynastic
Recent
0.478
0.398
Incumbent
Relative
0.536
0.435
Non-Dynastic
0.218
0.228
Table 1.C: Differences between Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Incumbents elected in 1992, 1998 and 2001
Fraction Female
Average Age
Fraction Previous Local Position
Average Net Worth (2009 $US)
Dynastic
Recent
0.24
49.5
0.10
321644
Non-Dynastic
0.10
54.8
0.15
216947
P-value
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.02
OLS Regressions for Vote
Table 2
Share, Winner Dummy and Type of Candidate
Dependent Variable is:
Dynastic
Incumbent
Incumbent Relative
Dynastic*Incumbent
Constant
Province Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
(1)
0.147
(0.006)
0.357
(0.007)
-0.078
(0.012)
0.178
(0.003)
NO
NO
Vote Share
(2)
0.137
(0.006)
0.349
(0.007)
-0.079
(0.012)
0.187
(0.033)
YES
YES
Winner Dummy
(3)
0.107
(0.007)
0.350
(0.007)
0.132
(0.013)
-0.048
(0.013)
0.190
(0.033)
YES
YES
(4)
0.226
(0.013)
0.561
(0.014)
-0.131
(0.024)
0.139
(0.004)
NO
NO
(5)
0.220
(0.013)
0.575
(0.014)
-0.128
(0.025)
0.160
(0.058)
YES
YES
Observations 11435 11435 11435 11435 11435 11435
R-squared 0.349 0.385 0.393 0.247 0.265 0.272
Robust Standard Errors, clustered at the candidate level are reported in parentheses. Sample includes all candidates for Congressional
and Gubernatorial elections for the period 1946-2007. Dynastic is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the candidate had a
relative who served as Congressman or Governor in the 20 years prior to the election. Incumbent Relative is a dummy that takes a
value of 1 if the candidate is related to the current incumbent. Incumbent is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the candidate is the
current incumbent seeking reelection.
(6)
0.164
(0.014)
0.576
(0.014)
0.247
(0.030)
-0.071
(0.026)
0.167
(0.058)
YES
YES
DeDendent Variable is:
Table 3
OLS Regressions for Post-Relatives, Winner Dummy and Vote Share
Dependent Variable is Posterior Relatives Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Winner 0.188 0.124 0.186 0.119
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
VoteShare 0.162 0.175
(0.021) (0.021)
Province Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES
Observations 9142 9142 9142 9142
R-squared 0.084 0.092 0.120 0.129
Robust Standard Errors, clustered at the candidate level are reported in parentheses. Sample includes all non-dynastic candidates for
Congressional and Gubernatorial elections for the period 1946-2007. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
the candidate had a relative who entered Congress or the Provincial Governorship in the 20 years following the election. Winner is a
dummy that takes a value of 1 if the candidate wins the election.
Table 4
Non-Dynastic Candidates in Close Elections in their First Election
Panel A: Number of Individuals in Baseline according to type of Opponent
Total Opponents
Dynastic Incumbents Seasoned In Same Baseline
Baseline_1Baeln -1383 116 100 184 67(Win Margin<=0.05)
Baseline 2 190 54 42 82 37(Win Margin<=0.025)
Panel B: Probability of Winning according to type of Opponent
Dynastic Incumbents Seasoned In Same Baseline
Baseline_1 0.475 0.422 0.46 0.489 0.500(Win Margin<=0.05) [0.332] [0.095] [0.427] [0.769] [1.000]
Baseline_2 0.489 0.463 0.442 0.500 0.500(Win Margin<=0.025) [0.773] [0.591] [0.452] [1.000] [1.000]
Numbers in brackets in Panel B are p-values of a T-test where the null hypothesis is that the fraction of races won=0.5. Baseline 1 is
composed of non-dynastic candidates (winners and runner-ups) who won or lost their first election by a margin smaller than 5
percentage points. Baseline_2 is composed of non-dynastic candidates (winners and runner-ups) who won or lost their first election by a
margin smaller than 2.5 percentage points. Seasoned opponents are those who previously ran for office.
Table 5
OLS Regressions for Posterior Relatives: Regression Discontinuity Results
Dependent Variable is Posterior Relatives Dummy
Baseline_1 Baseline_2 All Non-Dynastic Candidates
5% Margin 2.5% Margin 5th Order Polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Winner 0.116 0.131 0.120 0.171 0.111 0.112
(0.032) (0.034) (0.045) (0.052) (0.031) (0.031)
Province Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 383 383 190 190 1821 1821
R-squared 0.034 0.269 0.037 0.454 0.053 0.122
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the candidate has any relatives first
entering Congress or the Provincial Governorship in the 20 years following the election. Winner is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the
candidate wins the election. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 include all non-dynastic candidates (winners and runner-ups) who won or
lost their first election by a margin smaller than 5 percentage points. Regressions in columns 3 and 4 include non-dynastic candidates
(winners and runner-ups) who won or lost their first election by a margin smaller than 2.5 percentage points. Regressions in columns 5
and 6 include all non-dynastic candidates who were winners or runner-ups in their first election. Columns 5 and 6 include a 5th order
polynomial in the vote share of the first election, where the vote share is defined as the share of the votes obtained by the top 2
candidates.
Table 6
2SLS Regressions for Posterior Relatives: Regression Discontinuity Results
Dependent Variable is Posterior Relatives Dummy
Baseline_1 Baseline 2 All Non-Dynastic Candidates
5% Margin 2.5% Margin 5th Order Polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Served 0.156 0.172 0.167 0.233 0.156 0.156
(0.043) (0.044) (0.063) (0.069) (0.043) (0.042)
Province Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 383 383 190 190 1821 1821
R-squared 0.055 0.299 0.037 0.477 0.054 0.124
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the candidate has any relatives first
entering Congress or the Provincial Governorship in the 20 years following the election. Served is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the
candidate ever serves in Congress or as Provincial Governor. Coefficients reported are for the second stage of a 2-stage least squares
regression where in the first stage, Served is instrumented with Winner, a dummy for whether the candidate wins its first election.
Regressions in columns 1 and 2 include all non-dynastic candidates (winners and runner-ups) who won or lost their first election by a
margin smaller than 5 percentage points. Regressions in columns 3 and 4 include non-dynastic candidates (winners and runner-ups)
who won or lost their first election by a margin smaller than 2.5 percentage points. Regressions in columns 5 and 6 include all non-
dynastic candidates who were winners or runner-ups in their first election. Columns 5 and 6 include a 5th order polynomial in the vote
share of the first election, where the vote share is defined as the share of the votes obtained by the top 2 candidates.
Table 7
Robustness Checks: Close Elections against Non-Dynastic and Non-Incumbent Opponents
Dnndent Variahle is Posterior Relatives Dummy
Winner
Served
Province Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Baein_Baseline_1
5% Margin
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2)
0.155
(0.050)
0.190
(0.060)
YES
YES
YES
YES
Baseline_2
2.5% Margin
OLS 2SLS
(3) (4)
0.189
(0.077)
0.245
(0.098)
YES
YES
YES
YES
All Non-Dynastic Candidates
5th Order Polynomial
OLS 2SLS
(5) (6)
0.129
(0.050)
YES
YES
0.161
(0.062)
YES
YES
Observations 192 192 100 100 780 780
R-squared 0.402 0.417 0.491 0.506 0.165 0.175
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the candidate has any relatives first
entering Congress or the Provincial Governorship in the 20 years following the election. Winner is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the
candidate wins the election. Served is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the candidate ever serves in Congress or as Provincial
Governor. Coefficients reported in columns 2, 4 and 6 are for the second stage of a 2-stage least squares regression where in the first
stage, Served is instrumented with Winner. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 include all non-dynastic candidates (winners and runner-
ups) who won or lost their first election by a margin smaller than 5 percentage points against a non-dynastic and non-incumbent
opponent. Regressions in columns 3 and 4 include non-dynastic candidates (winners and runner-ups) who won or lost their first election
by a margin smaller than 2.5 percentage points against a non-dynastic and non-incumbent opponent. Regressions in columns 5 and 6
include all non-dynastic candidates who were winners or runner-ups against non-dynastic or non-incumbent opponents in their first
election. Columns 5 and 6 include a 5th order polynomial in the vote share of the first election, where the vote share is defined as the
share of the votes obtained by the top 2 candidates.
Table 8
Robustness Checks: Close Elections-Both Winner and Runner-Up in Baseline Sample
Dependent Variable is Posterior Relatives Dummy
Winner
Served
Province Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
0
(j
Baseline_1
5% Margin
LS 2SLS
1) (2)
0.149
(0.054)
YES
YES
0.192
(0.068)
YES
YES
Baseline_2
2.5% Margin
OLS 2SLS
(3) (4)
0.162
(0.071)
YES
YES
0.222
(0.095)
YES
YES
All Non-Dynastic Candidates
5th Order Polynomial
OLS 2SLS
(5) (6)
0.156
(0.060)
YES
YES
0.234
(0.090)
YES
YES
Observations 134 134 74 74 544 544
R-squared 0.425 0.449 0.579 0.599 0.263 0.269
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the candidate has any relatives first
entering Congress or the Provincial Governorship in the 20 years following the election. Winner is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the
candidate wins the election. Served is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the candidate ever serves in Congress or as ProvincialGovernor. Coefficients reported in columns 2, 4 and 6 are for the second stage of a 2-stage least squares regression where in the first
stage, Served is instrumented with Winner. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 include all non-dynastic candidates (winners and runner-
ups) who won or lost their first election by a margin smaller than 5 percentage points against a non-dynastic, non-incumbent and non-
seasoned opponent. Regressions in columns 3 and 4 include non-dynastic candidates (winners and runner-ups) who won or lost theirfirst election by a margin smaller than 2.5 percentage points against a non-dynastic, non-incumbent and non-seasoned opponent.Regressions in columns 5 and 6 include all non-dynastic candidates who were winners or runner-ups against non-dynastic, non-incumbent and non-seasoned opponents in their first election. Columns 5 and 6 include a 5th order polynomial in the vote share of thefirst election, where the vote share is defined as the share of the votes obtained by the top 2 candidates.
OLS Regressions for
Long Term Dummy
YearsOffice
YearsOfficeA2
Province Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Table 9
Post-Relatives, Long Term Dummy and Number of Years in Power
Only Elected Candidates
Dependent Variable
0.150
(0.024)
is Posterior Relatives Dummy
(2)
0.202
(0.027)
(3)
0.00603
(0.00146)
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
(4)
0.01035
(0.00167)
YES
YES
(5)
0.02626
(0.00379)
-0.00036
(0.00008)
YES
YES
Observations 1292 1292 1292 1292 1292
R-squared 0.025 0.131 0.01561 0.12357 0.13955
Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Sample includes incumbent Congressmen and Governors during the period
1946-2007. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the candidate has a relative who first entered Congress or
the Provincial Governorship in the 20 years following the election. Longterm is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the incumbents serves
for more than one term. YearsOffice corresponds to the total number of years serving as Congressmen and/or Governor during
1946-2007.
Table 10
OLS Regressions for Posterior Relatives: Regression Discontinuity Results on Intensive Margin
Incumbents on First Reelection Attempt
Dependent Variable is Posterior Relatives Dummy
BaselineIncumbents_1 BaselineIncumbents_2 All Non-Dynastic Incumbents
5% Margin 2.5% Margin 5th Order Polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Winner -0.008 0.031 -0.092 0.082 -0.066 -0.053
(0.058) (0.072) (0.080) (0.275) (0.059) (0.065)
Province Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 119 119 51 51 638 638
R-squared 0.000 0.719 0.024 0.828 0.040 0.220
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the candidate has any relatives first
entering Congress or the Provincial Governorship in the 20 years following the election. Winner is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the
candidate wins the election. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 include all non-dynastic incumbents who won or lost their first reelection
attempt by a margin smaller than 5 percentage points. Regressions in columns 3 and 4 include non-dynastic incumbents who won or
lost their first reelection attempt by a margin smaller than 2.5 percentage points. Regressions in columns 5 and 6 include all non-dynastic incumbents who were winners or runner-ups in their first reelection attempt. Columns 5 and 6 include a 5th order polynomial in
the vote share of the first election, where the vote share is defined as the share of the votes obtained by the top 2 candidates.
Figure 1
Posterior Relatives in Office and Vote Share in First Election
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Sample in the figure includes all non-dynastic candidates who were winners or runner-ups in their first election. Dots in the figure show the fraction of candidates with
future relatives in Congress or Provincial Governorship, for different bins of the vote share in their first election where the vote share corresponds to the share of the votes
obtained by the top 2 candidates. Candidates with vote share>0.5 win and become Congressmen or Provincial Governors while those with vote share<0.5 lose their first
election and do not serve (unless they run again and win). Solid lines correspond to local polynomial regressions at each side of the threshold and the dashed lines are the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
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Fraction of Candidates that are Dynastic, Dynastic Recent and Related to the Incumbent
By Election Year: 1946-2007
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Chapter 2
Political Reform and Elite
Persistence: Term Limits and
Political Dynasties in the Philippines
2.1 Introduction
Existing research on the political economy of development emphasizes the role of elites in
shaping the economic and political institutions that constitute the fundamental determinants
of economic development. Classical elite theorists such as Mosca (1939) and Pareto (1968
[19011) highlight the disproportionate power of certain elite groups in society. Michels (1911)
notes the tendency of elites to perpetuate themselves in power and persist across time. More
recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) emphasize the way by which elite persistence may
undermine attempts to reform institutions, leading to "captured democracies" wherein economic
institutions and policies disproportionately benefit the elite.
Political dynasties exemplify a particular form of elite persistence. The Philippines is a
notable example. More than half of elected Philippine congressmen and governors have had a
relative in office previously. Additionally, in 40% of the 79 provinces the provincial governor
and Congressman are related. In Querubin (2010), I study political dynasties in the Philippines
and provide evidence that the prevalence of dynastic politicians is not simply driven by specific
characteristics of members of these families such as wealth, talent or looks. There is evidence
of a causal effect of entering politics on the probability of having future relatives in office. This
suggests that (access to) the political system itself creates dynastic persistence and leads to
disproportionate political power in some families. Various scholars argue that the dynastic
nature of Philippine politics has lead to a personalized style of politics that undermines the
creation of a strong State (Hedman and Sidel, 2000 and Coronel at.al, 2007). As a consequence,
the reform of important economic institutions and the adoption of nation-wide policies are
often blocked by members of dynasties who benefit from the status-quo. Others claim that the
resiliency of dynasties is associated with rent-seeking and the allocation of State resources to
further private interests (McCoy, 1994 and Hutchcroft, 1998).
A natural question in this context is whether certain political reforms can break the dynastic
pattern and open up the political system. In 1987, following the return to democracy after a 15-
year long dictatorship by Ferdinand Marcos, a new Philippine Constitution introduced various
changes aimed at decreasing the power of political dynasties. For example, Article II, Section
26 of the Constitution included a clause stating:
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
However, after 23 years, a dynasty-controlled congress has failed to pass legislation pro-
viding a definition of "political dynasty" making this constitutional provision vacuous. Most
importantly, the 1987 constitution introduced term limits for all elective offices. Senators can
only be elected to two consecutive 6-year terms while congressmen, governors and all other
local officials can only be elected to three consecutive 3-year terms. Some political analysts
and scholars were optimistic, hoping these Constitutional provisions would open the political
system. For example, McCoy (1994, p. xvii) stated that "Aquino's Constitutional Comission
adopted articles designed to break, for all time, the influence of political dynasties through
both universal term limits and a specific prohibition on relatives (...) holding any public of-
fice." More generally, scholars such as Cromwell (1990) argue that term limits can bring to an
end "a conspiracy of circumstances that has, de facto, robbed the electorate of a meaningful
say in who does and does not belong to office."
In this paper, I analyze the extent to which term limits have effectively decreased the
persistence of political dynasties in the Philippines. From a conceptual point of view, the general
equilibrium effects of term limits in an elite-dominated democracy such as the Philippines are
not obvious. Most arguments in favor of term limits are based on the existence of an incumbency
advantage which establishes implicit barriers to entry to the political system. The direct effect
of term limits is to eliminate incumbency advantage periodically on a given office. However,
in a dynastic democracy, incumbency advantage may spill over to other elected offices and,
most importantly, to other members of the incumbent's family. As a consequence, there can be
countervailing effects to the direct effect of term limits if term-limited incumbents retain power
by running for another office or field their relatives to replace them in order to maintain family
control. Whether these countervailing effects are strong enough to undermine the effects of term
limits on dynasties is an empirical question I address in this paper. Moreover, one could think of
an even stronger general equilibrium effect by which term limits force term-limited incumbents
to run for higher offices while training and bringing additional family members into politics,
making dynasties more powerful as the family controls various offices simultaneously. These
potential general equilibrium effects constitute a special case of a more general point made by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) and Acemoglu et. al. (2008) amongst others: the introduction
of political institutions that do not modify the underlying sources of political power may be
ineffective in changing the political equilibrium as those affected will use their power to adapt
and remain powerful under the new institutions.
The experience of the infamous Marcos family illustrates some of the patterns and coun-
tervailing effects that I explore in greater detail in this paper. In 1998 Ferdinand Marcos' son
Ferdinand Jr. and his daughter Imee won the gubernatorial and congressional elections, respec-
tively, in the province of Ilocos Norte. They were both reelected in 2001 and 2004. By the end
of 2007, they had served three consecutive terms and could not run again due to term limits.
This however, did not hurt in any substantive way the political power of the Marcos family.
Ferdinand Jr. ran successfully in the 2007 elections for Congress and replaced his sister Imee.
Michael Marcos Keon, Ferdinand Jr's cousin, ran successfully for governor in 2007, replacing
Ferdinand Jr. as governor. The Marcos family, despite facing binding term limits, managed
to keep both offices in the family by having other relatives run to replace them. Ferdinand
Jr. maintained his own political power by running for a different office1 . This example is not
atypical. One family remained in power for at least 19 years between 1987 and 2010 in almost
50 Congressional districts, despite term limits.
In this paper I find that term limits have no effect on the persistence of political dynasties
in the Philippines. Once I account for the countervailing effects described above, I find no
statistically significant effect of term limits on the probability that the same family remains in
power in the short and long run.
In addition to the countervailing effects dynasties may exhibit after term limits bind, term
limits may also lead to changes in the strategic behavior of challengers before they bind. In
the presence of incumbency advantage, incumbents under term limits may now be able to
discourage high-quality challengers who prefer to wait for the incumbent to be "termed-out"
rather than risk their political career by running against an incumbent and losing with higher
probability. As a consequence, term limits may make incumbents safer in the early terms prior
to the term limit. This effect is independent of the existence of political dynasties and may
occur more generally in democracies that exhibit a substantial incumbency advantage.
The empirical analysis presented in this paper explores more systematically the prevalence
and magnitude of these effects. First, I briefly explore the effects of term limits on incumbents
before term limits bind. I find that incumbency advantage increases considerably after 1987
in the presence of term limits. As a consequence, incumbents were more likely to serve for
three consecutive terms after 1987 than during the first democratic spell between 1946 and
1972 when term limits were not in place. An important caveat is that these differences in the
post-1987 period may be attributed to other factors which also changed after 1987. However,
several facts point to the challenger-disuassion interpretation provided above. For example, I
find that races with incumbents running for reelection exhibit a smaller fraction of dynastic
opponents compared to open-seat races. This becomes particularly pronounced in the term
limits environment after 1987. Moreover, while no single Congressional race was uncontested
during the 1946-1972 period, 63 Congressional races were uncontested after 1987, almost all of
them being races in which an incumbent was running for reelection. This provides suggestive
In the most recent 2010 elections, Ferdinand Jr. ran succesfully for the Philippines Senate but his seat in
Congress was taken by his mother Imelda who won the election with over 80% of the vote share.
evidence that term limits may indeed induce a strategic reaction by strong challengers who
prefer to run in an open-seat race rather than face an incumbent.
Second, I consider the countervailing effects of incumbents and their families after term
limits bind. In particular, I explore whether the patterns revealed by the anecdotal evidence of
the Marcos family (running for a different office after term limits bind and the replacement of
term-limited incumbents by their relatives) are strong enough to undermine the overall effec-
tiveness of term limits on political dynasties. To do so, I first report evidence that incumbency
advantage may spill over to different offices and family members once term-limits bind. This
suggests that incumbents, when reaching their term-limit, may try to run for a different of-
fice or attempt to "bequeath" their seat to their relatives, preserving the political power of
the dynasty. I explore this empirically by estimating difference-in-difference regressions to test
whether the families of incumbents in their 3rd term (and term-limited in the post-1987 period)
are less likely to remain in power (either in the same office or in another elected office) than
incumbents in their 2nd term and not yet subject to any binding limit.
The results suggest that when we consider the dynasty as the unit of observation, the
direct effect of term limits on the individual incumbent falls by almost 50%. Moreover, once
I consider simultaneously the possibility of the term-limited incumbent running for a different
office and being replaced by a relative, I find no statistically significant effect of term limits
on the probability that the incumbent family remains in power. This is the main result of the
paper. Finally my results also show that term limits do not decrease the probability of having
dynastic incumbents: term-limited incumbents are often replaced either by their relatives or by
members of other established dynasties. This suggests that term limits are not able to change
the underlying sources of power of political dynasties. As a consequence, incumbent politicians
adapt to preserve their power.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents a brief review of related literature, section
3 includes a discussion of some institutional details and provides some descriptive and anecdotal
evidence, section 4 presents the main results of the paper and section 5 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Term limits date back to early democratic societies. Members elected to the council of five
hundred in Athens during the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. were subject to a two-year limit.
Rotation in office was believed to be important because it serves to represent a diversity of
interests and prevents the use of office for private gain 2 . Term limits were also present in the
Articles of Confederation which stated that members of Congress could not serve longer than 3
years. More recently, various U.S. states have introduced term limits on state legislatures and
governors. Similarly, in developing countries such as Colombia, the Philippines and Venezuela,
constitutional reforms have been passed in order to modify (or remove) term-limitations on the
president and other elected officials.
In the academic literature, the discussion for or against term limits has usually centered
around two main arguments: increasing office rotation by eliminating incumbency advantage
and removing long-tenure incumbents from office.
A large body of theoretical literature emphasizes the barriers to entry created by incum-
bency advantage. Incumbents control the institutions that determine the rules of political
competition (such as redistricting) and tend to spend more money on campaigning than chal-
lengers (Abramowitz, 1991). Similarly, Lott (1986) develops a model wherein investments in a
political brand name are non-transferable constituting past campaign expenditures as a barrier
to the entry of new challengers. Other scholars argue that incumbency advantage mutes the
beneficial effect of competitive elections, allows incumbents to disregard the interests of the
electorate, and prevents the entry of potentially more productive politicians. Term limits elim-
inate incumbency advantage periodically, possibly increasing the number of open seats for new
politicians from different parties, coalitions, or political sectors who are unlikely to enter office
in races with an incumbent. This will increase rotation in power and could potentially eliminate
the biases of policy in favor of the coalitions that long-serving incumbents represent (Tabarrok,
1996 and Cain, Hanley and Kousser, 2001). Rotation in office is particularly important in the
context of risk-averse voters with very heterogenous preferences who would benefit from term
limits that prevent the entrenchment of an opposing group in power for a long time (Glaeser,
2See Benjamin and Malbin (1992), p. 20-2 1.
1997 and Tabarrok, 1996).
A second strand of literature emphasizes the importance of term limits for removing long-
tenured incumbents and eliminating the incentives of politicians to choose policies that may be
electorally profitable but are socially inefficient. Seniority in Congress for instance, is associated
with more important committee assignments, agenda setting power and leadership positions. As
a consequence, voters prefer a representative who is relatively senior and can more successfully
broker resources and legislation to benefit his own constituents. While voters may benefit
from having a different and more productive representative, no single constituency will do it
unilaterally because they forfeit relative tenure and net transfers. In this context, Dick and Lott
(1993) develop a model in which term limits break this equilibrium and allow voters to choose
better candidates by breaking the seniority of all districts simultaneously. Finally, a set of
papers argue that term limits allow politicians to focus less on choosing policies that maximize
their reelection prospects rather than on policies which "truthfully" reflect their preferences
and interests allowing voters to better screen incumbents (Glazer and Wattenberg, 1995 and
Smart and Sturm, 2006). Naturally, many of these arguments must be contrasted against the
agency literature, most notably Barro (1973), that emphasizes the disciplining role of elections
and discusses the opportunistic behavior in which term-limited incumbents engage during their
last period, once reelection incentives disappear.
The empirical literature on the consequences of term limits is more scarce and focuses
almost exclusively on the United States. Besley and Case (1995) analyze the impact of term
limits on policy choices of U.S. governors between 1950 and 1986, finding that term-limited
incumbents choose higher taxes and expenditure levels. They view this evidence as consistent
with agency models in which incumbents care about their reputation, reducing their efforts
to keep taxes and expenditures down once they are unable to run again. Initially, a body of
literature used simulation models based on past reelection rates to predict the effect of term
limits on the rotation of power and the composition of the legislature. However, Lopez (2003)
later highlighted the caveats of these exercises and their failure to contemplate the effects of
term limits on the structural parameters that determine reelection rates, an argument in line
with the "Lucas Critique." For instance, Fowler (1992) and Grofman and Sutherland (1996)
argue that term limits may increase the reelection rates of incumbents because high-quality
challengers postpone running until the seat becomes open by mandatory rotation.
More recently, Cain, Hanley and Kousser (2001) analyze the effect of term limits on the
15 U.S. states that introduced them between 1990 and 2000. They find that while term limits
successfully increase the turnover of individual incumbents and the fraction of contested races,
they fail to make races more competitive or increase party turnover. They also find that seats
held by incumbents are less likely to be contested and that incumbents tend to face challengers
with less previous political experience.
This paper finds results similar to those of previous work in respect to the effect of term
limits on races with incumbents before term limits bind. However, to my knowledge, this is
the first paper to explore the countervailing effects resulting from the strategies that politicians
may use in order to adapt to term limits and preserve the power of their family. In particular,
previous work has not empirically explored the extent to which running for a different office
or replacement by relatives can undermine the effectiveness of term limits. This is particularly
relevant in the context of dynastic or elite-dominated democracies, where individual or party
turnover is not necessarily the relevant measure of interest, but rather the extent to which
political institutions can break the monopoly of powerful families and increase the diversity of
interests represented.
2.3 Institutional Background and Descriptive Evidence
In this section I provide some details on the changes introduced by the 1987 Constitution that
are relevant for the analysis of term limits in the Philippines. A brief description of the historical
political background in the Philippines can be found in Querubin (2010). See Lande (1956),
Owen (1971), McCoy (1994), Hedman and Sidel (2000), Cullinane (2003) or De Dios (2007) for
more lengthy discussions.
Elective offices in the Philippines vary according to the different subnational levels of gov-
ernment. The president, vice-president and 24 senators are elected by the country at large.
Thw province is the main sub-national level of government and is equivalent to a U.S. State. In
some cases, provinces are split into multiple congressional districts which elect a congressman.
The top executive position in the province is the governor followed by a vice-governor and a
provincial board (equivalent of a U.S. state legislature). These positions are elected by the
province at-large. The next sub-national level is the city/municipality (equivalent to a U.S.
city/town) headed by an elected mayor, vice-mayor and body of councilors. After 1987, cities
are entitled to elect at least one congressman to the House of Representatives. Finally, munic-
ipalities and cities are subdivided into barangays (equivalent to a U.S. ward) which also elect
a barangay captain. In this paper, I focus on congressmen and provincial governors, the most
important positions elected at a subnational level of government and for which electoral data is
available going back to the first election in 1946. There were originally 98 congressional districts
in 1946, but this number increased to 219 by 2007 due both to the creation of new cities and
provinces and to the redistricting introduced by the 1987 Constitution. Similarly, the number
of provinces (and of governors) in the Philippines increased from 49 in 1946 to 79 in 2010.
From 1946 until the declaration of martial law by Ferdinand Marcos in 1972, congressmen
and governors were elected to 4-year terms. The elections for both offices were not held si-
multaneously; elections for governors took place in the midpoint of congressional terms. Most
importantly, elected congressmen and governors were not subject to term limits and could be
reelected for an indefinite number of consecutive terms. In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos declared
Martial Law and closed Congress, halting regularly scheduled elections until the restoration of
democracy in 19873. Upon the return to democracy, President Corazon Aquino appointed a
Constitutional Commission to draft a new Constitution to replace the previous one, drafted in
1973 under Marcos' regime. The 1987 Constitution reduced the length of Congressional and
Gubernatorial terms and all other local offices from 4 to 3 years. It also mandated that elections
for all elective offices should take place simultaneously on the first Monday of May every three
years 4 . Most importantly, it introduced term limits for all elective offices. Congressmen, gover-
nors and all local politicians could only be elected to the same office for up to three consecutive
3Elections for the Batasang Pambansa, the Philippines parliamentary body under Marcos were held in 1978
and 1984. Similarly, a local election for provincial governors and municipality mayors took place in 1980.
However, there are no records of the electoral statistics of these elections and they are believed to have been
heavily influenced by Marcos' establishment.
'Congressional and gubernatorial elections occurred regularly and simultaneously every 3 years starting with
the 1992 election. The first election for Congress after the restoration of democracy took place in 1987 while
the first gubernatorial election took place in 1988. Hence the first elected cohort of congressmen and governors
served for a period longer than 3 years during their first term.
3-year terms5. Term-limited incumbents were allowed to run and re-enter the same office after
one term and they were not restricted from running for a different office immediately after
reaching the term limit in their current office.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on the turnover of incumbents and political
competition under the no-term limits environment (1946-1972) and after term limits were in
place (1987-2010). An important caveat is that any difference observed before and after 1987
cannot be solely attributed to the introduction of term limits; other details of the political
system may have changed. Throughout the rest of the paper, results are reported separately
for congressmen (Panel A) and governors (Panel B) to illustrate some important differences.
Under term limits, incumbents appear more likely to reach a second and a third consecutive
term. Between 1946 and 1972, 45% of first-termers were reelected to a second term and this
number increases to 63% under the term limits environment. The difference for governors is
even larger as the fraction of freshmen governors reelected to a second term almost doubles from
0.34 to 0.59. A similar phenomenon is observed for the fraction of first-termers that are reelected
twice and serve for at least 3 consecutive terms. This fraction is twice as large under the term-
limit environment for congressmen and almost four times larger for governors. These numbers
also suggest that, conditional on reaching a second term, the fraction of incumbents reelected to
a third term in 1987-2010 increases from 0.52 to 0.77 for congressmen and from 0.28 to 0.70 for
governors. This suggests that incumbents appear to be safer under a term-limit environment.
I address this question in more detail in the next section. Naturally, term limits eliminate the
possibility of serving a fourth or higher consecutive term; 14% of congressmen were reelected
to 4 or more consecutive terms between 1946 and 1962. This fraction fell automatically to
zero by mandate6 after 1987. However, in spite of this, the average maximum number of terms
served by incumbent congressmen and governors increased after 1987. If the main concern
about incumbency advantage is having incumbents in the same office for long spells, then term
limits fulfill their goal by eliminating the possibility of serving more than 3 consecutive terms.
Nonetheless, the fact that the average number of terms served increased after 1987 seems, a
priori, counter-intuitive. Again, it should be stressed that these differences cannot be solely
"For Presidents and Senators a term-timit of two consecutive 6-year terms was intoduced.
'In the case of governors, the fraction of incumbents reaching a fourth or higher term was pretty low even
before term-limits were introduced (0.04).
attributed to the introduction of term limits. Changes in incumbency advantage could occur
for a variety of reasons including an increase in the penetration of television and other forms
of media which give greater exposure to incumbents7 . It could also be explained by changes
in the local government code in 1991 which decentralized the provision of many public goods
and granted more power to governors (this however, could not explain the increase in the
incumbency advantage of congressmen).
Table 1 provides some additional descriptive statistics on political competition before and
after 1987 allowing a comparison of the effects of term limits in the Philippines with those in
U.S. State Legislatures, which were explored by Cain, Hanley and Kousser (2001). The fraction
of open-seat races increased in the Philippines by about 0.1 for Congress (a similar magnitude
to the U.S.) and by only 0.04 in the case of governors (in the latter case the difference is
not statistically significant). Interestingly, congressional and gubernatorial races became less
competitive under the term-limit environment. This effect was particularly strong in incumbent
races wherein the margin of victory almost doubled from about 15 to over 30 percentage points.
This differs from the evidence for the U.S., where margins of victory remained constant after
the introduction of term limits. This evidence is also at odds with the predictions of many
proponents of term limits who believe that because open-seat races are more competitive than
incumbent races, increasing the fraction of open-seat races should increase the overall level
of political competition. In the Philippines however, margins of victory under term limits
increased both in open-seat and incumbent races. Finally, rows 10 and 11 in each panel of
Table 1 illustrate that the fraction of races that were uncontested (those in which only one
candidate runs unchallenged) was practically zero between 1946 and 1972 and increased to
almost 5% after 1987. This occurred mostly in races with incumbents in Congress, but was
more common, surprisingly, in open-seat races for gubernatorial elections.
The descriptive evidence in Table 1 suggests that term limits may have made incumbents
safer in the terms prior to reaching the term-limit. The larger margins of victory and fraction
of uncontested races suggest that this may have occurred through the deterrence of high quality
challengers who prefer to wait until incumbents are termed-out rather than risk the possibility
In fact, Gelman and King (1990) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) also find evidence of an increasing incum-
bency advantage in U.S. general elections towards the end of the 20th Century.
of losing against an incumbent and hurt their future electoral prospects.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics on the number of term-limited incumbents and
the strategies used to preserve their political power after the term limits bind. The first cohort
of incumbents to reach a term limit were those elected to their third consecutive term in the
1995 elections. Column 2 shows that 83 congressmen and 22 provincial governors, corresponding
to approximately 40% and 30% respectively of the cohort that first entered office with them
in the 1987/1988 elections, became term-limited after the 1995 elections and could not run for
reelection in 1998. In subsequent election years, a different set of congressmen and governors
became term-limited, usually corresponding to 40-50% of the cohort that entered with them to
office 9 years (3 terms) before (column 3). As mentioned above, incumbents often resorted to
two main strategies to preserve their power: (1) Have a relative run to take their seat; (2) run
for a different office.
As column 4 shows, of the 83 congressmen elected to their third term in 1995, 36 (43%) were
replaced by a relative in the following elections in 1998. These included wives, sons, daughters,
brothers and cousins many of whom had no previous political experience. The fraction of term-
limited incumbents replaced by relatives remained relatively stable in subsequent years and
was relatively similar for congressmen and governors (the one exception are the 22 term-limited
governors in 1995 when only 5% of them were replaced by a relative in the 1998 elections).
Column 5 shows the fraction of term-limited congressmen (governors) who got elected to
the governorship (Congress) or the Senate in the elections immediately after reaching their term
limit. This strategy was successful for about 10-20% of term-limited congressmen and for up
to 64% percent of governors. In this case, the difference between congressmen and governors is
worth discussing in more detail as it will prove important in the subsequent analysis. 51 of the
79 provinces in the Philippines are divided into more than one, and sometimes as many as 6
Congressional districts. This implies that an incumbent governor, upon reaching a term limit,
can attempt to run and get elected to Congress in the district that offers the best electoral
prospects. Moreover, incumbent governors allocate resources and control patronage in munici-
palities across all Congressional districts in the province. As such, they have greater exposure
than a representative from a single district. Congressmen from multi-district provinces, on the
other hand, must compete against each other in a gubernatorial race and must attempt to run
for other offices as well. In the 28 single-district provinces however, the congressman and gov-
ernor are equally visible, giving a better chance to term-limited congressmen in a gubernatorial
race. Also, approximately 43 of the 219 members of Congress represent cities that are not
headed by a governor but by a city mayor. Hence, many congressmen run as city mayors (and
not as governors) after reaching a term limit. This is a more general limitation of the current
data used in this paper. As I only focus on congressmen and governors, the numbers in column
5 of Table 2 greatly under-estimate the fraction of term-limited incumbents that get elected to
other offices as many of them run for mayor, vice mayor and vice-governor.
Naturally, many term-limited incumbents are both elected to a different office and are re-
placed by a relative. This was particularly common for governors; almost a third of the incum-
bents that reached their term limit in 2004, moved to Congress and were replaced by a relative
in the 2007 elections (column 6). Figures 1-3 provide a sketch of the different combinations of
strategies used by term-limited incumbents, using real examples from the Philippines. Figure
1 illustrates the case of benchwarmers, which consists of term-limited incumbents replaced by
a relative for only one term, after which they can run again and serve, potentially, for another
three consecutive terms 8. This was the case for the 2nd Congressional District of Cebu City
where, upon serving for three consecutive terms (1988-1998), Cong. Antonio Cuenco had to
leave office and was replaced by his wife Nancy in the 1998 elections. In this example, his wife
did not continue a political career and left office in 2001 when Antonio Cuenco could run again
and regain his seat. Antonio served for another period of 9 consecutive years.
Most common, however, are those who enter politics to replace a term-limited relative and
start a political career of their own, expanding the political power of the family. An example,
based on the province of Camiguin, is illustrated in Figure 2. After serving for three-consecutive
terms in Congress, Pedro Romualdo could not run for reelection in 1998 and decided to run
for provincial governor. His seat in Congress was taken by his son Jurdin Romualdo who won
the 1998 congressional race by a vote margin of over 20 percentage points. As a consequence,
the Romualdo family controlled both Congress and the governorship. In 2007, both Pedro and
Jurdin reached their term-limit and could not run for reelection. This however, was no problem
for the Romualdos; Jurdin ran for provincial governor, taking his father's seat and Pedro went
'See Coronel etal. (2007) for a journalistic description of the use of benchwarmers by term-limited incumbents.
back to Congress. Term limits did not succeed at breaking the Romualdos' control over politics
in Camiguin.
A final example is illustrated in Figure 3. In the province of Bukidnon, Jose Zubiri Jr.
served in Congress between 1988 and 1998. Upon reaching his term limit, his son Juan Zubiri
took his seat in Congress. Jose succesfully ran for governor in the 2001 election. After his
victory, two members of the Zubiri family were in power in Bukidnon. In 2007, Juan reached
his term-limit in Congress. However, unlike the Romualdo family (illustrated in Figure 2),
Juan did not switch offices with his father. Instead, his seat in Congress was taken by his
brother Jose Zubiri III and Juan became a Senator9 . With three members of the Zubiri family
involved in politics, the family had managed to increase its sphere of influence despite term
limits. Moreover, these examples in Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that the response and adaptation
of dynasties to term limits may enhance the political power of these families as their scope of
influence increases both in terms of the number of family members involved and in the number
of elective offices controlled.
The examples illustrated in Figures 1-3 are not atypical. In fact, one family remained in
power for at least 19 years during 1987-2010 in almost 50 Congressional districts. In the next
section, I systematically explore the extent to which these strategies counteract the direct effect
of term limits on incumbents by reducing the effectiveness of term limits on the rotation in
power of families.
2.4 Results
In this section, I explore some of the patterns suggested by the descriptive statistics in Tables
1 and 2 in greater detail. First, I explore the extent to which incumbents become stronger in
their first two terms under the term limits environment. Next, I establish whether term limits
effectively break dynastic persistence in Philippine politics and increase the turnover of families
in office.
'Upon reaching the term-limit in 2010, Jose Zubiri Jr. ran for the vice-vovernorship of the Province and won
by a large margin.
2.4.1 Effect on Incumbents Before Term Limits Bind
As discussed earlier in the introduction, incumbency advantage may induce a strategic response
by challengers when term limits are introduced. Under a term-limit environment, high quality
challengers may prefer to wait for the incumbent to be termed-out and run in an open-seat
race when their probability of winning is much higher. This should be particularly strong
during the period when incumbents are running for reelection in their second term, because
challengers only need to wait one additional term before the incumbent is termed out. As
a consequence, incumbents face weaker competitors in their first two terms and incumbency
advantage increases under the term-limit environment.
The first exercise I use to explore these potential effects, involves looking at changes in
incumbency advantage before (1946-1972) and after (1987-2010) term limits began. While the
differences across these time periods may be explained by other factors I provide evidence
suggesting that such differences are consistent with the strategic response of challengers to
term limits. Estimating incumbency advantage is subject to various methodological challenges.
The electoral advantage enjoyed by incumbents confounds the higher quality of incumbents
vis-a-vis other candidates, the deterrence of high quality challengers and the benefits that
an incumbent derives from office (media exposure, targetted transfers, etc)"). Given that
estimating incumbency advantage is not the main objective of this paper, I explore the trends
in the electoral performance of incumbents in the most simple way by comparing their vote
share against that of non-incumbent candidates. I do this by running a regression of the form:
VoteShareijt z- a + BIncumbenti jt + A(Incumbentijt * Post1987) + 4j + 6t + eist (2.1)
where VoteShareijt is the share of the votes obtained by candidate i from province/district
j in the elections taking place in year t. Incumbentijt is a dummy variable that takes a value
of 1 if candidate i is an incumbent and zero otherwise and 4 and 6t correspond to a set of
province/district and year fixed effects respectively. Finally, Eijt is an error term capturing all
'
0See Erikson (1971), Gelman and King (1990), Levitt and Wolfram (1997) and Ansolabehere and Snyder
(2004) for a dicussion of the methodological challenges associated to estimating incumbency advantage.
omitted factors. The coefficient # captures the electoral advantage of incumbents in the 1946-
1972 period while 0 + A provides the measure for the 1987-2010 period. The OLS estimates of
equation (2.1), reported in Table 3, are for descriptive purposes and only attempt to compute
the change in the average electoral advantage of incumbents after 1987 once provincial and time
effects are partialled out. Given that the vote share is only observed for incumbents who decide
to run for reelection there is an obvious selection issue and # and A partly confound the effect of
higher quality with the actual electoral advantage conferred by incumbency status. Columns 1
and 2 report results for Congress while columns 3 and 4 report results for governors. The results
provide evidence of a substantial electoral advantage of incumbents. Prior to 1972, incumbent
congressmen obtained a vote share 28 percentage points larger than other candidates. Most
importantly, this electoral advantage became substantially larger after 1987 once term limits
were in place; incumbent congressmen between 1987 and 2010 obtained a vote share almost
40 percentage points larger than other candidates. The magnitudes are similar for incumbent
governors who exhibit an electoral advantage of almost 35 percentage points after 1987, an
advantage substantially larger than the one observed prior to 1972. In Querubin (2010) I
provide evidence that incumbents are more likely to be members of political dynasties than
other candidates. Furthermore, dynastic candidates exhibit a large electoral advantage. Hence,
in columns 2 and 4, I include a dummy for whether the candidate is dynastic in order to
disentangle the incumbency effect from that of being dynastic. Candidates are classified as
dynastic if they had a relative serving in Congress or as governor in the 20 years prior to the
election". Including this dummy does not significantly affect the estimated coefficients on the
incumbency variables.
Moreover as discussed in the previous section, the larger vote share obtained by incumbents
in their reelection attempts after 1987 has translated into a larger probability of winning the
election (that is, the larger vote share has mattered). As the first two rows of Table 1 show, the
probability of reelection for incumbent congressmen increased after 1987 by 17 percentage points
for those in their first term and by almost 25 percentage points for incumbents in their second
term. A similar pattern is observed for incumbent governors; the probability of reelection
' Relatives are traced by a match within the province of the family name on the mother, father and/or husband
side. See Querubin (2010) for more details.
after 1987 increases by 25 percentage points for those in their first term and by almost 42
percentage points for those in their second term. One possibility is that this result is driven by
changes in the strategic decision of incumbents regarding whether or not to run for reelection.
If incumbents are better able to assess their electoral prospects after 1987, then one may only
observe potentially successful incumbents running for reelection and this would naturally explain
the larger reelection rates and incumbency advantage in this period. However, the fourth row
of Table 1 suggests that this is not the case as the change in the probability of running for
reelection for incumbents in their first or second term is not statistically significant.
The evidence presented so far provides convincing evidence that incumbents after 1987 ex-
hibit an increase in their electoral advantage and probability of reelection. While this may be
caused by various factors which changed after 1987, the fact that the increase in the probabil-
ity of reelection after 1987 was particularly pronounced for incumbents in their second term
supports the challenger-deterrence hypothesis stated above. High quality challengers should be
particularly averse to challenge incumbents in their second term because they only need to wait
for one term before the seat becomes open. Additional evidence for this intepretation is given
by the junior surge defined as
Junior Surgei = VoteSharei,2 - VoteSharei
where VoteSharei,2 is the vote share of incumbent i in the second reelection attempt and
VoteSharei,1 is the vote share in the first reelection attempt
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. Evidence of a positive junior
surge will likely reflect deterrence of high quality challengers by second-term incumbents running
for reelection. The average junior surge during 1946-1972 and after 1987 is reported in the fifth
row of Panels A and B of Table 1. There is evidence of a negative junior surge of approximately 4
percentage points prior to 1972. However, the junior surge becomes positive (and statitistically
significant) after 1987 for both congressmen and governors. This increase of approximately 5
percentage points in the vote share of second term reelectionist incumbents relative to the vote
share in their first reelection bid is consistent with the deterrence of high-quality challengers
2 Mean reversion is less of a concern for the junior surge relative to other measures such as the sophomore
surge. Given that the conditional probability of reelection is so large in the Philippines (close to 90%) it does
not take an unusually successful run in order to win a reelectionist bid.
and provides further evidence on the role of term limits behind this phenomenon.
Finally, one would like to establish whether candidates who challenge reelectionist incum-
bents are of relatively lower quality compared to those who run in open-seat races. Measuring
challenger quality is not an easy task as many of these candidates only run once for office and
dissappear from the political scene. Moreover, it is often hard to compile data on personal
characteristics of losing candidates that would allow me to proxy for their quality. In Queru-
bin (2010) I provide evidence that dynastic candidates tend to be stronger than non-dynastic
candidates and hence this can be useful in establishing whether incumbents are less likely to
face strong challengers after 1987. The bottom two rows of Table 1 look indirectly at this issue
by reporting the fraction of opponents that were dynastic in races with and without incum-
bents before and after 1987. Interestingly, evidence for congressmen and governors suggests
a substantial (and statistically significant) increase in the fraction of high-quality (dynastic)
opponents in open-seat races but not in races where an incumbent is running for reelection.
This is consistent with the idea of term limits providing incentives for strong candidates (in
this case, dynastic) to wait until an incumbent is termed-out and run in an open-seat race.
The evidence presented in this section shows that under the term limits environment between
1987-2010 incumbency advantage increased. Incumbents in their first and second terms (prior
to reaching their term limit) were more likely to be reelected and reach a third consecutive
term. While this could be explained by other factors that changed after 1987, the evidence of a
positive junior surge only after 1987 as well as the lower opposition by dynastic candidates faced
by incumbents during this period suggests that the increase in the incumbency advantage may
have been caused by the strategic decision of challengers who prefer to wait for the incumbents
to be termed-out and hence give them an "easy ride" in their first two terms. This may seem
puzzling given that the ultimate goal of term limits is to mitigate the incumbency advantage. It
is likely that in the absence of term limits, the turnover of incumbents would have been higher
for those in their first and second term.
2.4.2 Effect on Incumbents and their Families After Term Limits Bind
In this section, I explore the effect of term limits on the persistence in power of term-limited
incumbents and their families. By mandate, term-limited incumbents cannot continue in the
same office immediately after their term limit binds. However, the anecdotal evidence provided
in section 3 suggests that incumbency advantage may spill over to their family members, or
they may even carry it with them to races for other offices. First, I provide descriptive evidence
of these spillovers in incumbency advantage. Then, I explore the extent to which countervailing
effects undermine the effectiveness of term limits.
Incumbency Advantage Spillovers Across Offices and Relatives
In order to analyze the extent to which incumbent governors enjoy an electoral
advantage when running for Congress I estimate a regression of the form:
VoteShareijt a +0IncumbentGovernorijt (2.2)
+A (Incumbent _Governorijt * Post 1987) + $j + 6t + Eit
where VoteShareijt is the vote share of candidate i, from district j who is running in the
congressional election at time t. Incumbent Governorijt is a dummy that takes a value of one
if candidate i is an incumbent governor in province j at time t and zero otherwise. Post1987
is a dummy that takes a value of one in all years after 1987 and #j and 6t are a set of province
and time fixed effects, respectively. 3 corresponds to the electoral advantage of incumbent
governors in congressional elections during 1946-1972 while 0 + A gives the corresponding es-
timate for the 1987-2010 period. Again, equation (2.2) is estimated for descriptive purposes
only and is not meant to capture the causal effect of cross-office incumbency status. In partic-
ular, VoteShareijt is only observed for incumbent governors who run for Congress and hence
selection issues may lead to biased estimates of actual incumbency advantage. Nonetheless,
equation (2.2) is informative on the relative trend of the electoral success across offices of in-
cumbent governors before and after 1987, once province and year fixed effects are partialled
out.
The OLS estimates of equation (2.2) are reported in columns 1 and 2, Panel A of Table 4.
The estimates in column 1 suggest that incumbent governors obtained a vote share that was
10 percentage points larger than that of other congressional candidates during 1946-1972. This
electoral advantage became twice as large in the post-1987 period when incumbent governors
obtained almost 21 percentage points more than other candidates. Moreover, the inclusion of
dynastic and incumbent congressmen dummies in column 2, suggest that cross-office incum-
bency advantage is half the size the advantage incumbents enjoy in their own office.
A similar analysis for the incumbency advantage of incumbent congressmen in gubernatorial
races can be done by estimating a regression of the form:
VoteShareijt = a + Incumbent Congressijt (2.3)
+A (Incumbent _Congres sijt * Post 1987) + $ + 6t + E jt
where the different variables are equivalent to those in (2.2) only that Vote Shareijt now corre-
sponds to the vote share of candidate i in gubernatorial race at time t and Incumbent _ Congressijt
is a dummy for whether candidate i is an incumbent congressman in province j at time t. The
OLS estimates of (2.3) are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Panel B in Table 4. The results are
very similar to those found for incumbent governors in congressional races: incumbent congress-
men received a vote share that was 8 percentage points larger than that of other candidates
during 1946 and 1972 and this advantage increased to 18 percentage points after 1987 (column
1).
Next I explore the existence of spillovers of incumbency advantage to the incumbent's rela-
tives by estimating a regression of the form:
Vote Shareit = a + /Ilncumbent_ Relativeigt (2.4)
+A(Incumbent - Relativei j * Post1987) + pj + 6t + sip
where all variables are as defined above and IncumbentRelativeijt is a dummy that takes
a value of one if candidate i is a relative of time t's incumbent and zero otherwise. Again,
regression (2.4) is estimated for descriptive purposes only. A more careful analysis of the
causal effect of previous relatives in office on electoral performance is provided in Querubin
(2010). The OLS estimates of (2.4) are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. The results
for congressmen in Panel A suggest that relatives of an incumbent obtain a vote share that
is 13 percentage points larger than that of other candidates and this advantage has remained
relatively constant before and after 1987 (column 3). However, the results for governors in Panel
B suggest a larger electoral advantage for relatives of the incumbent governor (20 percentage
points) only in the post-1987 period. In order to establish whether family links to the current
incumbent give any additional advantage beyond the one enjoyed by other dynastic candidates
or incumbents, column 4 controls directly for these effects. In this case, the electoral advantage
of an incumbent's relative corresponds to the sum of the coefficient on the Dynastic and
Incumbent Relative dummies. The results suggest that relatives of incumbent congressmen
receive a vote share that is 11 percentage points larger than that of other dynastic candidates
and 18 percentage points larger than that of other non-dynastic candidates during 1946-1972.
This advantage increased by about 6 percentage points during 1987-2010. The evidence for
governors in column 4 of panel B reveals an electoral advantage of about 3 percentage points
for relatives of the incumbent over non-dynastic candidates during 1946-1972. This advantage
however, increases substantially after 1987.
The evidence reported in Table 4 suggests that incumbents may be able to extend their
electoral advantage to their relatives and other offices. Moreover, this advantage has been
substantially larger after 1987, under a term limits environment, precisely when it is particularly
important for incumbents to devise strategies to maintain their power once term limits bind.
The Effect of Term Limits on the Continuation of Incumbents and their Families
Establishing the effect of term limits on the continuation in power of incumbents and their
families is not trivial because the sample of incumbents who serve for three consecutive terms
and reach a term limit is not random. The hypothetical counterfactual of interest in this setting
is: what would have been the probability of the term-limited incumbents or their families
remaining in power had they not been subject to a term limit? In order to address this
question one needs to define an appropriate control group. Incumbents who reach a term-limit
have been successful at winning three consecutive elections which suggests they are of relatively
high quality. In order to isolate the effect of term limits, the control group should consist of a
sample of incumbents with similar quality but who are not subject to term limits. The sample
of incumbents in their second term seems like the best possible control group in this context;
these incumbents have been elected to office twice (which reflects that they are also of relatively
high quality) but aren't restricted in their possibility to run for reelection. Moreover, one can
take advantage of the fact that during the 1946-1972 period term limits were not yet in place
and use this period as a "pre-treatment" period. This allows me to set up this problem as a
standard difference-in-difference analysis where the "treated" group corresponds to incumbents
in their third term, the "control" group corresponds to incumbents in their second term, the
"pre-treatment" period is 1946-1972 and the "treatment" period is 1987-2010.
The regression associated with the above empirical set-up takes the form:
yij a + Tcrin3ij + -(Post 1987 * Term3it) + 6j + $t + Eijt (2.5)
V i : {Termijt = 2 V Termijt = 3}
where yijt is a dummy that takes a value of one if incumbent (or its family) i, from province j
at time t, remains in power in the next electoral term. The exact definition of yijt will become
more precise later on and will vary depending on whether I study the effect of term limits on
individual incumbents or on the incumbent's family. Term3ijt is a dummy that takes a value of
one if incumbent i is serving the third consecutive term at time t and zero if it is in the second
term. Post 1987 is a dummy that takes a value of 1 in every year after 1987 and zero otherwise
and 6 j and #t are a set of province and year fixed effects respectively. Finally, eijt is an error
term that captures all omitted factors.
The magnitude of interest in this setup is -y which measures the differential continuation
rates of three-termers before and after 1987, compared to incumbents in their second term.
Under certain conditions, , can be interpreted as the causal effect of term limits on the per-
sistence/continuation of an incumbent and its family. The most common assumption, often
called the "parallel slopes" assumption, requires that absent term limits, the difference in the
continuation or persistence rates between three-termers and two-termers would have remained
constant after 1987. This condition often implies that the only difference between three-termers
in 1946-1972 and 1987-2010 is that the latter are subject to term limits while the former are
not. However, as Angrist and Pischke (2009) note, a common pitfall in difference-in-difference
analysis is that the composition of the treatment and control groups may change as a result of
the treatment (in this case, as a consequence of the introduction of term limits). The evidence
presented in section 4.1 suggests that this may be a concern for the empirical design described
by equation (2.5). Recall that in the post-1987 period, incumbents are more likely to serve
for three consecutive terms as incumbents in their first and second term are less likely to face
high quality challengers who prefer to wait for them to be termed-out. Had term limits not
been in place, some of these incumbents would have faced more serious competitors in their
first and second reelection attempts and may not have reached a third term. This implies that
the average quality of three-termers during 1987-2010 is lower relative to the average quality
of three-termers during 1946-1972. Under these conditions, the coefficient y will confound the
effect of term limits with the lower average quality of three termers after 1987. Because lower
quality incumbents are less likely to remain in office, -y will make term limits seem more effective
than what they really are (i.e. the bias will make y more negative than if the quality of three-
termers remained constant). This potential bias must be taken into account when interpreting
the estimates of -y in (2.5) in the subsequent analysis.
Another potential concern is that given the change in the length of congressional and guber-
natorial terms after 1987 from 4 to 3 years, three-termers during 1946-1972 served for 12 years
while those after 1987 served for only 9. To address this issue I will perform a robustness check
in which I count as "treated" 2-termers during 1946-1972 and 3-termers during 1987-2010. The
disadvantage of this approach however, is that first-termers must now be included in the control
group.
Persistence of Incumbents in the same office As a benchmark, I will first estimate the
direct effect of term limits on the probability of the incumbent remaining in power in the same
office. To this end, I estimate (2.5) where the dependent variable yijt is equal to Selfijt , a
dummy variable that takes a value of one if incumbent i remains in power in the same office
in the next period and zero otherwise. Columns 1-3 of Table 5 report the OLS estimates of -y
in equation (2.5). There is an obvious negative and statistically significant effect of term limits
on the persistence of incumbent congressmen (columns 1 and 2) and governors (column 3) in
the same office. This is only evidence that term limits have been enforced. While it is hard to
interpret the magnitude of the coefficient (partly due to the selection biases discussed above),
the estimates in columns 1-3 of Table 5 will be a useful benchmark against which other results
can be compared. In particular, subsequent evidence will establish the extent to which the
various potential countervailing effects created by the strategies of dynasties in order to remain
in power, lead to a reduction of the effect of term limits on the dynasty.
Persistence of Incumbents across offices The first important test concerns the effect of
term limits once one allows for the possibility of incumbents running and remaining in power
in other offices. To explore this, I estimate equation (2.5) where the dependent variable is now
Self OthOfficeijt, a dummy that takes a value of one if the incumbent remains in office the next
period, either in Congress, Senate or as provincial governor. The OLS estimates of -Y for this
analysis are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 5. Once one allows for the possibility of remaining
in power in other offices, the coefficient on congressmen falls by about 20%. Also, recall that,
as noted in section 3, the top executive position in a city is the mayor and not the governor
and hence congressmen representing cities will very rarely run for governor. To address this, I
estimate the regressions on congressmen excluding representatives from cities (column 5). This
however, has a negligible effect on the estimates.
A more striking result is reported in column 6, which reports the estimate of -Y on the
sample of governors. Once one allows for the possibility that governors may continue serving
in Congress or the Senate, the estimate of -y falls by about 65% and is no longer statistically
significant. This is remarkable given that the selection bias on Y, generated by changes in the
quality of three-termers, goes in the direction of finding a stronger negative effect of term limits
on the persistence of incumbents. The difference in the coefficients for congressmen (columns
4 and 5) and governors (column 6) is intuitive and was anticipated in section 3. Recall that
provincial governors often have multiple Congressional districts in which they can choose to
run should they want to enter Congress, while many congressmen must compete for only one
gubernatorial spot. Also, the results reported in columns 4-6 underestimate the extent to which
switching offices can reduce the effect of term limits on the persistence of incumbents as many
congressmen and governors run for city mayor, vice-mayor and provincial vice-governor that
are not in my dataset. Allowing for this possibility would probably make the estimates of -y in
columns 4-6 closer to zero.
Persistence of the Incumbent's Family in the same office. Next I explore the role
of relatives and the extent to which they counteract the effect of term limits on the family.
I do this by estimating equation (2.5) but using the dependent variable Self Relativeijt, a
dummy that takes a value of one if the incumbent or a relative remains in power in the same
office in the next term and zero otherwise. In this case, the focus is on whether term limits
are effective at removing the incumbent's family (and not just the incumbent) from the same
office. The OLS estimates of -y are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 6. Allowing for the
possibility that incumbents are replaced by family members causes the estimate of -y to fall by
almost 50% relative to the benchmark estimates reported in columns 1-3 of Table 6 (effects
on the incumbent). Moreover, the coefficient on governors (column 3) is no longer statistically
significant at standard levels. While the precise magnitude of the coefficients is hard to interpret
given the selection bias, the estimates in columns 1-3 suggest that the use of relatives allows
incumbents to undo almost half of the direct effect of term limits.
As a robustness check, columns 1-3 of Table 7 re-estimate columns 1-3 of Table 6 but
compare three-termers in 1987-2010 with two-termers in 1946-1972. That is, they report the
estimates of -y from estimating:
Self Relativeijt a + TermTreatedijt (2.6)
+1(Post1987 * Term_ Treatedijt) + 6j + $t + Eijt
V i : {Termijt = 1 V Termijt = 2 V Termit = 3}
where TermTreatedijt takes a value of one if the incumbent is a three-termer serving after
1987 or the incumbent is a two-termer serving between 1946 and 1972 and zero otherwise. The
estimates of -y in (2.6) reported in columns 1-3 of Table 7 reveal a similar, though slightly
smaller reduction with respect to the benchmark estimates in columns 1-3 of Table 5.
Persistence of the Incumbent's Family across offices Next, I combine the previous
two strategies for political survival by allowing for the possibility that the incumbent's family
(including the incumbent himself) remains in power in the same or in a different elected office.
I estimate equation (2.5) where the dependent variable is now Self Relative_ OthOfficeit, a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the incumbent or a relative remains in power in the
next period either in Congress, the Senate, or the provincial governorship. This essentially
tests whether term limits are effective at removing the incumbent family from the top elective
positions in the Philippines. The results are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 6. Remarkably,
the coefficient on the effect of term limits on the persistence of congressmen's families (columns
4 and 5) falls by over 80% relative to the benchmark effect on the individual incumbents and is
no longer statistically significant. The results for governors are even stronger; the estimate of
-y in column 6 becomes very close to zero and is not statistically significant either. This result
suggests that term limits may not effectively increase the turnover of families in Congress and
provincial governorships because incumbents successfully adapt by running for other offices and
bringing relatives into politics in order to maintain their political power. This is the main result
of the paper. Confidence in this result is strengthened because is probably biased towards
showing that term limits are more effective than they really are. Moreover, just as in Table 5,
these estiniates underestimate the extent to which running for other offices reduces the effect
of term limits because they do not take into account those who become mayors, vice-mayors
and vice-governors after becoming term-limited.
A robustness check is reported in columns 4-6 of Table 7 based on estimates of equation
(2.6) but using Self Relative_ OthOfficeijt as the dependent variable. The result for governors
is basically unchanged; the estimate of -i remains very close to zero. The estimates for Congress
however, though still almost 50% smaller than the benchmark estimates in Table 5, still suggest
a statistically significant effect of term limits. However, this robustness check must be inter-
preted cautiously as it requires using incumbents in their first term as a control. This latter
group may be very different from second arid third-termers for reasons other than term limits.
Persistence of Incumbents and their families in the Long Run The results presented
so far focus on the effect of term limits on the persistence in power of an incumbent or his
family in the term/period immediately after the third consecutive term, when the incumbent is
term-limited and cannot run again in the same office. However, incumbents are allowed to run
again and attempt to return to office after "waiting" for one term out of office. This implies
that the effect of term limits may be smaller in the long run than in the short run if a large
fraction of incumbents manage to return to office at some point in the future after being term-
limited. I explore the long run effect of term limits on both incumbents and the incumbent's
family. To estimate the effect on the individual incumbents I estimate equation (2.5) using as a
dependent variable Self Everjjt, a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the incumbent serves again
in Congress, the Senate, or the provincial governorship at any point in the future (after time t),
and zero otherwise. The results are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 8. Columns 1 and 2 report
the estimates for congressmen and show that the long run effects are about one third smaller
than the short run effects reported in columns 4-5 of Table 5. However, the estimates of - are
still statistically significant, which suggests that term limits may be an effective way to end the
political career of some individual incumbents (even though the estimated effect is probably
smaller in absolute value due to the selection bias). It is important to keep in mind, however,
that these estimates may over-estimate the long-run effectiveness of term limits as the analysis
only tracks whether incumbents had returned to power by 2007 (when the latter elections in my
sample took place). Some incumbents that became term-limited during 1995-2004 may return
to politics after 2007, but this is not captured in my measure. The estimate of -y for governors
reported in column 3 also suggests that the long run effect of term limits is about one third
smaller than the long-run effect and is not statistically significant.
Perhaps the most important question given the prevalence of political dynasties in the
Philippines, is whether term limits effectively remove the incumbent's family from office in
the long run. I address this question by estimating equation (2.5) but using as a dependent
variable Self Relative_ Everijt, a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the incumbent
or a relative serve in Congress, the Senate or the provincial governorship at any point in the
future (after time t), and zero otherwise. The OLS estimates of -y are reported in columns 4-6
of Table 8 and suggest that term limits do not effectively remove an incumbent's family from
office. The point estimates for both congressmen and governors are very close to zero and are
not statistically significant. This further reinforces the main result of the paper: while term
limits may effectively remove individual incumbents from office, the important role of relatives
in Philippine politics allows incumbents to maintain the political power of the family both in
the short and the long run.
Term Limits and the persistence of dynastic politicians The final question I address in
the paper is whether term limits are capable of changing the type of politician that gets elected
to office. In Querubin (2010) I discuss the prevalence of dynastic politicians in Philippine
politics and the potential negative effect that this has on the political system. It is important
to establish whether the open seat races created by term limits allow new candidates without
any family ties to politics to access elected office. To do this I estimate equation (2.5) using the
dependent variable Rep_ Dynasticijt, a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a dynastic
incumbent remains in the same office in the term immediately after time t and zero otherwise.
The OLS estimates of -/ for this analysis are reported in Table 9. The point estimate for
governors in column 3 is practically equal to zero which suggests that term limits are not
successful at breaking the dynastic pattern in Philippine politics. The results for congressmen
in columns 1-2 are even stronger and suggest, if anything, a positive effect of term limits
on the likelihood of having a dynastic incumbent in office. Most of this effect is naturally
driven by the fact that some term-limited incumbents are replaced by their relatives (which
are by definition dynastic). Hence, large cohorts of dynastic incumbents enter office after 1998
when the first cohort of incumbents became term limited. However, this positive effect also
captures the fact that open-seat races following a term-limited incumbent are often won by
members of other established dynasties not necessarily related to the previous incumbent. In
sum, term limits have not changed the dynastic nature of politics in the Philippines and has,
if anything, exacerbated it by providing incentives for incumbents to use their relatives as a
"survival strategy" when term limits bind.
2.5 Conclusions
The evidence provided in this paper suggests that term limits do not effectively increase the
turnover of incumbent families in Congress and Provincial governorships in the Philippines.
This is not very encouraging in the context of an elite dominated democracy such as the Philip-
pines, where the family constitutes the most important unit of social and political organization.
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence in section 4 suggests that term limits may have been par-
tially effective at increasing the turnover of individual incumbents; often, older generations
retire as a consequence of term limits, giving way to younger members of their families who
enter politics to replace them and start their own political careers. This generational shift may
change the stance in Congress with respect to certain social policies, but is unlikely to change
the fundamental interests represented in the democratic system. This is ultimately what term
limits pursue. The impact on the average quality of politicians is also uncertain. Larger in-
cumbency advantages make it easier for an incumbent to remain in power for 9 consecutive
years. Some of these incumbents (particularly the least able) might not have retained power
for such a long period if term limits had not been in place. Instead, they would have faced
stronger competitors in earlier terms. Similarly, relatives of term-limited incumbents may have
less political experience than their predecessors which could potentially hurt the provision of
public goods and other policies.
The result that term limits have not been effective (and may have exacerbated) the dynastic
nature of Philippine politics should not be surprising. This particular institution does not affect
in any sense the fundamental sources of political power of dynasties which include their control
over land, employment and violence in their respective provinces. This is a more general concern
about other types of political reform. Reforms that do not alter the underlying distribution
of political power will not succeed in substantively changing the political equilibrium because
incumbents will adapt and remain powerful under the new set of institutions (Acemoglu, John-
son and Robinson, 2005 and Acemoglu and Robinson 2008 amongst others). The dynastic
politicians who drafted the 1987 Constitution probably understood this and anticipated their
ability to adapt to the term limits that they themselves introduced.
This paper motivates some additional questions to be addressed by future research. On the
methodological side, a more structural approach which incorporates the underlying quality of
incumbents and their challengers will be very useful in order to more precisely estimate the
effect of term limits and eliminate the potential selection bias that contaminated some of my
results. Alternatively, one can collect additional information on the candidates such as their
previous political experience in order to control directly for potential measures of their quality.
Most importantly, future research should try to establish the effect that the generational
shift in politics, induced by term limits, has had on legislation and other type of policies and
economic outcomes.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics (Before and After Term-Limits)
No Term-Limits Term-Limits
Environment Environment T Test
Variable (1946-1972) (1988-2010) (p-value)
A. Congress
Fraction of freshmen who reach at least a 2nd term 0.458 0.633 0.00
Fraction of freshmen who reach at least a 3rd term 0.238 0.484 0.00
Fraction of freshmen who reach a term>3 0.140 0.000 0.00
Fraction of incumbents in their 1st or 2nd term who run for reelection 0.793 0.824 0.15
Junior Surge -0.038 0.038 0.00
Average Number of Terms Served 1.698 1.912 0.00
Fraction of Races without Incumbent (Open Seat) 0.324 0.421 0.00
Margin of Victory (Open Seat Races) 0.158 0.196 0.02
Margin of Victory (Races with Incumbents) 0.161 0.369 0.00
Fraction of Open Seat Races Uncontested 0.000 0.015 0.06
Fraction of Races with Incumbent Uncontested 0.000 0.066 0.00
Fraction of Opponents that are Dynastic (Open Seat Races) 0.176 0.255 0.00
Fraction of Opponents that are Dynastic (Races with Incumbents) 0.150 0.147 0.85
B. Governors
Fraction
Fraction
Fraction
of freshmen who reach at least a 2nd term
of freshmen who reach at least a 3rd term
of freshmen who reach a term>3
Fraction of incumbents in their 1st or 2nd term who run for reelecti
Junior Surge
Average Number of Terms Served
Fraction of Races without Incumbent (Open Seat)
Margin of Victory (Open Seat Races)
Margin of Victory (Races with Incumbents)
Fraction of Open Seat Races Uncontested
Fraction of Races with Incumbent Uncontested
Fraction of Opponents that are Dynastic (Open Seat Races)
Fraction of Opponents that are Dynastic (Races with Incumbents)
on
U.342
0.096
0.038
0.806
-0.042
1.405
0.361
0.155
0.174
0.000
0.012
0.197
0.159
0.590
0.412
0.000
0.839
0.050
1.810
0.397
0.198
0.292
0.052
0.019
0.332
0.200
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.27
0.00
0.00
0.26
0.04
0.00
0.01
0.50
0.00
0.12
Junior surge is defined as the difference of the vote share obtained by incumbents in their second and first reelection attempt. Open
Seat races refer to races in which the current incumbent is not running for reelection. Fraction of opponents that are dynastic refers to
the fraction of candidates (excluding the incumbent in races with incumbent) that had a relative in office in the 20 years prior to the
election.
Table 2
Term-Limited Congressmen and Governors and SurvivalStrategies
A. Congressmen
As % of those who % Moved to % Replaced by Relative
Entered with them Governorship AND Moved to
Election Year Term Limited in Term 1 % Replaced by Relative or Senate Governorship or Senate
1995 83 0.415 0.434 0.084 0.036
1998 49 0.521 0.286 0.245 0.020
2001 23 0.460 0.522 0.087 0.087
2004 63 0.496 0.397 0.190 0.063
2007 62 0.574
Total (1995-2007) 280 0.491 0.311 0.118 0.036
B. Governors
As % of those who % Moved to % Replaced by Relative
Entered with them Congress or AND Moved to Congress or
Election Year Term Limited in Term 1 % Replaced by Relative Senate Senate
1995 22 0.301 0.045 0.409 0.045
1998 19 0.432 0.263 0.158 0.000
2001 11 0.423 0.455 0.636 0.273
2004 21 0.525 0.476 0.476 0.333
2007 18 0.419
Total (1995-2007) 91 0.418 0.231 0.319 0.121
Term-limited refers to incumbents who started their third consecutive
reelection in the same office in the following election.
term in the respective election year and could not run for
Table 3
Incumbency Advantage before and after term limits
Dependent Variable is Vote Share
Incumbent Dummy
Incumbent*Post 1987
Dynastic Dummy
Dynastic Dummy*Post 1987
Congress
(1)
0.276
(0.009) (
0.130
(0.013) (
(
(
(2)
0.265
0.009)
0.118
0.013)
0.099
0.010)
0.029
0.013)
(3)
0.19 z
(0.01
0.15 5
(0.01
Governors
(4)
0.188
3) (0.013)
0.142
(0.019)
0.063
(0.018)
0.071
(0.022)
Observations 8377 8377
R-squared 0.411 0.443
3058 3058
0.324 0.360
Robust Standard Errors, clustered at the candidate level are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of province/district
and year fixed effects. Sample includes all candidates for Congressional and Gubernatorial elections for the period 1946-2007. Dynastic
Dummy takes a value of 1 if the candidate had a relative who served as Congressman or Governor in the 20 years prior to the election.
Incumbent Dummy takes a value of 1 if the candidate is the current incumbent seeking reelection.
Table 4
Electoral Advantage of Incumbents in Other Office and Incumbent Realtives
Panel A: Congress
Dependent Variable is Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incumbent Governor
Post-1987*lncumbent Governor
Incumbent Relative
Post-1987*1ncumbent Relative
Dynastic
Incumbent
Post-1987*1ncumbent
Post-1 987*Dynastic
0.105
(0.029)
0.119
(0.036)
0.161
(0.029)
0.136
(0.036)
0.101
(0.010)
0.273
(0.009)
0.120
(0.013)
0.023
(0.012)
0.128
(0.025)
0.026
(0.030)
0.109
(0.027)
0.063
(0.032)
0.087
(0.010)
0.275
(0.009)
0.132
(0.013)
-0.002
(0.013)
Observations 8377 8377 8377 8377
R-squared 0.103 0.435 0.109 0.435
Panel B: Governors
Incumbent Congressman 0.084 0.112
(0.025) (0.024)
Post-1987*lncumbent Congressman 0.097 0.131
(0.032) (0.032)
Incumbent Relative -0.028 -0.030
(0.073) (0.076)
Post-1987*lncumbent Relative 0.209 0.203
(0.077) (0.081)
Dynastic 0.063 0.065
(0.018) (0.018)
Incumbent 0.192 0.188
(0.013) (0.013)
Post-1987*lncumbent 0.159 0.155
(0.019) (0.019)
Post-1 987*Dynastic 0.061 0.042
(0.022) (0.022)
Observations 3058 3058 3058 3058
R-squared 0.125 0.395 0.118 0.370
Robust Standard Errors, clustered at the candidate level are reported in parentheses. Sample includes
all candidates for Congressional and Gubernatorial elections for the period 1946-2007. Dynastic
Dummy takes a value of 1 if the candidate had a relative who served as Congressman or Governor in
the 20 years prior to the election. Incumbent takes a value of 1 if the candidate is the current
incumbent in that office seeking reelection. Incumbent Relative is a dummy that takes a value of one if
the candidate is related to the current incumbent.
Table 5
Difference-in-Difference Regressions for whether the incumbent remains in office.
Dependent Variable is Self
Congress
Post-1 987*Term=3
(Excluding
Cities)
(2)
-0.559
(0.092)
Governors
(3)
-0.637
(0.193)
Dependent Variable is SelfOthOffice
Congress
(4)
-0.466
(0.093)
Congress
(Excluding
Cities)(5)
-0.446
(0.096)
Governors
(6)_
-0.229
(0.198)
Observations 789 685 272
R-squared 0.758 0.749 0.609
789 685 272
0.675 0.668 0.439
Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of province/district and year fixed effects. Sample
includes all incumbent Congressmen and Governors in their 2 nd and 3rd term in the period 1946-2007. The dependent variable in
columns 1-3 is a dummy that takes a value of one if the incumbent remains in power in the same office in the next term. The dependent
variable in columns 4-6 is a dummy that takes a value of one if the incumbent remains in power in Congress, Senate or the provincial
governorship in the next term.
Congress
(1)
-0.561
(0.091)
Table 6
Difference-in-Difference Regressions for whether the Incumbent or it's Family remains in office.
Lependent Variable is Self Relative
Post-1 987*Term=3
Congress
(1)
-0.253
(0.092)
Congress
(Excluding
Cities)
(2)
-0.223
(0.096)
Governors
(3)
-0.355
(0.208)
Observations 789 685 272
R-squared 0.607 0.601 0.497
Dependent Variable is Self RelativeOthOffice
Congress
(Excluding
Congress Cities) Governors
(4) (5) (6)
-0.153 -0.103 -0.048
(0.092) (0.095) (0.197)
789 685 272
0.565 0.553 0.446
Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of province/district and year fixed effects. Sample
includes all incumbent Congressmen and Governors in their 2nd and 3rd term in the period 1946-2007. The dependent variable in
columns 1-3 is a dummy that takes a value of one if the incumbent or a relative remain in power in the same office in the next term.The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is a dummy that takes a value of one if the incumbent or a relative remain in power in Congress,Senate or the provincial governorship in the next term.
Table 7
Difference-in-Difference Regressions for whether the Incumbent or it's Family remains in office.
Using 2-termers as "treated" incumbents in the Pre-1987 period
Dependent Variable is SelfRelative
Post-1 987*Term-Treated
Congress
(1)
-0.350
(0.064)
Congress
(Excluding
Cities)
(2)
-0.328
(0.067)
Governors
(3) 
_
-0.286
(0.101)
Observations 1742 1512 760
R-squared 0.339 0.327 0.220
Dependent Variable is Self_RelativeOthOffice
Congress
(Excluding
Congress Cities) Governors
(4) (5) (6)
-0.342 -0.306 -0.038
(0.064) (0.067) (0.100)
1742 1512 760
0.305 0.289 0.196
Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of province/district and year fixed effects. Sample
includes all incumbent Congressmen and Governors in their 1st, 2nd and 3 rd term in the period 1946-2007. Term-Treated is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if the incumbent is a 2-termer serving between 1946 and 1972 or a 3-termer serving after 1987. The
dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy that takes a value of one if the incumbent or a relative remain in power in the same
office in the next term. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is a dummy that takes a value of one if the incumbent or a relative
remain in power in Congress, Senate or the provincial governorship in the next term.
Table 8
Difference-in-Difference Regressions for whether the Incumbent or it's Family Continue in Politics in the Future
Cc
(I
Post-1 987*Term=3
Dependent Variable is
Congress
(Excluding
ngress Cities)
(1) (2)
0.319 -0.321
0.095) (0.099)
SelfEver
Governors
(3)
-0.198
(0.161)
Dependent Variable is SelfRelativeEver
Congress
(4)
0.011
(0.063)
Congress
(Excluding
Cities)
(5)
0.017
(0.065)
Governors
(6)
-0.049
(0.094)
Observations 760 664 280
R-squared 0.542 0.532 0.395
823 718 301
0.391 0.393 0.358
Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of province/district and year fixed effects. Sample
includes all incumbent Congressmen and Governors in their 2 nd and 3rd term in the period 1946-2007. The dependent variable in
columns 1-3 is a dummy that takes a value of one if the incumbent returns to Congress, Senate or the provincial governorship at any
point in the future. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is a dummy that takes a value of one if the incumbent or a relative serves in
Congress, Senate or the provincial governorship at any point in the future.
Table 9
Difference-in-Difference Regressions for whether a Dynastic Politician Remains in Office
Dependent Variable is RepDynastic
Congress
Congress (Excluding Cities) Governors
(1) (2) (3)
Post-1 987*Term=3 0.182 0.198 -0.003
(0.101) (0.105) (0.171)
Observations 789 685 272
R-squared 0.579 0.578 0.462
Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of province/district and year fixed effects. Sample
includes all incumbent Congressmen and Governors in their 2nd and 3rd term in the period 1946-2007. The dependent variable in
columns 1-3 is a dummy that takes a value of one if a dynastic incumbent is in power in the same office in the next term.
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Chapter 3
Economic and Political Inequality in
Development: The Case of
Cundinamarca, Colombia1
3.1 Introduction
A large and growing academic literature argues that economic inequality has adverse effects on
economic development, for example, because of the effects of imperfect capital markets, through
demand externalities, or because of political economy reasons. 2 A recently-emerging consensus,
exemplified by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), maintains that the divergent economic paths of
North and South America are a consequence of their different levels of economic inequality. This
consensus asserts that the main difference between the two parts of the American continent was
the differences in economic inequality that emerged during the colonial period and persisted to
'Joint with Daron Acemoglu, Maria Angelica Bautista and James A. Robinson2 On the effect of inequality because of its interactions with imperfect capital markets see, for example, Banerjee
and Newman (1993) or Galor and Zeira (1993). For the impact of inequality through the composition of aggregate
demand, see, for example, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). More important for the application of these
theories to Latin America and for the focus of the present paper are the political economy mechanisms linking
inequality to economic development (see, among others, Meltzer and Richard, 1981, Alesina and Rodrik, 1994,
Persson and Tabellini, 1994, Benabou, 2000). In addition, some authors emphasize the link between inequality
and political instability (Alesina and Perotti, 1996) and on incentives to invest in education (Bourguignon and
Verdier, 2000, Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2006). See Benabou (1996) and Aghion, Caroli and Garcfa-Pefialosa
(1999) for surveys of this literature.
the 19th century, and links the current economic difficulties of South American nations to their
greater inequality.
A major empirical challenge for this view, however, is that economic inequality is also
correlated with many other potential determinants of long-run development. Most important
for the focus of this paper, economic inequality may be associated with political inequality, in
the sense that collective choices reflect the wishes and interests of a small subsection of the
society. Theoretically, we may expect economic inequality to lead to political inequality (as
the economically powerful become politically more influential), but the reverse link is at least
as important, as those with political power will be able to amass greater economic wealth.
To illustrate this point, note that there is a negative relationship between land inequality and
development not only when we compare the United States to South America, but also across
the US states. For example, Figure 1 shows a plot of the land gini in each US state in 1860
against total school enrollment in 1870 (see below for data details). There is a clear negative
relationship, with the more unequal Southern states having lower enrollments. Figure 2 plots
the relationship between the land gini in 1860 against the enrollment rate in 1950 and shows
that this relationship persists to the 20th century.3 Do these correlations establish that there
is an adverse effect of economic inequality on schooling? While this is a possibility, one also
has to bear in mind that the US states with greater economic inequality are also those with
greater political inequality. For example, the Southern states were not only more unequal
economically, but exhibited a very high degree of political inequality, with a large fraction
of the population disenfranchised and large planters controlling politics directly or indirectly.
Therefore, one can imagine that it might be the relationship between political inequality and
economic outcomes that underlies the patterns shown in Figures 1 and 2. Political inequality
may retard development because elites who control politics may create rents for themselves,
3A similar relationship between land inequality and education across US states during the mid-20th-century is
documented in Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2006) and Ramcharan (2006). However, consistent with Nunn's (2007)
results on the relationship between land inequality and income today, we find that the relationship between land
inequality in the 19th century and current educational attainment is much weaker. This presumably reflects the
rapid convergence of Southern states to the US average in terms of education and income per capita over the
past 50 years following the major educational and political reforms in the South. The fact that the relationship
between historical economic inequality and educational attainment has disappeared in less than half a century
following political reforms further bolsters our evidence from Cundinamarca suggesting that political inequality
is as important as, or more important than, economic inequality in shaping comparative development.
impede entry (Acemoglu, 2007a), and have little interest in the provision of public goods,
including schooling (Bates, 1981). Political inequality will also tend to be associated with the
absence of political competition and accountability, two factors which help to guarantee that
political systems generate desirable outcomes. 4
Is it economic or political inequality that matters for long-run development? And how
does inequality in general interact with the institutional structure of a society in shaping its
development path? These questions are made interesting in part because even though it is
typically asserted that economic and political inequality go hand in hand, particularly in Latin
America and across US states, this is not necessarily so everywhere else in the world, or even,
as we show, in Colombia. For example, in much of Sub-Saharan Africa since independence
measured economic inequality has been quite low, but political inequality has been severe
with rule by long-running autocrats or small cliques, most clearly in the Sudan, Angola, the
Congo, Malawi, C6te d'Ivoire, Togo and the Cameroon. This combination led to disastrous
development outcomes. In contrast to the African cases, development in South Korea and
Taiwan seems to have taken place precisely in the context of economic equality, but under
dictatorial regimes, with political power concentrated in the hands of a small elite. Finally,
there are examples of rapid development with high economic inequality but relative political
equality, such as Mauritius in the 1970s and 1980s. It is therefore important to attempt to
"unbundle" the separate effects of economic and political inequality on long-run development
both to gain a better understanding of the causes of the process of economic development and
to evaluate the newly emerging conventional wisdom about the sources of underdevelopment in
Latin America.
Despite the importance of the aforementioned questions, they have not been tackled by the
existing literature. The early cross-country work finds a negative correlation between economic
inequality and growth (for example Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Persson and Tabellini, 1994,
Perotti, 1996), but as noted above, this work does not distinguish between political and eco-
nomic inequality, which are often highly correlated. Moreover, even the negative correlation
between economic inequality and subsequent growth appears to be non-robust (Barro, 2000,
'Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2006a) also suggest that in societies with significant political inequalities,
those with political power may block the introduction of new technologies or underinvest in public goods because
of the fear that this will erode their political power.
Forbes, 2000, Banerjee and Duflo, 2003).5 There is also micro evidence on the relationship be-
tween economic inequality and development, for example Benjamin, Brandt and Giles (2006).
The issue of the effects of political inequality has not been systematically addressed, however,
except to the extent that it can be associated with the absence of democracy. While some
theoretical papers suggest that democracy ought to be good for development (Acemoglu, and
Robinson, 2000b, Lizzeri and Persico, 2005), others argue the relationship is ambiguous (Ace-
moglu, 2007a) and the empirical literature mostly finds no effects (Barro, 1997), though Bond,
Barndt, Gerring and Moreno (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006) find a positive effect of
the cumulative democratic history of a country on economic growth.
In this paper we investigate the influence of economic and political inequality on long-run
development using microdata from the state of Cundinamarca in Colombia. Our focus is the
critical period of development in the late 19th century when Latin American economies began
to grow and integrate with the world market. Cundinamarca provides a natural setting for such
an investigation since it was the center of the largest pre-Columbian civilization in Colombia,
the Muiscas. It also contains Bogotd the capital both of colonial and independent Colombia. In
many ways, Cundinamarca was at the heart of the Spanish colonial system. Our investigation
is made possible by unique data on 19th-century land ownership. In 1879 and 1890 the state of
Cundinamarca undertook comprehensive land censuses (catastros) which recorded the identity
of each landowner in the state, the name of their farm and the value of their land. We use
these data to construct gini coefficients for the distribution of landed wealth. The land gini is
both a natural and easy to interpret measure of economic inequality, and it is used commonly
in the literature. Moreover, by focusing on land inequality, we can capture the major source of
economic inequality in South America emphasized by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997).6
To measure political inequality we collected data on the identity of all of the mayors of
the municipalities of Cundinamarca for the period 1875 to 1895. Specifically, we construct
" To deal with the ubiquitous omitted variable biases in such regressions, Easterly (2007) instruments inequality
with the extent of land suitable for growing sugarcane and finds a negative effect on growth. Since the presence
of sugar plantations may create negative effects through a variety of channels, including political inequality, this
evidence does not establish that it is economic inequality that matters or that there is a causal effect from overall
economic inequality to growth.
"Though some of these data has been discussed by historians, for example Jimenez (1985), and Palacios
(1981) provided an analysis of the 1879 data for the entire department, we are the first to study these data more
systematically and examine the long-run consequences of land inequality in Cundinamarca.
an index of political concentration, which measures the extent to which political officeholding
was monopolized by individuals. Throughout this period, the right to vote in Cundinamarca
was restricted by property and literacy requirements. Nevertheless, the distribution of political
power varied a lot across different municipalities of Cundinamarca, with some having frequent
turnover of mayors, while in others the same family or small group of families kept power for
extended periods. 7
Finally, our data also enable us to investigate another interesting related question, the de-
velopmental implications of the overlap between economic and political power. In particular,
having both political and economic power concentrated in the hands of a small group of indi-
viduals creates both benefits (since the politicians are willing to choose policies that encourage
investment as this increases the value of their own assets) as well as costs (since a greater degree
of elite control of politics and the economy can lead to the existence of a landed oligarchy, which
may be costly for development).8 We investigate these questions by constructing an index of
overlap, which measures the extent to which large landowners and politicians were the same
people. 9
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, by way of comparison, using micro data
from the 1860 US census, we show that while the distribution of landed wealth in Cundinamarca
was considerably more unequal than Northern US states, it was less unequal than in the US
South.10 More important and somewhat surprising, we find a negative association between
7 We calculated political concentration both at the level of individuals and aggregating last names to the level
of families. However, the results with families were very similar and in the paper we report results only with
individuals.
"Classic works that emphasize the cost of landed oligarchy in Latin America include Stein and Stein (1970),
Gilbert (1977), Stone (1990), and Paige (1997). See Schwartz (1996) for a review of the facts and issues. Acemoglu
(2007a) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) present models in which such concentration of power can lead to
adverse effects. On the other hand, many simple political economy models suggest that congruence of interests
between the politically and economically powerful may be good for economic development (see, for example,
Acemoglu, 2007b).
"There is an interesting literature that indirectly speaks to this issue. This literature finds that connections
between politicians and firms tend to raise the asset prices of firms (Fisman, 2001, Johnson and Mitton, 2003,
Faccio, 2006), get them preferential access to loans from government banks (Khwaja and Mian, 2005) or policy
favors (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar and Thesmar, 2006). Bertrand et al. (2006) also find that politically connected
firms alter their decisions in response to political incentives. However, this literature has not looked at the
implications of these linkages for development outcomes.
"'This in itself is important. We know little about the basic historical facts on comparative wealth inequality
in Latin America and what we do know is not always consistent with the view espoused by Engerman and
Sokolof (1997) that Latin America always had greater economic inequality than the United States (see Jones,
1980, Johnson, 1994). Most notably, Coatsworth (1998) argues that greater inequality in Latin America is a
land inequality (land gini) and political concentration across municipalities in Cundinamarca.
Though this is inconsistent with the stylized picture that, at least in Latin America, political
and economic inequality often covary, it is actually consistent with the historical literature on
Colombia which stresses that politics was a career open to people of many backgrounds (see
Safford, 1972, 1974, Deas 1993, and Uribe-Uran, 2000).
Our second set of results are rather surprising. When we look at current outcomes, we
find that land gini (economic inequality) is positively associated with good outcomes. For
example, areas that were more unequal in the late 19th century have higher levels of secondary
and primary school enrollment, lower poverty and higher urbanization. Figure 3 shows the
relationship between the land gini at the end of the 19th century and contemporary secondary
school enrollment in Cundinamarca. In contrast to Figures 1 and 2 for the United States, there
is now a positive relationship. A natural concern is that this positive relationship may reflect
the effect of some omitted factors, such as higher land quality in places with higher inequality.
We attempt to deal with potential sources of omitted variable bias by controlling for a rich set
of geographic characteristics and current land inequality. Overall, our results suggest that the
relationship shown in Figure 3 is relatively robust. We also find similar results when we look
at outcomes at intermediate dates, such as data from the 1937 census. The estimated effects
are also large economically. For instance, the historical land gini on its own accounts for about
30% of the variation in the contemporary outcome variables.
Even though this correlation does not establish a causal effect, it is difficult to rationalize
with theories that argue for a direct causal link from economic inequality to long-run economic
development, such as that in Engerman and Sokoloff (1997). This is particularly challenging
to the view that greater land inequality will have negative effects on economic development by
depressing education, for example as articulated by Galor and Zeira (1993), Benabou (2000),
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2006) and Ramcharan (2006). Our
evidence shows that land inequality is uncorrelated with literacy in 1937 and has a positive
effect on primary and secondary school enrollment in 1993.
When we turn to political variables, however, we find a fairly robust negative relationship
relatively recent phenomenon associated with the economic developments of the late 19th century, leading to
some group of politically-powerful individuals monopolizing large productive stretches of land. Our result that
land inequality in the US South was greater than in Cundinamarca provides support to this viewpoint.
between political concentration (our measure of political inequality) and good economic out-
comes. Figure 4, for example, shows a significant negative relationship between our index of
political concentration at the end of the 19th century and secondary school enrollment today.
In contrast, we find no robust effect of the overlap measure discussed above on either long-term
or medium-term outcomes.
Though difficult to reconcile with the conventional wisdom, our findings are consistent
with other strands of research, including both the historical literature on Colombia and Latin
America and work by Bates (1981) on the political economy of Africa. Bates (1981) documented
that economic policy in post independence Kenya was more conducive to better economic
outcomes than in Ghana because of the balance of power between politicians and economic elites
in the former country. In Ghana, smallholders growing cocoa could not solve the collective action
problem and were unable to restrain politicians from engaging in costly clientelism and choosing
highly distortionary economic policies. In Kenya, mostly as a legacy of white settlement in the
highlands, farm sizes were larger and an agricultural elite was able to organize and check the
power of the politicians in Nairobi. In consequence, better policies and economic outcomes
resulted. Therefore, Bates's comparison of Ghana versus Kenya provides an example in which
greater (land) inequality led to better economic outcomes.11
In this light, a possible interpretation for our results is that powerful and rich landowners
may be creating checks against the most rapacious tendencies of politicians. Consequently,
in the municipalities with major landowners, distortionary policies that could be pursued by
politicians were limited, and this led to better economic outcomes. This interpretation is also
consistent with the negative association between political inequality and economic outcomes
(as well as the negative relationship between economic and political inequality we find in Cun-
dinamarca). Though plausible, this explanation is in stark contrast to both the conventional
wisdom about the source of underdevelopment in Latin America and to the insights of many
economic models emphasizing the negative effects of inequality by restricting access to credit or
'Our findings and this interpretation are also consistent with Coatsworth (1998, 2005) and Nugent and
Robinson (2002), who have emphasized that economic inequality in Latin America is better thought of as an
outcome of the unequal distribution of political influence. In turn these more general arguments echo a large
literature by historians, for instance Solberg (1969) or McCreery (1994).
Our results are also consistent with Banerjee and Somanathan's (2006) finding that higher land inequality
is associated with greater public good provision in India. They suggest that this may be because higher land
inequality allows landowners to solve their collective action problems.
through political economy mechanisms. As a check on the plausibility of our interpretation, we
use the microdata from the Cundinamarca land censuses to construct a separate overall land
gini. While the standard measure of the land gini captures inequality among landowners, the
overall land gini measures inequality in the entire population, assigning zero land holdings to
families without any land. According to Bates's hypothesis, it should be land inequality among
landowners-i.e., the standard land gini-that should have a positive effect, while overall land
gini should have no impact on economic outcomes. According to the Engerman-Sokoloff type
hypotheses and to economic models emphasizing the adverse effects of inequality, both of these
measures should have a negative effect on economic development. We find that when both mea-
sures are included together., it is inequality among landowners-the standard land gini-that
has a positive effect on subsequent economic outcomes, while the overall land gini has a small
negative and insignificant impact.
One question raised by our interpretation is the source of the difference between the results
we find in Cundinamarca and the patterns across US states in the 19th century, where land
inequality appears to be strongly negatively correlated with economic outcomes. We believe
that the answer to this question may lie in the differences in the level of political development
between the United States and Colombia. Like 20th century Africa, Colombia in both the
19th and 20th centuries can be characterized, in the terminology of Acemoglu, Robinson and
Verdier (2004), as "weakly institutionalized" in the sense that political institutions placed few
constraints on what actions politicians could take. Bates' insight was that in such circumstances
land inequality may be associated with better outcomes because, at least when landed elites
are distinct from politicians, such elites can check the power of politicians. In the central
areas of Cundinamarca, where landed elites were more consolidated and land inequality higher,
they were able to constrain politicians. In consequence political concentration was lower. In
more peripheral areas of the department, it was easier for politicians to consolidate their hold on
power since there was no strong economic elite to counterbalance their power. When unchecked,
politicians were less accountable and, as we show, were able to accumulate large amounts of
land and wealth. The resulting political economy also appears to have involved a severe lack of
public good provision. In contrast, the relationship between inequality and economic outcomes
appears to be different in strongly institutionalized environments such as the United States.
Here, political institutions place certain constrains on politicians so that having a strong landed
elite is not necessary as a check against politicians and does not necessarily create a tendency for
better outcomes. Rather, and possibly consistent with the US evidence, in such environments
greater inequality may have negative economic or political consequences (for example, in the
extreme via "political capture," as in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006b, or Acemoglu, Ticchi
and Vindigni, 2006). This description is broadly consistent with the situation in the US South.
Landed elites in the Southern US, both in the pre and post-bellum periods, tended to have more
say in politics and were able to use their power strategically to generate rents for themselves, by
creating a low-wage, low-skill labor market and by underinvesting in education so as to make
the plantation labor force easier to control and less mobile (Wright, 1986, Margo, 1990).
Therefore, the overall pattern that emerges from this interpretation is one that can be
summarized schematically as follows:12
high economic low economic
inequality Examples inequality Examples
weakly
institutionalized
polities
strongly
institutionalized
polities
Our final set of results also provide support for the interpretation presented above. We
exploit the micro data on land holdings and the identity of politicians to investigate the inecha-
nism via which political inequality might be affecting economic outcomes. In particular, we use
linear and quantile regressions to document that those with political power are able to increase
12 Our discussion and the schematic summary above represent the US South as "strongly institutionalized".
An alternative is to view the US South, just as the 19th-century Colombia, as weakly institutionalized. In
this case, the outcomes in the US South are the intermediate outcomes generated by highly unequal weakly-
institutionalized polities, which are inferior to those arising in strongly-institutionalized polities such as the US
North. This alternative perspective is consistent with all the results we present in this paper and with our general
interpretation, though we believe that the power of the Federal State in the United States in the 19th century
put certain real restrictions on politics in the South and justifies our schematic representation of the South as
strongly institutionalized.
better property Kenya worse property Ghana
rights Central rights Peripheral
Cundinamarca Cundinamarca
captured Southern US competitive Northern US
politics politics
the value of their land holdings much more rapidly than others. In particular, an individual
who remains a politician for four years triples the value of his landholdings relative to other
landowners. This is a very large effect, suggesting that politicians are able to use their posi-
tion in order to increase their wealth substantially. These results illustrate a direct mechanism
through which political power played an important role in the allocation of economic resources
in 19th-century Cundinamarca.13 Finally, consistent with these results, we also find that those
with political power seem to be significantly more likely to acquire additional land than the
likelihood of those with land to become politicians.
Overall, even though what we present in this paper are historical correlations (not neces-
sarily estimates of causal effects or structural parameters), they are both challenging to the
conventional wisdom and paint a picture very different from those obtained from cross-country
studies and from the within-US variation shown in Figures 1 and 2. At least for Cundinamarca
(and as we will show below, for Colombia as a whole), there is no evidence that greater land
inequality is associated with bad economic outcomes. On the contrary, greater land inequality
more than 120 years ago has a positive predictive power for economic outcomes today, even after
controlling for current land inequality and a variety of geographic controls. In contrast, greater
monopolization of political power in the hands of particular families or individuals during the
19th century seems to be robustly associated with worse outcomes today.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 3.2 we describe the historical and institutional
setting of Cundinamarca and some of the relevant literature. Section 3.3 describes the historical
and contemporary data we use in this paper and introduces the measures of land gini, political
concentration and overlap. Section 3.4 compares land inequality in Cundinamarca to inequality
in US states around the same time. In Section 3.5 we examine the correlations between these
variables and long-run outcomes in 1993 and 1937. Sections 3.6 and 3.7 examine the dynamics
of wealth accumulation and political office holding. Section 3.8 concludes.
1
"A number of caveats are once again important to note. First, unobserved heterogeneity in the talents of
different individuals might be responsible for some of these results. Second, our regressions are not informative
about whether this process of political power leading to economic wealth is efficient or inefficient.
3.2 The Setting
In this section, we provide some relevant background information about the history and insti-
tutions of Cundinamarca and Colombia and discuss in more detail the relationship between our
work and the relevant historical and social scientific literatures. The modern department of
Cundinamarca14 was the heart of the Muisca civilization at the time of the conquest of Colom-
bia and the capital of Colombia, BogotA, is located in the middle of the department. Since the
greatest density of indigenous peoples were in Cundinamarca and the neighboring department
of BoyacA, Spanish colonial institutions originated here and the first grants of encomienda, the
institution which allocated the labor and tribute of indigenous peoples to conquistadors, were
given by the conquistador Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada in this region beginning in 1538.13
Subsequently large haciendas emerged in Cundinamarca and throughout the colonial period
the department remained at the heart of state and society in the Spanish province of New
Grenada.16 This situation persisted after independence with BogotA remaining the capital and
in the period we study Cundinamarca was clearly at the heart of national politics and the home
of a great deal of the most important sections of the political elite.17
From at least the 1850 presidential election onwards political conflict in Colombia coalesced
around two parties, the Conservatives and Liberals. In 1850 the Liberals won the presidency
for the first time and Jos6 Hilario L6pez became president. From then until 1885 the Liberals
controlled the central state except for a brief period after 1856 when they lost a presidential
election to the Conservatives held under universal male suffrage (Bushnell, 1971). The Liberals
shortly afterwards reclaimed control through a brief civil war and wrote a new liberal consti-
tution at Rionegro in 1863.18 The Rionegro constitution was highly federal and the right to
determine who could vote was delegated to the states.
In 1885 there was another civil war between the parties and power switched to the Conserv-
"The name for the department stems from an Indian phrase Kundur marqa which means the "Condor's nest."
" The best overview of the colonial period are Colmenares (1973), Melo (1996) and the early chapters of Safford
and Palacios (2001).
"Some narrative information on the emergence of haciendas in central Cundinamarca is in Pardo Uniaia
(1946) and Villamarin (1975).
"Key Conservative Presidents such as Miguel Antonio Caro (President between 1894-1898) and Jose Manuel
Marroquin (President 1900-1904), both of whom appear in the 1890 catastro, lived their entire life on the Sabana
de Bogota, the intermontane plane on which Bogota sits.
"8The best overviews of politics in this period are Delpar (1981), Park (1985).
atives until 1930. This period, known as the Regeneracion (Regeneration) led to the re-writing
of the constitution and an undoing of many of the policies promoted by the Liberals. In par-
ticular, federalism was abolished and power was centralized to the national state. There were
also important changes in economic policies, for example a significant increase in tariffs and
a general movement away from free trade." The Liberal election victory of 1930 led to the
introduction of universal male suffrage in 1936 and the introduction of more progressive social
and labor market policies but led to increasing political polarization between the parties which
culminated in the victory of Conservative Mariano Ospina in 1946 followed by a partisan civil
war (the so-called La Violencia) which led to a military coup in 1953. The parties negotiated
a return to democracy in 1958.
There are many interpretations of long-run development in Colombia from various perspec-
tives. The 19th century Liberal politicians and intellectuals, such as Manuel Murillo Toro,
Salvador Camacho Rolddn, Jose Maria Samper and Miguel Samper, wrote extensively on eco-
nomic matters and promoted a version of classic 19th-century liberalism as the way to modernize
and develop the country. Vestiges of the colonial system were one of the main things they criti-
cized. During the Liberal period between 1850 and 1885 tariffs were cut, monopolies abolished,
the remnants of colonial institutions such as slavery finally destroyed, and Church lands were
expropriated. However, the Liberal period also generated significant economic and political
instability, and McGreevey (1970) argues that there was a notable increase in inequality dur-
ing this era. Despite transitory booms it was only with the sustained expansion of the coffee
economy from the 1880s onwards that economic growth began in Colombia. Growth has been
sustained but slow ever since, and after 1900 Colombia has remained at about 18% of US GDP
per-capita (Robinson and Urrutia, 2007). The development of the coffee industry was linked
most famously to a frontier expansion into the current states of Caldas, Risaralda and Quindfo
which is typically characterized as rather egalitarian by Latin American standards (the classic
work is by Parsons, 1949).
For our focus, the institutions governing the selection of mayors and their powers are es-
sential. During the Liberal period mayors were appointed by the departmental governors who
"For overviews of the politics of this period see McGreevey (1970), Bergquist (1978), Posada-Carb6 (1997) or
Nazzuca and Robinson (2006).
were themselves elected. After 1885 and the centralization of power, governors still appointed
mayors but were themselves appointed by the president of the Republic. Municipal councilors
were elected throughout the entire period. The centralized appointment of mayors was only
abandoned in 1986. Before 1885 the governor of Cundinamarca was a LiberalN except for a
brief period in 1867 when a Conservative, Ignacio Gutierrez was elected, only to be replaced
with a Liberal by the federal government in 1868 (Delpar, 1981, p. 96). After 1880 the governor
was a more moderate Liberal from the camp of President Rafael Nifiez (called Independents)
and by the time of Nfiez's second presidency after 1884 Independents were cooperating with
Conservatives in the department (Park, 1985, p. 250). Under the Political and Municipal Code
of 1858 (Estado de Cundinamarca, 1859) mayors were appointed each year along with a substi-
tute and the term of the mayor was six months after which he was replaced by the substitute
for six months. Article 130 of the code says "At the end of each term, the substitute becomes
the mayor and executes the functions in the next period; only in extraordinary cases there will
be a new appointment of the mayor, since in ordinary cases the only appointment that can take
place is the one for the substitute each semester." In practice, however, repeated terms for the
same mayor were common. For example, in Suesca, Rafael Olaya was mayor continually from
1871 to 1883 (Olaya was also the fifth largest landowner in the municipality with land worth
24,000 pesos in 1879 when then mean value of land in the municipality was 1,429 pesos). After
1885, the law was changed so that the term of a mayor became one year and mayors could be
officially reappointed (Estado de Cundinamarca, 1889, Article 227).
In terms of the power and responsibilities of the mayor, Article 127 of the 1858 code says
that "The mayor is the highest figure of the public administration in the District, and as the
representative of the Executive Power he is in charge of the execution of the laws in the District."
Mayors were in charge of raising property taxes ('rents') to fund schools and Article 298 of the
1858 code states that there "Is an obligation for every city, village or parish to maintain a
public primary school for boys and another one for girls." Taxes were also supposed to pay for
the police and public works such as the maintenance of roads and bridges. Mayors therefore
had a large number of tasks with respect to the enforcement of laws and the provision of public
2('Even though the period before 1885 was dominated at the national level by Liberals, Conservatives controlled
the states of Antioquia and Tolima.
goods arid Cruz Santos (1965, Volume I, p. 519) estimates that in 1869-1870 about 23% of total
government expenditures were decided at the municipal level.
One of the most important parts of the mayors' responsibilities from the point of view of
this paper was his role in adjudicating land disputes. During the 19th century large areas of
government owned land, or baldios, were distributed to individuals in Colombia and there were
constant disputes over the title to lands. Although the right to "regulate the distribution or
destiny of uncultivated lands" was delegated to the municipal councils, the secondary literature
on this makes it very clear that mayors played a pivotal role in determining the outcome of these
conflicts, probably because they were in charge of the police. Palacios' (1980) seminal work on
the evolution of the coffee economy in Colombia has an extensive discussion of the allocation of
land and property rights noting that "local control of power was the sine qua non in this process
of distribution" (p. 186). Although national laws gave "squatters" the chance to file for title in
government lands if no other previous title existed, the reality was that many were expropriated
by those who controlled the instruments of local political power. LeGrand (1986, p. 73) notes
"By their compliance with or disregard of legal prescriptions, municipal authorities shaped the
expression and resolution of the public land conflicts. Given their strategic position in the
bureaucratic hierarchy, they also played a significant role in interpreting the issues involved in
any given dispute to authorities at higher levels." Mayors and local police were the people who
evicted squatters and supported or denied claims to land ownership. Both Palacios (1980, pp.
185-195) and LeGrand illustrate this with many stories. For instance, LeGrand describes the
typical way in which squatters would be forced to recognize the title of the politically powerful:
"Once entrepreneurs had established property rights over the land, whether through grants or
by illegal means, they then took action to deprive the settlers living there of their independence.
Accompanied by the local mayor or a police patrol, they informed the settlers who had opened
the land that they had mistakenly occupied private property" (p. 58).
Who were these mayors? Christie (1979, p. 50) in his study of local political bosses-
gamonales (also known as caciques) -argues "Only sometimes were they the largest landown-
ers," and LeGrand (1986, p. 73) asserts "Large landowners, for the most part, declined to
occupy local political posts." One interesting source on these matters is Rufino Gutierrez who
in his capacity as Prefect visited many municipalities of Cundinamarca in 1886 and 1887 and
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subsequently wrote a memoir (Gutierrez, 1920).21 Gutierrez (pp. 90-91) points out that few
mayors were important landowners, but instead tended to be from small landowners. He argues
that the major landowners used their influence to get mayors appointed who would favor their
interests (see also Deas, 1971, on local politics). These conclusions are consistent with the
general historiography on Colombia which, following Safford (1972, 1974), has played down the
political role of large landowners. Though Colombia did have land-owning caudillos like Jos6
Maria Obando and Tomas Mosquera, this literature claims that, by and large, politics was a ca-
reer in 19th-century Colombia and attracted people from all backgrounds (see also Uribe-Uran,
2000). Our empirical findings are partially consistent with this view. We find that there were
many non-land-owning mayors (often using their powers to enrich themselves), though there
was also some overlap between landowners and politicians. Indeed in a number of municipali-
ties, there were close links between the largest landowners and local politics. In addition to the
case of Suesca discussed above, in Fomeque the largest landowner, Manuel Pardo Rojas (land
valued at 20,020 pesos in 1879 when the mean land value of landholdings in the municipality
was 989 pesos) was mayor six times. In Une, Simon Rojas (land holding of 3,500 pesos when
the mean was 883 pesos) was mayor ten times between 1873 and 1883. There are many other
examples of mayors belonging to the top quintile of the land distribution.
Moreover, as Christie (1979, 1986) himself showed, elite families were heavily involved in
local politics. Christie, in his re-examination of the nature of frontier expansion in 19th century
Colombia, compiled a list of the mayors and members of the local councils of all the munici-
palities of Viejo Caldas up until 1905. Using documents on the history of Manizales and other
municipalities, Christie was able to determine the 27 most prestigious families who were also
owners of great land concessions in the region. Matching the official posts with the last names
of these families, he estimated that during the period between 1827 and 1905 more than 2,500
out of the 3,500 positions available were occupied by members of these families. When doing
the same exercise but for the year 1920 this time, Christie found that 75% of the mayors came
from the same families.
2 Article 115 of the 1858 Municipal Code states that "The Prefect, as political representative of the Executive
Power, is in charge of the Political administration of the Department and the Corregidores and Alcaldes are
subject to him," Article 116 continues that the Prefect will "visit all the Districts of the Department once in a
year and find out if the laws have been implemented and enforce them for a better execution."
What do we know about the process by which mayors were appointed? Though we do not
have direct evidence on this, the most likely process that drove the appointments is that gover-
nors had to respect local power structures and local gamonales and caciques. Neither the central
state nor the department of Cundinamarca had military forces that were sufficient to intervene
effectively in local politics and in practice it was probably impossible to overturn local power
structures, even had there been an incentive. Evidence supporting this interpretation comes
from the dramatic shift in power with the Regeneracion in 1885 in which the Conservatives
replaced the Liberals at the national level (see Mazzuca and Robinson, 2006). Even though at
the national level the Conservatives drove the Liberals out of the legislature to such an extent
that in the 1890s there was only one Liberal, Rafael Uribe Uribe, in the legislature, in most
municipalities the same mayors were appointed before and after the Regeneraci6n. Additional
evidence consistent with this pattern comes from the Memorias of Gutierrez. Guti6rrez records
that he was called urgently to visit Choachi and found that the public administration was in
a terrible shape. He notes that "the person that by that time was the Mayor, Mr. Patrocinio
Pardo, did not satisfy the position, for several justified reasons, we demanded his resignation
and appointed his substitute Mr. Pedro Angel Garcia" (p. 51). Though Guti6rrez may have
removed Patrocinio Pardo, he was back as mayor in 1890, 1891 and 1893, and had previously
been mayor in 1878 and 1881. Pedro Angel Garcia (who was in the top quintile of the land
distribution with land of 2,180 pesos when the municipal average was 874 pesos) served as
mayor nine times between 1871 and 1891 and several other members of the Pardo and Garcia
families did as well. The fact that Patrocinio Pardo could be removed for incompetence but
was quickly re-appointed is consistent with the interpretation that the governor, who made the
appointments, had to recognize the power of local elites. The situation appears to have been
similar in Suesca. Rafael Olaya was removed from the office of mayor in 1873 for manipulating
adhesiones- endorsements or declarations of support for different political candidates (Delpar,
1981, p. 102). But our data show that he was immediately re-appointed. Another interesting
example comes from Deas' (1977) study of the Hacienda Santa Bdrbara in Sasaima. Though
he points out that Sasaima was and is a Conservative municipality (p. 286), the first person
appointed mayor after the Regeneracion was Felipe Castellanos with Esteban Garcia as his
alternate. Yet both of these people had been appointed in the Liberal period, Castellanos as
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mayor in 1879 and 1883 and Garcia in 1880. The probable interpretation of this is that even
Liberals had to appoint Conservative mayors in Sasaima.
Finally, the degree of political concentration in Cundinamarca, which we will exploit and
document further below, is illustrated by a few prominent examples. For instance, in Viani, out
of 44 mayors who held office, half of them corresponded to only 4 individuals and 25 out of the
44 came from either the Bonilla or Hernandez family. In Arbelaez, the Rodriguez family was
in power in every single year for which we have data on. With the exception of 1888, Ramon
Rodriguez was the mayor in every year between 1887 and 1895. In Quipile, only 3 individuals
account for 20 of the 44 mayor appointments that were recorded. Francisco Escobar was the
mayor during 1880-1884 and Genaro Mendieta from 1888-1895. In La Calera, a municipality
founded by Don Pedro de Tovar in 1765, half of the mayor appointments came from the Tovar
family which was in power every year during the 1875-1895 period (except in 1889). In Guasca,
almost 70% of the 51 mayor appointments came from only 3 families and the Acosta and
Rodriguez controlled power during most of the period. Similarly, most of Cucunubi's mayors
came from the G6mez family, which was in power during 1875-1881 and 1887-1895. Today,
much of Cucunubi is owned by Pedro G6mez. These are only a few examples that illustrate
the way in which power was concentrated in the hands of a few families and individuals in many
municipalities.
3.3 The Data
3.3.1 Cadastral Data and the Land Gini
Our basic source of data on economic inequality in 19th century Cundinamarca are the cadastral
(land census) data collected by the state of Cundinamarca in 1879 and 1890.22 The cadastral
information was collected by State officials for tax purposes and provides information on the
location, owners and value of every plot with value above $25 Colombian pesos in 1879 and above
$100 in 1890. The censoring values for each land census are low, so that we have information for
2 2 Cundinamarca also undertook such catastros in 1868 and in 1915. Unfortunately we have been unable to
locate these data, possibly because the State archive of Cundinamarca was burned down in April 1948 in the
rioting which followed the assassination of the Liberal politician Jorge Eliseer Gaitan, though see Camacho
Roldan (1892) for a discussion of the 1868 data. The departments of Tolima and Santander also conducted
several catastros in the 19th century but we have also been unable to find these data.
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most plots. In 1879, there are 15,478 landowners in Cundinamarca and this number increases to
18,598 in 1890. We have no real information about the reliability of this data though Camacho
Rolddn (1892) praises the 1868 data as being accurate. Guti6rrez (1920) noted in his visit to
Usme in 1886 that the value of lands for that municipality in the catastro was low relative to
his own expectations, but he does not systematically record views on this for all the places he
visited.
We will construct two measures of land inequality. The first is the standard measure of the
land gini coefficient, which measures land inequality among landowners. For each municipality
at each date, we construct the gini coefficient using the standard formula
1 12  n
i=1 j=1
where i = 1,..., n denotes the total number of land owners at time t, yi,t is the value of land
nt
owned by individual i at time t, and and n = yi, is the average value of land at time t.
i=1
Throughout most of our analysis, we average the gini coefficients across the two dates for each
municipality to arrive to our main measure of (average) land gini. The average gini over this
entire period was 0.65 (see Table 1 below). If we look at the two land censuses separately, we
find that the land gini was 0.64 in 1879 and increased slightly to 0.66 in 1890.23
Despite its widespread use, the land gini suffers from an obvious problem. An area in which
all land is held by two very large landowners will have a low value of the land gini, because
land is equally distributed among landowners. But if we looked at the population as a whole,
there would be tremendous amount of land inequality. To alleviate this problem, we construct
an alternative measure, overall land gini, which again computes equation (3.1), but uses the
total number of families and assigns zero land holdings to the families who do not appear in
the catastro.2 1 We start our analysis with the land gini and then show how controlling for both
2
:There were however, striking cases of land inequality such as those of Fontib6n, formerly the site of the
encomienda of Jimenez de Quesada, which had a gini coefficient of 0.857 in 1879 and Ricaurte with a gini
coefficient of 0.891 in 1890.
2 Since the 19th century censuses do not provide information on the number of families or households, but
only on the number of individuals, we used the estimate of 10 members per family provided by Gomez (1969) to
convert the number of individuals in a municipality into the number of families. We then calculated the number
of landless families by subtracting the total number of landowners from the total number of families.
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the land gini (among landowners) and overall land gini affects the results.2 5
In Figure 5, we superimpose the distribution of the land gini on a map of Cundinamarca.
This figure is useful both to show the geographic structure of Cundinamarca and the distribution
of municipalities, and also depicts the variation in land inequality. Darker colors in the figure
correspond to higher values of the land gini (as indicated in the legend to the figure). The
picture reveals that land inequality tends to be higher in the series of intermontane basins to
the west and north of Bogota, but it is also high in the far western municipalities which are
down in the valley of the Magdalena river.
3.3.2 Political Concentration
To measure political inequality, we collected data on politician (mayor) names from the Registro
del Estado and Gaceta de Cundinamarca, official newspapers which published the names of
principal and substitute mayors appointed in each municipality. We were able to find a total
of 4763 mayor appointments between 1875 and 1895.2 Each appointment however, does not
correspond necessarily to a different individual, for the same individuals were sometimes re-
appointed in many years. Hence, the 4763 different appointments we collected correspond to
2300 different individuals during this period. A striking fact is the large number of mayors.
While in principle, two mayors (principal and substitute) should be appointed per year in each
municipality, an average of 2.9 appointments per municipality was observed. This is because
there are resignations and replacements in some years.
We used these data to construct a measure of the concentration of political power. Our
measure of political concentration for municipality m at time t is computed as:
Number of Different Individuals in Powermt
Pint : - Number of mayor appointmentsmt
The negative sign in front is introduced so that higher values of the index correspond to higher
political concentration (thus making the interpretation of the coefficients easier). Consequently,
2 We are only able to compute the overall land gini for Cundinamarca at the end of the 19th century. We do
not have micro data for Cundinamarca or the rest of Colombia today, thus the contemporary land gini numbers
we use below are for inequality among landowners.
2
6 Information was not reported for every single municipality in every year, but there does not appear to be
any systematic bias in this.
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our political concentration index takes a value of -1 when there is very low political concen-
tration, and values close to 0 for high levels of concentration. We computed this index for the
whole period 1875-1895. Table 1 shows that the mean of this variable is -0.56.
Figure 6 is similar to Figure 5 and maps political concentration across the municipalities of
Cundinamarca. Now darker colors correspond to higher levels of political concentration. This
figure shows that places with higher levels of political concentration are spread out all over the
state. They range from municipalities like Beltran in the Magdalena river valley in the west,
to Ubala which is on the eastern slopes of the cordillera. Also highly concentrated are the
southern coffee growing municipality of Arbelaez, founded in the mid 19th century, and the
northern municipality of Sutatausa, an area of dense Muisca settlement and one of the first
municipalities to be founded in Cundinamarca.
3.3.3 Measuring the Overlap of Wealth and Political Power
In addition to our basic measures of economic and political inequality, we constructed a measure
of the overlap between political officeholding and landed wealth. To do this we classified the
individuals in our sample according to whether they were politicians, rich, or both. We define
an individual as being both rich and a politician if we can find an exact match of the first
and last name in the catastro and in the list of mayors within each municipality. Naturally,
this procedure may lead to an overstatement of overlap if we match two different persons with
the same first and last name, though this appears to be unlikely within a municipality. On
the other hand, there are various reasons for understating overlap, since rich landowners may
be politicians in neighboring municipalities or they may have substantial political influence
without becoming mayor's themselves.
To construct our measure of overlap, let us introduce some notation. Let Nmt be the
set of adult males living in municipality m at time t, Lmt be the set of adult males without
any substantial landholdings or political power, Rmt be the rich, i.e. those with substantial
landholdings and finally let Pt be those with political power (mayors). It is clear that:
Nmt = Lit U Rmt U PUt.
Let #Rmt be the number of individuals in the set Rmt, and define #Nmt, #Pmt, # (Rmt U Pmt)
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and #Lmt similarly. Since we can directly compute #Pmt and #Rmt, and observe #Nmt, the
number of individuals who are neither rich nor politicians can be computed as
#Lmt = #Nmt - # (Rmt U Pmt).
For the purposes of our analysis, we define individuals whose land plots are in the top 25%
most valuable plots as "rich landowners". In these calculations, we compute the thresholds
for the entire region (and not for each municipality separately) so as to exploit the variation
in the presence of big landowners driven by inequality across regions which we want to take
into account.2 7 In calculating the number of rich landowners in each municipality, we use the
catastros for 1879 and 1890. For politicians, we use neighboring dates to these, so that for 1879,
any individual who is a mayor between 1877 and 1882 is considered a politician, and for 1890,
we look at the window from 1888 to 1892.
Our measure of overlap in municipality m at time t is computed as
# (Rmt n Pnt)
U-# (Rt U P 
.&
Our main measure of overlap is the average of this index for the two dates 1879 and 1890. Table
1 shows that the mean of this variable is 0.07, so that 7% of rich landowners and politicians
were both rich and in power.
3.3.4 Data on Outcomes
We have two sets of outcome variables. The contemporary data are from the 1993 population
census and the Colombian statistical agency DANE (Departamento Administrativo Nacional
de Estadistica).
We constructed two basic education variables from the 1993 census; primary school enroll-
ment which was calculated as the number of children attending school that are between 7 and
11 years old divided by the total number of children that are between 7 and 11 years old in
2 7 We have also computed an alternative measure where individuals whose land plots are in the top 50% most
valuable plots are counted as "rich landowners," with very similar results. We do not report these results to save
space.
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the municipality; and secondary school enrollment defined as the number of children attending
school that are between 12 and 17 years old divided by the total number of children that are
between 12 and 17 years old in the municipality. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that
there is much more variation across municipalities in secondary school enrollment, motivating
our focus on this measure (though we will also show results using primary school enrollment).
Figure 7 is similar to Figures 5 and 6 and maps the secondary enrollment data across the
Cundinamarca municipalities. Darker colors now indicate higher enrollment. It is evident from
this figure that enrollment is higher closer to Bogota and particularly on the Sabana de Bogota.
We also used the 1993 census to construct a measure of urbanization, defined as the propor-
tion of the population in urban areas. The census reports urban population for each municipality
so we simply divided this by the total population of the municipality. Each municipality has
one urban area, the cabecera where the municipal government buildings are located (other sub-
districts of the municipality are called veredas) so urban population is the population of the
cabecera.
Finally, the 1993 census also provides an index of poverty, referred to as unsatisfied ba-
sic needs (which has the Spanish acronym NBI-Necesidades Basicas Insatisfechas) and used
commonly in Colombia and in other Latin American countries. In this index, a household is
counted as having unsatisfied basic needs if it meets any one of five different criteria. These are
(1) inadequate dwelling, such as the floor is composed of soil or the house is made of precarious
building materials. (2) The household's dwelling lacks basic services, such as piped water, sew-
ers or toilets. (3) The household is overcrowded which is defined to be one where the number of
people per bedroom is greater than 3. (4) The household is characterized by inadequate school
attendance which is indicated by a child between 7 and 11 years old who does not attend school.
(5) The household has high economic dependence, meaning that the head of the household has
less than fourth grade education and has more than three dependents. The indicator we use is
the proportion of households in a municipality with unsatisfied basic needs.
For the medium-term outcomes, we used data from the 1937 population census. While there
are no data on educational enrollment in this census, we can measure the proportion of adults
who were literate. We also calculated urbanization in 1937 in exactly the same way as we did in
1993. Finally, the 1937 census also records for each municipality the total number of buildings
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and also the number of buildings which lack access to electricity, water and sewage. We therefore
constructed the fraction of buildings without access to all public services by combining these
two pieces of information, which provides us with a measure of non-educational public good
provision.
We use a variety of exogenous control variables in the regressions in order to ensure that our
results are not driven by omitted differences in the quality or productivity of land. Our controls
include altitude of the municipality (in meters above sea level), the distance of the municipality
to Bogota (in kilometers), area (in squared kilometers), average rainfall (in millimeters). All
of these data were obtained from Instituto Geografico Agustin Codazzi in Bogota. Distance
to Bogota may be particularly important, since Figure 5 suggests that there are a number of
municipalities near Bogota that have relatively high land inequality. We check the robustness
of our results to including high degree polynomials in distance to Bogota that would capture
any non-linear effect of this variable.
Finally, we also control for the year of foundation of a municipality (from Bernard and
Zambrano, 1993). While the highlands of Cundinamarca were settled in the 16th century,
much of the lower Western and Eastern slopes were only settled in the mid 19th century in a
process of frontier expansion. This frontier expansion was associated with the spread of the
coffee economy (see Rivas, 1946, or Palacios, 1980, for discussion) and the determination of
property rights in land and the nature of the societies that formed in the 19th century may be
quite different from those founded during the colonial period (see Jim6nez, 1985, for a detailed
treatment of one such municipality, Viota). We include the foundation date in some of our
regressions to control for this source of omitted variable bias.
3.3.5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our entire sample and also for subsamples created ac-
cording to land gini and political concentration (both average values over the two dates and
the subsamples were created by dividing the sample according to median values). A number
of features are notable in this table. First, the land gini at the end of the 19th century was
quite high, 0.65. Moreover, it still continues to be very high today (third row). The standard
deviation of this variable indicates that there is considerable variation in the extent of land
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inequality within Cundinamarca. The same applies to the extent of political inequality. Also,
as noted above, the outcome variables also show considerable variation, except primary school
enrollment, which is very high in most municipalities, thus exhibits less variation than the other
outcome variables.
Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics by dividing the sample into low and high land
inequality areas (columns 2 and 3) and into low and high political concentration areas (columns 4
and 5). The comparison of columns 2 and 3 shows that all economic outcomes are better in high
land inequality areas. For example, secondary school enrollment is 65% in high land inequality
areas, whereas low land inequality areas have only 52% secondary school enrollment. In contrast,
when we turn to political concentration, low political concentration areas have better economic
outcomes. For example, secondary school enrollment is 60% in low political concentration
areas and 56% in high political concentration areas. These differences are consistent with the
patterns shown in Figures 3 and 4, and the regression analysis will show that these differences
are relatively robust to controlling for a variety of geographic and other controls.
Table 2 describes our data further by showing the correlation matrix among our main
historical explanatory variables, the land gini at the end of the 19th century, the overall land
gini at the end of the 19th century, the contemporary land gini, the political concentration
index and the overlap variable, as well as our main outcome variables. This table shows that
there is a negative correlation between political and economic inequality, which is the opposite
of the pattern that appears in the 19th-century US (where political inequality also appears to be
higher in the more unequal South). This contrast between the US and Cundinamarca confirms
the discussion in the Introduction. In any case, the correlation between the two variables is not
very large (correlation coefficient -0.25), giving us an opportunity to determine the separate
correlation between political and economic inequality and economic outcomes. Overlap is even
less correlated with these two variables.
The outcome variables are also correlated with each other, though not very highly so. For
example, the correlation between urbanization and primary school enrollment is only 0.23. This
implies that there is independent information in all of these outcome variables, and considerable
independent variation in our basic inequality variables.
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3.4 The Inequality of Wealth: Cundinamarca and the United
States
As discussed in the Introduction, a recently-emerging consensus relates the current differences in
economic outcomes between the United States and South America to 19th-century differences in
inequality (especially land inequality). Was land more unequally distributed in Cundinamarca
than in the United States in the 19th century? In this section, we will see that the answer to this
question is more nuanced than typically presumed. Cundinamarca appears to be substantially
more unequal than the Northern United States, but more equal than the US South.
To provide a comparison of land inequality between Cundinamarca and the United States
in the 19th century, we compare our land inequality data (described above) with US microdata
from the 1860 land census provided in the Gallman-Parker and Bateman-Foust samples. These
data, which are downloadable from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR) website, comprise two famous random samples taken from the 1860 census.
The Gallman-Parker sample contains variables recorded for 5,228 farms located in the major
cotton-producing counties of the South (see, e.g., Schaefer and Schmitz, 1985, Schmitz and
Schaefer, 1986). The farms were selected from the 1860 manuscript census schedules by a
sample of all farms in 405 Southern counties which each produced over 1,000 bales of cotton
in 1860. This resulted in a 1.67 percent sample of all farms in the major cotton-growing
counties of the eleven states of the Confederacy. We use the data on the value of the farms
in dollars. The Bateman-Foust sample (see Bateman and Foust, 1974) contains demographic,
occupational, and economic information for over 21,000 rural households in the northern US.
The data were obtained from the agricultural and population schedules of the 1860 census and
cover all households in a single township from each of 102 randomly-selected counties in sixteen
northern states. We again use the data on the dollar value of farms. Together these datasets
give us a picture of land distribution in both the northern and southern US in 1860.
Our calculations using these samples are reported in Table 3. In particular, we compute
the land gini for individual states and for the North, the South and the entire United States.
The picture that emerges from the comparison of the numbers in Table 3 to those in Table 1 is
interesting. As expected, Northern US states are considerably more equal than Cundinamarca.
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For example, Connecticut has the lowest land gini of 0.34, compared to the land gini of 0.65 in
Cundinamarca. However, contrary to the widespread notion that Latin America is substantially
more unequal than the United States, all Southern states, except Florida, Georgia and the
Carolinas, are more unequal than Cundinamarca. For example, the land gini in Louisiana is
0.83, considerably higher than that of Cundinamarca. The average land gini in the South is
0.72, which is also greater than the gini for Cundinamarca, 0.65.
3.5 Inequality and Long-Run Development in Cundinamarca
We now examine the consequences of wealth inequality, political concentration and overlap for
long-run development outcomes. To do this we exploit the cross-sectional variation within the
municipalities in Cundinamarca. Throughout the section, we estimate cross-sectional ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions of the following form
Ym = agm + Pm + -Yom + X'm6 + Um, (3.2)
where ym is some measure of development in municipality m, xm is a vector of covariates
and um is an error term, capturing all other omitted factors, with E (um) = 0 for all m. In
(3.2) the main objects of interest are the coefficients on the land gini, denoted by gm, the
extent of political concentration, denoted by pm, and the degree of overlap, denoted by om, in
municipality m. We report regressions in which each of these variables features separately and
then together. We start by looking at the effect of these variables on contemporary outcomes
and then turn to their effect on 1937 outcomes. A key concern in all of these regressions is
omitted variable bias. For this reason, the vector xm will control for a rich set of covariates,
especially for measures of differences in land quality across municipalities.
3.5.1 Contemporary Outcomes
Tables 4 and 5 examine the relationship between our four contemporary outcome variables
and historical land inequality, political concentration and overlap. Panel A of Table 4 is for
secondary school enrollment, while Panel B is for primary enrollment. Column 1 shows the
bivariate relationship between land gini and secondary school enrollment without any other
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controls. There is a strong positive association, indicating that municipalities that were more
unequal at the end of the 19th century have higher levels of secondary school enrollment today.
This relationship in column 1 is the same as that shown in Figure 3 in the Introduction.
The coefficient estimate is equal to 0.61, and is highly significant with a standard error of
0.09. The R2 of this bivariate regression is 30%, indicating a large and significant correlation
between historical land inequality and secondary schooling. As a different way of gauging the
quantitative significance of this correlation, recall from Table 1 that the standard deviation of
land gini is 0.10 in the entire Cundinamarca. The coefficient estimate implies that we expect a
municipality with one standard deviation greater land gini than the mean to have approximately
0 .06 percentage points higher secondary school enrollment. Relative to the mean of this variable
in Cundinamarca, 0.58, this translates into a 10% increase, which is substantial.
The main threat to the interpretation of the relationship between land inequality and con-
temporary economic outcomes is that municipalities with greater inequality may have higher
quality lands or other sources of higher incomes. While we cannot control for all possible
sources of omitted variable bias, we can check the robustness of this correlation to a range of
geographic controls that should capture differences in land quality. Column 2 attempts to do
this by adding altitude, distance to Bogota, amount of rainfall, and also the historical variable,
the year of foundation of the municipality. After including these controls, there is still a posi-
tive association between the land gini and secondary schooling, though the coefficient is slightly
smaller now, 0.48 (standard error = 0.10).
Column 3 looks at relationship between the political concentration index and secondary
school enrollment. Here we see a statistically significant (though somewhat weaker) negative
relationship, corresponding to the pattern shown in Figure 4 in the Introduction. The coefficient
estimate, -0.36, is highly significant with a standard error of 0.11. The quantitative magnitude
of this effect is also somewhat smaller than the magnitude associated with the land gini; the
coefficient estimate implies that a municipality with a one standard deviation above the mean
political concentration index tends to have 3.6% lower secondary school enrollment in 1993.
Column 4 demonstrates that this relationship is robust to including geographic controls and
the magnitude of the effect is only slightly smaller, -0.35 (standard error = 0.10), than in column
3.
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Columns 5 and 6 show that there is a negative but not always significant relationship
between overlap and school enrollment. For example, without covariates, the relationship is
insignificant, and it becomes marginally significant at 5% when the geographic controls are
included.
Columns 7 and 8 look at the effect of land gini and the political concentration index when
they are included together. Both variables continue to be significant, and together with the
geographic controls they explain about 50% of the variation in secondary schooling across
Cundinamarca municipalities.
Finally, in columns 9 and 10, we add further controls in order to deal with potential omit-
ted variable concerns. Column 9 adds the contemporary land gini. Interestingly, this is also
significant and positive, but the historical land gini continues to be positive and significant
(coefficient = 0.28, standard error = 0 .11), while the political concentration index continues
to be negative and significant (coefficient= -0.22, standard error = 0.11).
Column 10 is the most demanding specification and adds a quartic in distance to Bogota
in order to flexibly control for differences in the quality of land plots that may be near Bogotd.
In this column we also control for the best proxy for differences in land quality across munic-
ipalities, the average land value per square kilometer from the land censuses. The quartic in
the distance to Bogota is useful since Figure 5 showed that land inequality is higher in many
of the municipalities that are near Bogota. Average land value is the market's perception of
differences in land quality at the end of the 19th century and should be a "sufficient statistic"
for these differences. Moreover, differences in average land value will also indirectly control for
differences in tax revenues across municipalities, a major source of revenue and thus of fiscal
capacity of municipalities. 2  The addition of these variables reduces the effect of the land gini
to 0.16 (standard error = 0.10), which is no longer significant at 5%, but the effect of political
concentration index remains unchanged and still significant at 5%.
One concern may be that Cundinamarca is atypical and some unobserved heterogeneity is
responsible for the positive relationship between land inequality and secondary school enroll-
2
"We do not have data on current land values or average income differences across municipalities. Even if we
had such data, it would not be appropriate to include these as controls in our regressions, since average income in
a municipality is partly an outcome of education and public good provision, which we are attempting to explain
with historical measures of economic and political inequality.
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ment. In fact, the results in Panel A of Table 4 show not only a positive relationship between
the historical land gini and secondary enrollments today, but also a positive association be-
tween contemporary land inequality and schooling. As a check for whether Cundinamarca is
atypical in terms of the relationship between land inequality and schooling, we looked at the
contemporaneous relationship between these two variables for all Colombian municipalities. 2 9
Figure 8 shows the relationship between land gini today (2002) and secondary school enrollment
in the whole Colombia.30 Consistent with the patterns for Cundinamarca, there is a positive
relationship, and in fact the magnitude of this relationship is very similar to that we find in
Cundinamarca. This gives us some confidence that the relationship within Cundinamarca is
not an aberration, and whatever factors are responsible for the positive association between
land inequality and education within Cundinamarca seem to be present when we look at the
whole of Colombia.
Panel B repeats the same regressions as in Panel A with primary school enrollment. The
overall pattern is the same, except that all of the variables are less significant than in Panel
A, and both land gini and the political concentration index are no longer significant in column
10 when all of the controls, including the contemporary land gini and the quartic in distance
to Bogota are included. These weaker results probably reflect the fact that, as noted above,
primary enrollment is already high in most municipalities.
Panel A of Table 5 looks at urbanization, which is a crude but useful proxy for overall
development in a municipality and to an index of poverty constructed from the national census
based on unsatisfied basic needs of a family as described in the data section. The results in this
table are broadly similar. There is a positive effect of the land gini on urbanization, though
this effect becomes insignificant in columns 9 and 10. The relationship between political con-
2 9We cannot look at the relationship between historical land gini and schooling for the whole of Colombia,
since the historical data on land distribution are only available for Cundinamarca.
"In particular, Figure 8 shows the relationship excluding "outliers," that is municipalities with the highest
2.5% and lowest 2.5% values for the land gini. The relationship is very similar without excluding these extreme
values, though the basic pattern in the figure is harder to see, The same results can be seen from simple regression
analysis. Within Cundinamarca, a regression of secondary school enrollments on contemporary land gini gives a
coefficient of 0.67 (standard error = 0.09). For the entire Colombia, the same regression leads to a coefficient of
0.57 (standard error = 0.04) without excluding municipalities with extreme values of the gini, and to a coefficient
of 0.63 (standard error =0.05) when these extreme values are dropped. The coefficients are very similar when
we include the standard geographic controls. In addition, including a full set of department (region) fixed effects
leaves the relationship between the land gini and secondary school enrollment essentially unchanged (coefficient
= 0.53, standard error = 0.04).
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centration and urbanization is also negative and significant, when we do not include additional
controls, but becomes insignificant in columns 9 and 10.
When we turn to our index of poverty in Panel B of Table 5, the results are more robust. In
all columns, there is a negative and significant relationship between the land gini and poverty
and a positive and significant relationship between the political concentration index and poverty.
In particular, even in column 10, where we control for a quartic in distance to Bogota and for
average land values, a higher land gini is associated with lower poverty and higher political
concentration is associated with significantly higher poverty.
Overall, we conclude that, contrary to the conventional wisdom about the nature of long-
run development in Latin America, there is no evidence that higher land inequality is related
to bad economic outcomes. On the contrary, in most of our specifications there is a positive
and significant relationship between land inequality and good economic outcomes. Instead,
there seems to be a fairly robust negative relationship between political inequality on the one
hand and education and poverty on the other. The results in Tables 4 and 5 also indicate that
the comparatively worse development in municipalities with lower land inequality and higher
political concentration might be working partly through lower provision of public goods, such
as schooling, in these areas.31
3.5.2 Medium-term Outcomes from the 1937 Census
We next turn to the effect of the land gini, political concentration and overlap from the late
19th century on medium-term (1937) outcomes. This exercise is interesting for a number of
reasons. First, looking at the 1937 outcomes is a useful robustness check on the results presented
in Tables 4 and 5. Second, the effect on medium-term outcomes might be informative about
3 We tried a number of different identification strategies to estimate the causal effect of political concentration
on development outcomes using instrumental variables. All of these tried to exploit the idea that political
concentration represented the legacy of the political monopoly of colonial elites. We first looked directly at the
colonial elite, that is, all of the Spaniards granted encomiendas in the 16th century and those working for the
colonial state in 1794, and matched their last names to the names of mayors at the end of the 19th century. Even
though there were a number of matches, this variable turned out not to have much predictive power for political
concentration. We then looked directly at where the grants of encomiendas were and at the density of tributary
Indian population in the 16th century, but we found these to be uncorrelated with political concentration. We
finally looked more generally at other measures of the colonial legacy such as the presence of the colonial state,
measured by the location of tax collectors or state monopolies. Again this turned out to be uncorrelated with
political concentration.
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the mechanisms through which economic and political inequality might be affecting economic
development.
The results with the 1937 outcomes are presented in Tables 6 and 7. In all cases, we
report regressions of the form (3.2) again, with the only difference that the different dependent
variables are now those that are available in the 1937 census.
Panel A of Table 7 examines the impact of the land gini, political concentration and overlap
on adult literacy. A greater land gini is associated with higher literacy in column 1, but this
relationship disappears once we control for the standard geographic covariates in column 2. In
contrast, there is a robust negative relationship between political concentration and literacy
with or without the covariates (shown in columns 3 and 4).
Columns 5 and 6 show that although the estimated coefficient on overlap is negative, it is not
statistically significant. Columns 7, 8 and 9 include the land gini and the political concentration
index together, and column 9 also includes the quartic in the distance to Bogota and our proxy
for differences in land quality, average land value. In all cases, there is no relationship between
literacy and the land gini, but there is a robust and statistically significant negative effect of
political concentration on literacy. Consequently, we conclude that the negative effect of higher
political inequality on medium-term educational outcomes is relatively robust.
Panel B of Table 6 examines urbanization in 1937. The results here are similar to those for
urbanization in 1993. The land gini has a significant positive coefficient. Political concentration
and overlap are also significant and have the same sign as in the other tables, though they
become less significant when entered together with the land gini. When all of these variables,
as well as the quartic in distance to Bogota and average land values, are included together in
columns 7, 8, and 9, the results become insignificant, though the quantitative effect of political
concentration index is similar to earlier columns.
Finally Table 7 looks at a direct measure of public good provision for 1937, the fraction
of buildings without access to public services. This variable is informative about whether the
effects of land inequality and political concentration might be working by affecting the extent of
public good provision in different municipalities. Column 1 shows that greater land inequality
is associated with better outcomes (greater access to public services). This effect remains
statistically significant when covariates are added in column 2, though the size of the coefficient
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falls by one half.
Columns 3 and 4 show that there is a negative relationship between political concentration
and public good provision in 1937 with or without covariates. In this case, the magnitude of the
coefficient is also relatively insensitive to whether or not covariates are included. Columns 5 and
6 then show that higher overlap is also significantly correlated with worse outcomes. However,
this effect is not robust to the inclusion of economic and political inequality. The effect of the
land gini continues to be negative and significant in columns 7 and 8, but not in column 9.
The coefficient on political concentration index remains similar even with the extended set of
controls, though because of the larger standard errors, it is only significant at 10%.
Overall, the results from the 1937 census are broadly consistent with the patterns for contem-
porary outcomes and indicate that municipalities with greater economic inequality fare better
in terms of economic outcomes and public good provision, while those with greater political
inequality do worse.
3.5.3 Corroborating the Mechanism
The results presented so far are the opposite of much of the recent literature on underdevel-
opment in Latin America and also inconsistent with the literature in economics emphasizing
the negative effects of inequality on economic growth working through either credit market
mechanisms or political economy. In the Introduction, we suggested a potential interpreta-
tion for these patterns based on Bates's (1981) seminal work on Africa. Bates showed how
greater land inequality in Kenya relative to Ghana led to better policies and outcomes, because
it prevented politicians from pursuing highly distortionary policies, leading to the collapse of
agricultural markets in many African countries. We argued that in weakly institutionalized
polities such as post-colonial Africa or 19th-century Colombia, economic inequality may be a
useful counterbalance against the unchecked power of political elites.
Is there any way to corroborating this story? In the next section, we will document that
politicians in Cundinamarca indeed appear to have used their political power to amass very
significant wealth. Another way of checking our story is to distinguish between the land gini
(land inequality among landowners) and the overall land gini (inequality among all families)
as described in Section 3.3. In Table 8 we repeat our main regressions including the land
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gini together with the overall land gini. We only show the specifications with the standard
geographic controls and the specification with the extended set of controls (quartic in distance
to Bogota and average land value). In all of the regressions, we drop the overlap measure, since
it is almost always insignificant and not central to this discussion. Panel A of the table shows
the long-term outcomes, while Panel B is for medium-term outcomes.
The overall picture that emerges is very interesting. In all cases, a higher land gini is
associated with better outcomes both in the long run and in the medium run. In contrast, overall
land inequality has the opposite sign, though it is typically insignificant. Political concentration
maintains its negative effect on long-run and medium-run outcomes and is typically significant.
Therefore, the results in this table suggest that what matters is not overall inequality or poverty
(as would be the case in models with credit market constraints), but the extent of inequality
among landowners. This is consistent with the interpretation that better economic outcomes
emerge when there exists a group of significant landowners that can counterbalance the effect
of politicians.
3.6 Political Power and Land Accumulation
The evidence presented so far established a range of interesting correlations between historical
variables and the economic development of different municipalities in Cundinamarca. While
we are unable to conclude that these correlations correspond to the causal effects of economic
and political inequality on economic development, they suggest some interesting patterns that
need to be investigated further. One possible area of study is to see whether various first-
order mechanisms via which political power might affect economic outcomes are present. In
particular, is it the case that individuals with greater political power are able to use this for
their own economic benefit?
The data suggests that both for 1879 and 1890 landowners with political power have on
average more valuable land plots than non-politician landowners. For 1879, landholdings of a
non-politician landowner were worth $1770 on average while the average was $3022 for landown-
ing politicians. The corresponding figures for 1890 are $2915 and $5726 respectively. The same
pattern applies when we look at the percentage change in land value between the two catastros.
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While the value of land for non-politician landowners increased on average 99% between 1879
and 1890, plots for politicians increased, on average, 209%.32
More interesting than this cross-sectional comparison would be to investigate whether politi-
cians increased their land holdings (or the value of their land) more than other landowners and
by how much. We are able to do this by using our micro data. In particular, we restrict the
sample to landowners that were present in both censuses and investigate whether those that
have held political power saw the value of their lands increase. We measure the extent of po-
litical power by the number of years that an individual was in power between 1879 and 1890
(thus creating a continuous measure of political power). We denote this measure by nm, the
number of years that individual i was in power in municipality m. We start with the simple
OLS regression of the form
Avmi = Anmi + x/mp + emi, (3.3)
where the dependent variable Avmi is the percentage change in the value of land held by
landowner i in municipality m. The coefficient of interest is A, which measures the relationship
between the number of years the politician has been in power, nj and the change in land value.
Once again xm refers to a vector of control variables, all of them defined at the municipality
level (since we do not observe any individual characteristics). Also Emi is an error term with
the usual properties.
The results of this exercise are reported in the first three columns of Table 9. The first
column does not include any geographic controls. The second column includes the standard
geographic controls, while the third column also adds a full set of municipality fixed effects (so
that identification comes only by comparing politicians and landowners within each municipal-
ity). Panel A of this table reports the results of this regression on a balanced panel consisting of
6391 individuals that were landowners both in 1879 and in 1890. When we include geographic
controls, the sample is down to 6156 landowners. Columns 1-3 show that one more year in
power is associated with approximately 50% higher land values, which is a very large effect.
The estimates in all three columns are highly statistically significant. This estimate suggests
that an individual that remains in power for four years increases the value of his land holdings
2 Since we do not have a price index for this period, all of these changes are nominal.
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by 200% relative to other landowners. This is truly a large effect and shows how important
political power appears to have been in 19th century Cundinamarca.
Panel B of Table 9, on the other hand, focuses on within-politician variation, and restricts the
sample to a balanced panel of individuals that were landowners in both states and a politician
at some date in-between. This leaves us with a sample of 560 individuals, out of which 32
are lost when we restrict the sample to municipalities for which we have all the geographic
controls. In this case again, there is a positive association between number of years in power
and the change in land value in both columns, though this relationship is now only significant
at 10%. While the relationship is slightly imprecise, the magnitude of the effect continues to
be large. An additional year in power is associated with an additional increase in land value of
29 percentage points.3 3
The effect of political power on land values may be different for different politicians. For
example, some politicians may be more corrupt than others, or some politicians may focus their
energy in self-enrichment in other spheres of economic life. To investigate this issue we estimate
standard quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). In particular, we report regressions
from the quantile regressions of the form:
Avmi = A(-r)nmi + x'mP(r) + Emi (-r), (3.4)
where T refers to the quantile in question. This regression estimates a separate vector of
coefficients, A(T) and pt(-r), for each quantile, indicating how political power has different effects
depending on the (residual) distribution of changes in land value of the politician. Given the
moderate number of observations we have (approximately 6000 in Panel A and only 528 in
Panel B), we look at non-extreme quantiles, 0.15, 0.25, ..., 0.85.
Consistent with our expectations, we find much larger effects of political power on land
value changes at higher quantiles. For example, in Panel A, while the effect at the median is
0.27 (standard error= 0 .02), the effect at the 75th percentile is 0.65 (standard error =0.04)
and at the 85th percentile it is even significantly larger, 1.02 (standard error = 0.0.7). These
In some sense, the difference in the magnitudes between the two Panels corresponds to the difference in
"intensive" and "extensive" margins. Panel B only exploits the intensive margin, the within-politician variation,
and thus has a lower effect of an additional year in power on land values, whereas Panel A includes the sum of
the intensive and extensive margins.
results are also plotted in Figure 9, which shows the monotonically increasing effect as we look
at higher quantiles. The results in Panel B confirm the same pattern.
Our interpretation of these is that those with political power are able to amass greater
economic wealth, either by acquiring more land or by increasing the value of their land, and
this effect is especially pronounced when we look at heterogeneity among landowners. Naturally,
these micro-data regressions do not establish causality either, and part of the effect may reflect
unobserved heterogeneity (for example, those with greater ability being selected into politics and
also able to increase the value of their lands). Nevertheless, we find these results encouraging for
hypotheses emphasizing the importance of political power and political inequality. In addition,
we believe these results are very consistent with the idea that in places where their power was
not checked by landed elites, politicians were able to use their power in socially inefficient ways,
possibly by expropriating land and or by targeting public services, such as roads, to increase
the value of the land they held.
3.7 The Dynamics of Wealth and Political Power
As a final check on the relationship between political power and economic wealth, we also
investigate whether politicians are likely to become landowners and how this compares to the
likelihood of economically wealthy individuals becoming politicians. In particular, let rit C
{0, 1} be an indicator for whether individual i is a rich landowner at time t, while pit E {0, 1}
is an indicator for whether individual is a politician at time t. We also use p' = 1 to denote
an individual who is a politician but not a rich landowner at time t, and rt = 1 to denote a
rich landowner at time t who is not a politician. Finally, lit = 1 denotes an individual who is
neither a rich landowner nor a politician.
We are interested in the likelihood that a politician who was not a rich landowner becomes
a rich landowner, which can be expressed as Pr [ritt1 lp']. However, rather than looking at this
conditional probability, it is more natural and informative to normalize this with the probability
that an individual who is neither a politician or a rich landowner becomes a rich landowner,
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Pr [rit+dlit. Consequently, the first measure of interest is
Pr [frit I Ip' ]iPr [rit+ lit]
Our main interest is to compare this ratio to the likelihood that a rich landowner who was not
a politician initially became a politician, which is defined similarly as
Pr [pit~l r']
Pr [pit+d lit])
Finally, we can also look at
Pr rati Ir]it] and r pit+Ip'1
Pr [rit+d lit] Pr [Pit+d lit]
to measure persistence in the landowning and political status again for comparison. 4
Table 10 shows 2x2 matrices of these ratios for Cundinamarca and for the nine provinces
(which are made up of the municipalities we studied until now). We compute the standard
errors for these ratios by bootstrapping.3 5 The results in Table 10 show that in Cundinamarca
as a whole and in eight out of the nine provinces, the probability of transitioning from being a
politician to landowner is greater than the probability of transitioning from being a landowner
to a politician (in both cases normalized by the probability of transition of a non-landowner
non-politician). Moreover, this difference is statistically significant (at 5% or less) for the whole
of Cundinamarca and for the four larger provinces. This finding is also consistent with our
interpretation that political power is important in obtaining economic rents and resources. In
contrast, there seems to be a smaller role of wealth in enabling individuals to become politicians.
This pattern therefore strengthens our overall conclusion that a more systematic study of the
consequences of political power and of political inequality on economic outcomes and economic
development is necessary.36
:"There are naturally many other ratios of conditional probabilities we can look at, for example,
Pr [rit+d ri] and Pr [rit+ 1pit]
Pr [rit±i lli] Pr [rit+11it]
but the four that we focus on are sufficiently informative for our purposes.
3The standard errors were computed via non-parametric bootstrapping with 500 replications.
"6 One caveat is that when we look at individuals that are both landowners and politicians in 1879, they have
the highest probability of (still) being a landowner or remaining a politician in 1890.
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3.8 Conclusions
What is the effect of economic inequality on long-run economic development? This question
is central for many theories of comparative development and has gained further attention by
recent emphasis from Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and others that the roots of the different
economic performances of the north and south of the American continent are in their different
levels of economic inequality in the 19th century. Most existing investigations of this question
look at cross-country data (or cross-state and cross-village data) and do not distinguish between
economic and political inequality. However, many theories suggest that economic inequality is
likely to lead to political inequality, so that political power should be concentrated in the hands
of those who are rich, while other equally plausible theories suggest that political inequality, the
concentration of political power in the hands of a few, is likely to lead to economic inequality
as the politically-powerful use politics to become richer. Consequently, we expect the Latin
American societies in the 19th century not only to be economically more unequal, but also to
feature greater levels of concentration of political power in the hands of a few. Nevertheless,
neither existing theoretical discussions nor existing empirical studies distinguish the potentially
different roles of economic and political inequality. Understanding whether it is economic or
political inequality that matters for economic development is important both to understand
the mechanics of long-run development and also because outside of the Americas, there are
instances of societies with relatively equal distributions of economic resources but high degrees
of political inequality (e.g., many countries in the sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia).
In this paper, we used unique data from 19th century Colombia to undertake a first inves-
tigation of the relative and potentially distinct roles of economic and political inequality on
long-run development. Using land censuses (catastros) from 1879 and 1890, we constructed
measures of land inequality (land gini) and we collected information on the identity of mayors
in each of the municipalities in Cundinamarca from which we constructed an index of political
concentration.
Our data indeed confirm that Cundinamarca is more unequal than the Northern United
States in the 19th century. However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we find that Cundina-
marca is more equal than the US South. Even more surprising, we find that across Cundina-
marca municipalities there is a negative association between political and economic inequality.
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Though perhaps political inequality can be conceptualized and measured in other ways, what
we find certainly suggests the conventional wisdom is too simplistic. Moreover, and again very
differently from the recently-emerging consensus about the sources of comparative development
within the Americas, we find a positive association between economic (land) inequality and
long-run development. Municipalities with greater land inequality are those that supply more
public goods and are more educated and urbanized today. In contrast, we find a relatively robust
negative relationship between political inequality and economic outcomes. We also showed that
politically powerful individuals appear to have been much more likely to become landowners
and to have increased the value of their lands substantially.
Our interpretation of these results is that in weakly institutionalized polities, such as 19th-
century and 20th-century Colombia, economic inequality may be a useful counterbalance against
the most rapacious policies that may be pursued by political elites. This interpretation is
consistent both with the negative effect of political concentration (inequality) on long and
medium-term outcomes in Cundinamarca, with the evidence presented by Bates (1981) for
Africa, and with the additional results we presented above, suggesting that it is inequality
among landowners, not overall inequality, that has the positive effect on various economic
outcomes. Although this interpretation is consistent with our findings and plausible in view of
the experiences of other countries with weakly institutionalized polities, it is very different from
the conventional wisdom in the studies of underdevelopment in Latin America and from the
conclusions of the recent economic literature focusing on the effects of inequality on economic
growth. Nevertheless, our results do not provide a direct test of this interpretation and whether
this perspective is useful for understanding the relationship between inequality and economic
growth and the development path of Latin America remains an open research question.
It should also be emphasized that all of the results presented in this paper, striking though
they may be, are historical correlations. While we control for a variety of geographic factors
and other municipality characteristics, we cannot be sure that these associations correspond to
the causal effect of land inequality and political concentration on long-run economic develop-
ment. Nevertheless, given the robustness and the magnitudes of these patterns, they call for
more nuanced theories of comparative development. At the very least, theories that empha-
size the importance of economic inequality should be able to explain these robust correlations.
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Therefore, irrespective of whether the correlations presented here have a causal component and
of whether the interpretation we offer is the correct explanation of the patterns observed in
Cundinamarca, the evidence strongly suggests that in addition to the emphasis on economic
inequality, there should be more research to understand the effects of politics and political
inequality on economic outcomes in comparative development.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
All
Municipalities
(1)
Land Gini
Overall Land Gini
Contemporary Land Gini
Political Concentration Index
Overlap
Secondary School
Enrollment
Primary School Enrollment
Urbanization (1993)
Unsatisfied Basic Needs
Literacy Rate
Urbanization (1937)
Share of Buildings without
Access to Public Services
Distance to Bogota
Values are averages with standard deviations in parentheses Land Gin is the average land value gini coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from the
caasitros Overall Land Gist is the average land value gini coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from thecatasiros taking into account landless
families (see text for details) Political Concentration Index measured as the negative of the number of different individuals in power between 1875 and
1895 over number of mayor appointments for which data is available Overlap is measured as fraction of rich landowners and politicians that are both
landowners and politicians (average for 1879 and 1890) Contemporary Land Gini corresponds to gini coefficient of land value for 2002 constructed from
IGAC catastros Secondary School Enrollment is constructed from the 1993 Census as fraction of kids between 12 and 17 years old attending school
Primary School Enrollment also constructed from the 1993 Census as fraction of kids between 7 and I I years old attending school Unsatisfied Basic Needs
constructed from the 1993 Census as fraction of households with unfulfilled basic needs (see text for details)
Urbanization figures constructed from the corresponding year censuses as fraction of total population leaving in urban areas Literacy Rate constructed from
the 1937 Census as number of literate individuals over total population Fraction of Buildings without Access to Public Services also constructed from 1937
Census as number of buildings without access to electricity, water and sewage Distance to Bogota is measured in kms Column I reports figures for all
municipalities Column 2 reports figure for the 49 municipalities with land gini below its median value while column 3 reports figures for the 49
municipalities with land gini above its median value Column 4 reports figures for the 56 municipalities with Political Concentration Index below its median
value and column 5 reports figures for the 56 municipalities with Political Concentration Index above its median value
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0.65
(0.10)
0.86
0.07
0.67
(0.09)
-0.56
(0.10)
0.07
(0.04)
0.58
(0.11)
0.83
(0.06)
0.31
(0.23)
0.40
(0.14)
0.40
(0.12)
0.17
(0.18)
0.91
(0.12)
88.23
(45.00)
Low Land
Inequality
(2)
0.57
(0.06)
0.83
0.07
0.63
(0.07)
-0.53
(0.08)
0.07
(0.04)
0.52
(0.09)
0.83
(0.05)
0.22
(0.13)
0.44
(0.13)
0.40
(0.12)
0.12
(0.10)
0.95
(0.07)
93.49
(38.74)
High Land
Inequality
(3)
0.73
(0.05)
0.90
0.05
0.73
(0.08)
-0.57
(0.10)
0.06
(0.04)
0.65
(0.09)
0.86
(0.07)
0.41
(0.28)
0.33
(0.11)
0.41
(0.10)
0.20
(0.18)
0.88
(0.13)
77.96
(48.35)
Low Political
Concentration
(4)
0.66
(0.09)
0.86
0.07
0.69
(0.09)
-0.64
(0.06)
0.05
(0.03)
0.60
(0.11)
0.84
(0.08)
0.35
(0.26)
0.37
(0.14)
0.42
(0.13)
0.20
(0.22)
0.88
(0.16)
85.84
(44.28)
High Political
Concentration
(5)
0.65
(0.10)
0.87
0.07
0.66
(0.09)
-0.48
(0.06)
0.08
(0.04)
0.56
(0.10)
0.84
(0.05)
0.26
(0.20)
0.42
(0.14)
0.38
(0.10)
0.14
(0.13)
0.94
(0.08)
90.53
(46.01)
Table 2
Correlation Matrix
Political Secondary Unsatisfied
Overall Land Contemporary Land Concentration School Urbanization Basic
Land Gini Gini Gini Index Overlap Enrollment (1993) Needs
Land Gini 1.00
Overall Land Gini 0.48 1.00
Contemporary Land Gini 0.60 0.23 1.00
Political Concentration Index -0.25 -0.05 -0.26 1.00
Overlap -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.43 1.00
Secondary School Enrollment 0.54 0.16 0.56 -0.30 -0.09 1.00
Urbanization (1993) 0.47 0.11 0.59 -0.30 -0.10 0.64 1.00
Unsatisfied Basic Needs -0.56 0.09 -0.49 0.37 -0.03 -0.67 -0.47 1.00
Land Gini is the average land value gini coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from the catastros. Overall Land Gini is the average land value gini coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from the
catastros taking into account landless families (see text for details). Contemporary Land Gini corresponds to gini coefficient of land value for 2002 constructed from IGAC catastros. Political Concentration
Index measured as the negative of the number of different individuals in power between 1875 and 1895 over number of mayor appointments for which data is available. Overlap is measured as fraction of rich
landowners and politicians that are both landowners and politicians (average for 1879 and 1890). Secondary School Enrollment is constructed from the 1993 Census as fraction of kids between 12 and 17 years
old attending school. Urbanization constructed from the 1993 census as fraction of total population leaving in urban areas. Unsatisfied Basic Needs constructed from the 1993 Census as fraction of households
with unfulfilled basic needs (see text for details).
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State
Panel A. Northern States
Connecticut
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Vermont
Wisconsin
Total Northern States
Panel B. Southern States
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Total Southern States
Total U.S. States
0.73
0.70
0.60
0.63
0.83
0.69
0.60
0.63
0.75
0.70
0.71
0.72
0.58
Land Inequalit
Land Gini
0.34
0.50
0.47
0.48
0.41
0.49
0.55
0.55
0.52
0.35
0.35
0.42
0.38
0.47
0.43
0.44
0.47
1,005
434
65
818
225
707
391
524
465
551
42
5,055
25,876
3,223
3,048
2,162
3,459
18,197
4,491
2,548
4,293
5,986
3,340
3,555
4,514
3,333
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The land ginis for the US south and north were constructed from the complete 'Gallman-Parker and Bateman-Foust
samples, respectively, from the micro data of 1860 US 'census.
Table 3
y in U.S. States (1860)
No. Observations
259
1,563
5,020
825
623
534
1,516
379
1,180
807
362
4,043
851
2,465
147
544
20,821
Average Land Value
3,421
2,659
2,534
2,066
1,702
2,097
1,544
983
1,745
1,860
5,274
3,888
3,381
3,722
3,327
1,748
2,820
Table 4
OLS Regressions for Long Term Oucomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable: Secondary School EnrollmentPanel A
Land Gini 0.61
(0.09)
Political Concentration Index
Overlap
0.48
(0.10)
-0.36 -0.35
(0.11) (0.10)
-0.27
(0.29)
-0.43
(0.24)
0.44 0.44
(0.09) (0.09)
-0.27 -0.27
(0.10) (0.11)
-0.01
(0.23)
Contemporary Land Gini
0.28 0.16
(0.11) (0.10)
-0.22 -0.22
(0.11) (0.11)
-0.07 -0.13
(0.19) (0.19)
0.38 0.37
(0.13) (0.11)
Geographic Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Extended
Observations 92 92 94 93 93 93 92 92 92 92
R-squared 0.30 0.45 0.09 0.37 0.01 0.32 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.61
Panel B Dependent Variable: Primary School Enrollment
Land Gini 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.05
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Political Concentration Index -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Overlap 0.04 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.12
(0.16) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Contemporary Land Gini -0.04 0.00
(0.07) (0.06)
Geographic Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Extended
Observations 92 92 94 93 93 93 92 92 92 92
R-squared 0.09 0.52 0.01 0.51 0.00 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.60
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Secondary School Enrollment is constructed from the 1993 Census as fraction of kids between 12 and 17 years old attending school. Primary School Enrollment also
constructed from the 1993 Census as fraction of kids between 7 and I1 years old attending school. Land Gini is the average land value gini coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from the catastros.
Political Concentration Index measured as the negative of the number of different individuals in power between 1875 and 1895 over number of mayor appointments for which data is available. Overlap is
measured as fraction of rich landowners and politicians that are both rich landowners and politicians (average for 1879 and 1890). Rich Landowners are defined as those with landholdings among the top 25%
most valuable plots. Contemporary Land Gini corresponds to gini coefficient of land value for 2002 constructed from IGAC catastros . Geographic controls include Altitude (in mts above sea level), Distance
to Bogota (in kms), Area (in sq. kms), Rainfall (in mms) and Year of Foundation. A quartic in distance to Bogota and land value per square km (average for 1879 and 1890) are included in Column 10.
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Table 5
OL S Regressions for Long Term Oucomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DependentPanel A
Land Gini 1.11
(0.23)
Political Concentration Index
Overlap
Contemporary Land Gini
(6) (7) (8) (9) (1U)
Variable: Urbanizatio
0.79
(0.21)
-0.77 -0.57
(0.26) (0.27)
-0.65 -1.07
(0.66) (0.55)
n in 1993
0.71 0.71
(0.21) (0.20)
-0.44 -0.33
(0.29) (0.32)
-0.51
(0.65)
0.21 0.06
(0.23) (0.23)
-0.15 -0.26
(0.28) (0.27)
-0.73 -0.32
(0.56) (0.46)
1.23 0.97
(0.28) (0.28)
Geographic Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Extended
Observations 92 92 94 93 93 93 92 92 92 92
R-squared 0.22 0.36 0.09 0.31 0.01 0.30 0.38 0.39 0.50 0.6
Panel B Dependent Variable: Unsatisfied Basic Needs
Land Gini -0.72 -0.49 -0.44 -0.44 -0.35 -0.21
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Political Concentration Index 0.51 0.36 0.28 0.41 0.38 0.33
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Overlap -0.11 -0.03 -0.62 -0.58 -0.6
(0.35) (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24)
Contemporary Land Gini -0.23 -0.33
(0.13) (0.14)
Geographic Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Extended
Observations 92 92 94 93 93 93 92 92 92 92
R-squared 0.31 0.57 0.14 0.51 0.00 0.45 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.69
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Urbanization constructed from the 1993 census as fraction of population living in urban areas. Unsatisfied Basic Needs constructed from the 1993 Census as fraction of
households with unfulfilled basic needs (see text for details). Land Gini is the average land value gini coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from the catastros . Political Concentration Index measured as
the negative of the number of different individuals in power between 1875 and 1895 over number of mayor appointments for which data is available. Overlap is measured as fraction of rich landowners and
politicians that are both rich landowners and politicians (average for 1879 and 1890). Rich Landowners are defined as those with landholdings among the top 25% most valuable plots. Contemporary Land
Gini corresponds to gini coefficient of land value for 2002 constructed from IGAC carastros. Geographic controls include Altitude (in mts above sea level). Distance to Bogota (in kms), Area (in sq. kms),
Rainfall (in mrns) and Year of Foundation A quartic in distance to Bogota and land value per square km (average for 1879 and 1890) are included in Column 10.
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OLS Regressio sfor Loniz Term Oucomes
OLS Regressions
Table 6
for Medium Term Oucomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A Dependent Variable: Literacy Rate in 1937
Land Gini 0.27 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.00
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
Political Concentration Index -0.31 -0.27 -0.27 -0.30 -0.29
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Overlap -0.16 -0.19 0.17 0.21
(0.31) (0.28) (0.29) (0.34)
Geographic Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Extended
Observations 97 91 99 92 98 92 91 91 91
R-squared 0.05 0.26 0.06 0.30 0.00 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.31
Panel B Dependent Variable: Urbanization in 1937
Land Gini 0.42 0.31 0.24 0.24 -0.02
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15)
Political Concentration Index -0.43 -0.47 -0.42 -0.37 -0.32
(0.20) (0.24) (0.25) (0.27) (0.31)
Overlap -0.67 -0.73 -0.24 0.16
(0.37) (0.40) (0.39) (0.36)
Geographic Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Extended
Observations 98 92 100 93 99 93 92 92 92
R-squared 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.35
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Literacy Rate constructed from the 1937 Census as number of literate individuals over total population. Urbanization constructed from 1937 Census as fraction of
population living in urban areas. Land Gini is the average land value gini coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from the catastros. Political Concentration Index measured as the negative of the
number of different individuals in power between 1875 and 1895 over number of mayor appointments for which data is available. Overlap is measured as fraction of nch landowners and politicians that are
both landowners and politicians (average for 1879 and 1890). Rich Landowners are defined as those with landholdings among the top 25% most valuable plots. Geographic controls include Altitude (in mts
above sea level), Distance to Bogota (in kms), Area (in sq. kms), Rainfall (in mms) and Year of Foundation. A quartic in distance to Bogota and land value per square km (average for 1879 and 1890) are
included in Column 9.
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Table 7
OLS Regressions for Medium Term Oucomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A Dependent Variable: Fraction of Buildings without Access to Public Services
Land Gini -0.41 -0.23 -0.17 -0.16 -0.03
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Political Concentration Index 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.35
(0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.23)
Overlap 0.55 0.61 0.17 -0.07
(0.26) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21)
Geographic Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Extended
Observations 97 91 98 92 98 92 91 91 91
R-squared 0.13 0.25 0.16 0.33 0.03 0.26 0.36 0.36 0.44
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fraction of Buildings without Access to Public Services constructed from the 1937 Census as number of buildings without access to electricity, water and sewage.
Land Gini is the average land value gini coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from the calastros. Political Concentration Index measured as the negative of the number of different individuals in
power between 1875 and 1895 over number of mayor appointments for which data is available. Overlap is measured as fraction of rich landowners and politicians that are both landowners and politicians
(average for 1879 and 1890) Rich Landowners are defined as those with landholdings among the top 25% most valuable plots. Geographic controls include Altitude (in mts above sea level), Distance to
Bogota (in kms), Area (in sq. kms), Rainfall (in mms) and Year of Foundation. A quartic in distance to Bogota and land value per square km (average for 1879 and 1890) are included in Column 9.
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Table 8
OLS Regressions for Long and Medium Term Oucomes
Panel A: Long Term Outcomes
Land Gini
Overall Land Gini
Political Concentration Index
Contemporary Land Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable:
Secondary School
Enrollment
0.30
(0.13)
-0.03
(0.13)
-0.23
(0.09)
0.37
(0.13)
0.14
(0.12)
0.04
(0.15)
-0.24
(0.10)
0.37
(0.11)
Primary School
Enrollment
0.20
(0.07)
-0.19
(0.08)
-0.07
(0.05)
-0.05
(0.07)
0.13
(0.07)
-0.15
(0.07)
-0.06
(0.05)
-0.02
(0.06)
Urbanization
(1993)
0.26
(0.28)
-0.07
(0.28)
-0.31
(0.25)
1.19
(0.29)
0.07
(0.31)
-0.02
(0.29)
-0.32
(0.26)
0.95
(0.27)
Unsatisfied Basic
Needs
-0.50 -0.34
(0.16) (0.16)
0.34 0.23
(0.17) (0.17)
0.25 0.22
(0.10) (0.11)
-0.22 -0.33
(0.14) (0.14)
Geographic Controls Yes Extended Yes Extended Yes Extended Yes Extended
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
R-squared 0.54 0.60 0.55 0.61 0.49 0.60 0.64 0.67
Panel B: Medium Term Outcomes Dependent Variable:
Urbanization Lack of Public
Literacy Rate (1937) Services
Land Gini 0.22 0.22 0.43 0.14 -0.28 -0.11
(0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.24) (0.08) (0.14)
Overall Land Gini 
-0.41 -0.41 -0.43 -0.30 0.25 0.16
(0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.28) (0.14) (0.18)
Political Concentration Index -0.26 -0.27 -0.41 -0.30 0.38 0.34
(0.12) (0.14) (0.24) (0.27) (0.17) (0.20)
Geographic Controls Yes Extended Yes Extended Yes Extended
Observations 91 91 92 92 91 91
R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.36 0.38 0.45
Robust standard errors in parentheses Land Gini is the average land value gini coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from the cata.stros Overall Land Gini is the average land value gini
coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from the catastros taking into account landless families (see text for details) Political Concentration Index measured as the negative of the number
of different individuals in power between 1875 and 1895 over number of mayor appointments for which data is available Contemporary Land Gini corresponds to gini coefficient of land
value for 2002 constructed from IGAC catastros Secondary School Enrollment is constructed from the 1993 Census as fraction of kids between 12 and 17 years old attending school Primary
School Enrollment also constructed from the 1993 Census as fraction of kids between 7 and I I years old attending school Unsatisfied Basic Needs constructed from the 1993 Census as
fraction of households with unfulfilled basic needs (see text for details)
Urbanization figures constructed from the corresponding year censuses as fraction of total population leaving in urban areas Literacy Rate constructed from the 1937 Census as number of
literate individuals over total population Lack of Public Services is fraction of buildings without zccess to public services constructed from 1937 Census as number of buildings without
access to electricity, water and sewage. Geographic controls include Altitude (in mts above sea level), Distance to Bogota (in kms), Area (in sq. kms), Rainfall (in mms) and Year of
Foundation Extended Geographic controls include the former plus a quartic in distance to Bogota and land value per square km (average for 1879 and 1890)
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Table 9
OLS and Quantile Regressions for % Change in Land Value
Panel A: Balanced Sample for all landowners. Dependent Variable is % Change in Land Value between 1879 and 1890
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Quantile Regression
OLS Regressions Quantiles
0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85
Number of years in power between 0.50 0.47 0.42 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.44 0.65 1.02
1879-1890 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Geographic Controls No Yes Extended Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6391 6156 6156 6156 6156 6156 6156 6156 6156 6156 6156 6156
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Panel B: Balanced Sample for Landowning Politicians. Dependent Variable is % Change in Land Value between 1879 and 1890
Quantile Regression
OLS Regressions Quantiles
0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85
Number of years in power between 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.48 0.53
1879-1890 (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.22)
Geographic Controls No Yes Extended Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 528
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Standard Errors in parentheses. The sample in Panel A consists of individuals that appeared as landowners both in 1879 and 1890 in the same municipality. The sample in Panel B consists of individuals that appeared
as landowners both in 1879 and 1890 and were politicians in any given year between 1879 and 1890. Geographic controls include Altitude (in mts above sea level), Distance to Bogota (in kms), Area (in sq kms),
Rainfall (in mms) and Year of Foundation. Extended controls in column 3 include geographic controls and municipality dummies.
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Table 10
Conditional Probability Ratios
(b) Choconta
Ratios r|
Pr r 1 e] 13.58 4.54
Pr r+l 1///] (1.61) (1.26)
Pr p , I. 1.98 15.66
Pr[p,,+i I/) (0.89) (4.06)
(c) Facatativa
Ratios r,| pi
Prlr,, 1 .] 35.44 16.28
Pr r , (4.43) (4.66)
Pr p1 1 i] 21.34 50.02
Pr p / ) (11l.78) (32.16)
(e) Guatativa
Ratios r| p
Pr r,1 e1 76.04 23.11
Prlr,+ ]J (13.25) (7.86)
Prp,,i 1  . 20.28 41.71
Pr p 1 (9.64) (22.75)
(g) Tequendama
Ratios r| pi
Pr r * 34.97 7.33
Prlr I (4.28) (2.46)
Pr[p1 1 * 2.58 27.56
Pr[ P 11 1 (1.16) (7.47)
(i) Zipaquira
Ratios r|| p
Pr r+l .] 32.95 18.01
Prl,+ r / (3.g81) (4.53)
Pr[p,, .] 6.35 53.22
Pr[p,,+ /1 (2.36) (18.75)
Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parentheses
Ratios r p
Prr+ . ] 80.70 22.94
Pr r | / I/ (15.98) (10.52)
Pr pt~i I e 14.74 33.52
Pr_ 
_ 
p 
_/ (7.19) (18.87)
(d) Guaduas
Ratios r|
Prlr . 71.33 23.77
Pr r / ) (1 1.37) (6.68)
Pr[ .]+* 9.38 40.43
Pr p, /,I (3.52) (12.58)
(f) Oriente
Ratios r|| p
Prr,, ] 45.25 17.05
Prr 1 (8.47) (7.07)
Pr[ ]+ 5.93 36.85
Pr[Pu+i I ]It (2.61) (15.65)
(h) Ubate
Ratios r p
Pr r,, e 39.60 22.63
Pr[r 1 +1 I/J (6.13) (5.93)
Prp,,+1  s 7.80 30.15
PrAp,+ ]/J (3.62) (15.05)
(j) Cundinamarca
Ratios r
Pr r 0) 39.19 14.55
Pr r,+ /la] (1.86) (1.41)
Pr[Pa+ 1 *p 6.48 34.48
Pr[P,,+ I / } (0.87) (4.25)
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(a) Bogota
Figurel
Land Gini and School Enrollment in the U.S.
(1870)
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The land ginis for the US south and north were constructed from the complete Gallman-Parker and Bateman-Foust samples, respectively, from the micro data of
1860 US census. School enrollment constructed from the 1870 Census as Number of persons attending school over population between 5 and 18 years old.
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Land Gini and School Enrollment in the U.S.
(1950)
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The land ginis for the US south and north were constructed from the complete Gallman-Parker and Bateman-Foust samples, respectively, from the micro data of
1860 US census. School enrollment constructed from the 1950 Census as Number of persons between 5 and 18 years old attending school over total population
between 5 and 18 years old. 138
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School Enrollment in Cundinamarca
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Land gini is the average gini coefficient for 1879 and 1890 constructed from the catastros. Secondary School Enrollment constructed from the 1993 Census as
fraction of kids between 12 and 18 years old attending school. 13 9
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Political Concentration and Secondary School Enrollment in Cundinamarca
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Figure 5
Land Gini in Cundinamarca
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Figure 6
Political Concentration Index in Cundinamarca
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1895, over the number of mayor appointments for which data is available.
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Figure 7
Secondary School Enrollment in Cundinamarca
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Figure 8
Contemporary Land Inequality and Secondary School Enrollment in Colombia
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old attending school.
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Figure 9
Land Accumulation and Political Power: Quantile Regressions
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